

dossier 57

**MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN**

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28  
TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

**ONTVANGEN  
CODEBERICHT**

DATUM VAN ONTVANGST:

26 juni 1979

BESTEMD VOOR:

min. van b.z.

REFERENTIE No: 14414	KOPIE No 1
Dir./Afd.: <i>DAW/ATWJ</i>	
Visie	
Ag. No: <i>101055</i>	
Dossier: <i>B13.339.2</i>	

DATUM VAN AFZENDING:

26 juni 1979

AFKOMSTIG VAN:

*i s l a m a b a d*

PARAAAF/OPM.:

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

onderwerp : pakistæn nucleair.

heb van verschillende zijden alhier vernomen dat installatie u.c. fabriek (vrijwel) voltooid zou zijn. infrastructuur is gereed en naar wordt verondersteld is benodigde materiaal voorhanden. niet bekend is of alle technische problemen zijn opgelost en, zo ja, of installatie al in bedrijf is.

installatie zou zich bevinden te kahuta, ongeveer 40 km ten oosten van islamabad, en wordt officieel aangeduid als armywork shopbase.

van der kroon 54 ++

AFGESCHRIJVEN:

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

KOPIE:  
gs  
m r t s  
dgpz dges  
dgis  
chef drw  
hfd drw/at  
chef dpn  
chef dio  
hfd dio/ov } pers  
hfd dio/pi }  
jura (mr. m. g.)

Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijz. bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.  
4. Doelsters, welke codeber. bevatten dienen veilig te worden opge.

2. Afchriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

1. Op een codeber. mag teleg. niet in open taal v. geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

REFERENTIE No: 14415	KOPIE No: 1
Dir./Afd.: <b>DRW/AT</b>	
Visie	
Ag. No: <b>101054</b>	
Dossier: <b>815.339.2 Pakistan</b>	

**MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN**

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

**ONTVANGEN  
CODEBERICHT**

DATUM VAN ONTVANGST:

26 juni 1979

BESTEMD VOOR:

min. van b.z.

DATUM VAN AFZENDING:

26 juni 1979

KOPIE:

gs  
m r t s  
dgpz dgis  
dges  
chef drw  
chef dpn  
hfd drw/at  
chef dio  
hfd dio/ov) pers  
hfd dio/pi) pers  
jura (mr'.m'.g'.)

AFKOMSTIG VAN:

i s l a m a b a d

PARAAF/OPM.:

*HWJ*

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

onderwerp : u.c. pakistan.

r u c 24. ✓

ontvang gaarne bericht omtrent beantwoording kamervragen.

van der kroon 55 ++

*[Handwritten signature]*

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

1. Op een codeber. mag teleg. niet in open taal worden beantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar: da. bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.

4. Dossiers, welke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

# MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

Redacteur: *Hand*

Datum: *27/6*

Par. Medeparaaf en datum:

Vastgesteld	dat. <i>27/6</i>
-------------	------------------

Visie na verzending:

MINUUT

- |         |         |
|---------|---------|
| 1. .... | 4. .... |
| 2. .... | 5. .... |
| 3. .... | 6. .... |

~~GEHEIM~~

AAN: ~~GEHEIM~~  
 Harer Majesteits Buitengewoon en  
 Gevolmachtigd Ambassadeur  
 te

Verzonden 27 JUNI 1979

B O N N

Dienstonderdeel Raad van Europa en Wetenschappelijke Samen- Datum 27 juni 1979  
werking

Onderwerp: UC-samenwerking

Kenmerk: DRW/AT-124845-1785GS/820

Op 19 juni jl. heeft in het kader van de UC-samenwerking te Uwent een bijeenkomst plaatsgevonden van de Gemengde Commissie. In die vergadering is o.m. de kwestie Pakistan aan de orde geweest. Van Nederlandse zijde is daarbij een uiteenzetting gegeven over het onderzoek dat alhier plaatsvindt naar de gedragingen van een Pa-kistaan die in de jaren 1972 tot 1975 in het kader van het UC-project werkzaam is geweest. Daarbij is toegezegd dat die uiteenzetting in aangepaste vorm in enkelvoud ter beschikking zou worden gesteld van de partners in de vorm van een geheim document.

In verband hiermede verzoek ik U bijgaand exemplaar nr 2 te overhandigen aan de Voorzitter van de Gemengde Commissie, de Heer Schmidt-Küster.

DE MINISTER VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN,  
 Voor de Minister  
 Het Hoofd van het Bureau Atoomzaken,

45000  
 45000

(Drs A.J. van Galen Last)

*del. 101*


MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

PLEIN 23 - 'S-GRAVENHAGE - TEL. 614941

~~GEHEIM~~

AAN: ~~GEHEIM~~  
Harer Majesteits Buitengewoon en  
Gevolmachtigd Ambassadeur  
te

B O N N



Dienstonderdeel Raad van Europa en Wetenschappelijke Samen-  
werking Datum 27 juni 1979

Onderwerp: UC-samenwerking

Kenmerk: DRW/AT-124845-1785GS /820

Op 19 juni jl. heeft in het kader van de UC-samenwerking te Uwent een bijeenkomst plaatsgevonden van de Gemengde Commissie. In die vergadering is o.m. de kwestie Pakistan aan de orde geweest. Van Nederlandse zijde is daarbij een uiteenzetting gegeven over het onderzoek dat alhier plaatsvindt naar de gedragingen van een Pakistaan die in de jaren 1972 tot 1975 in het kader van het UC-project werkzaam is geweest. Daarbij is toegezegd dat die uiteenzetting in aangepaste vorm in enkelvoud ter beschikking zou worden gesteld van de partners in de vorm van een geheim document.

./.  
In verband hiermede verzoek ik U bijgaand exemplaar nr 2 te overhandigen aan de Voorzitter van de Gemengde Commissie, de Heer Schmidt-Küster.

DE MINISTER VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN,

Voor de Minister

Het Hoofd van het Bureau Atoomzaken,

(Drs A.J. van Galen Last)

# MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

Redacteur: *Sant*Datum: *24/6* Par. Medeparaaf en datum:

Vastgesteld	dat. <i>27/6</i>
-------------	------------------

Visie na verzending:


MINUUT

1. ....	4. ....
2. ....	5. ....
3. ....	6. ....

Informatiehoor:

~~GEHEIM~~

AAN: Harer Majesteits Buitengewoon en  
Gevolmachtigd Ambassadeur  
te

L O N D E N~~GEHEIM~~

Dienstonderdeel: Raad van Europa en Wetenschappelijke Samen- Datum: 27 juni 1979  
werking

Onderwerp: UC-samenwerking

Kenmerk DRW/AT-124845-1785GS/1218

Op 19 juni jl. heeft in het kader van de UC-samenwerking te Bonn een bijeenkomst plaatsgevonden van de Gemengde Commissie. In die vergadering is o.m. de kwestie Pakistan aan de orde geweest. Van Nederlandse zijde is daarbij een uiteenzetting gegeven over het onderzoek dat alhier plaatsvindt naar de gedragingen van een Pakistaan die in de jaren 1972 tot 1975 in het kader van het UC-project werkzaam is geweest. Daarbij is toegezegd dat die uiteenzetting in aangepaste vorm in enkelvoud ter beschikking zou worden gesteld van de partners in de vorm van een geheim document.

In verband hiermede verzoek ik U bijgaand exemplaar nr 3 te overhandigen aan het Britse lid van de Gemengde Commissie, *de heer W. V. ...*

DE MINISTER VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN,  
Voor de Minister  
Het Hoofd van het Bureau Atoomzaken,

(Drs A.J. van Galen Last)

u/cvml

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

PLEIN 23 - 'S-GRAVENHAGE - TEL. 614941

~~GEHEIM~~

AAN: Harer Majesteits Buitengewoon en  
Gevolmachtigd Ambassadeur  
te

~~GEHEIM~~

VERZOEK 27 JUNI 1979

L O N D E N

Dienstonderdeel: Raad van Europa en Wetenschappelijke Samen-  
werking Datum: 27 juni 1979

Onderwerp UC-samenwerking

Kenmerk DRW/AT-124845-1785GS /1218

Op 19 juni jl. heeft in het kader van de UC-samenwerking te Bonn een bijeenkomst plaatsgevonden van de Gemengde Commissie. In die vergadering is o.m. de kwestie Pakistan aan de orde geweest. Van Nederlandse zijde is daarbij een uiteenzetting gegeven over het onderzoek dat alhier plaatsvindt naar de gedragingen van een Pakistaan die in de jaren 1972 tot 1975 in het kader van het UC-project werkzaam is geweest. Daarbij is toegezegd dat die uiteenzetting in aangepaste vorm in enkelvoud ter beschikking zou worden gesteld van de partners in de vorm van een geheim document.  
/ In verband hiermede verzoek ik U bijgaand exemplaar nr 3 te overhandigen aan het Britse lid van de Gemengde Commissie, de Heer Manley.

DE MINISTER VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN,  
Voor de Minister  
Het Hoofd van het Bureau Atoomzaken,

(Drs A.J. van Galen Last)

~~GEHEIM~~ 100A

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28  
TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

VERZONDEN  
CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN VERZENDING:

28 juni 1979

AFKOMSTIG VAN:

min. van b.z.

REFERENTIE No:	KOPIE No:
408878	13
Dir./Afd.: dio	
Visie	
Ag. No:	
Dossier:	

MINUUT GEPARAFEERD DOOR:  
pve/tvs

KOPIE:  
 gs m r t s  
 dgpz dges dgis  
 chef drw  
 hfd drw/at  
 chef dpn  
 chef dio  
 hfd dio/ov)g  
 hfd dio/pile  
 jura  
 (mr. maas s.  
 geesteranus)  
 chef doa

BESTEMD VOOR:

1 sl amab ad

PARAAF/OPM.:

~~GEHEIM~~

onderwerp: pakistan nucleair

ruc 54 en 56 g e h e i m

moge verzoeken alle toekomstige berichten over bovengenoemd onderwerp geheim te classificeren i.v.m. grote gevoeligheid deze materie alsook teneinde te voorkomen dat voortijdig bekend worden informatie terzake lopend onderzoek h.t.l. bemoeilijkt.

van der klaauw 27 ++

chef DIO via AVR, DGA

De instructie veel te rigoreus wordt geïnterpreteerd en uiteraard uitsluitend kan slaan op het lopend onderzoek, moge dit te verzoeken deze in die zin aan te passen. Directie DGA raakt thans hierdoor in moeilijkheden. Zo deed ambassadeur van afg navraag naar enige gewone Pakistaanse demarche die niemand op de directie kende en die tenslotte in "persoonlijk" gerubriceerde enveloppes van de post voor de met vacantië afwezige mr. Hoytink werden teruggevonden. De betrokken berichten bevatten weinig meer dan hetgeen reeds in de pers had gestaan, aldus ook mr. van afg die zich verbaasd toonde over de gevolgde procedure.

~~GEHEIM~~

\*) zie bu. Lysaand 1/4 kroon 54!

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar de bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.  
 4. Dossiers, welke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

2. Afschriften van codeberichten, mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

1. Op een codeber. mag teleg. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).



# ONTVANGEN TELEXBERICHT

625838

**DOSSIERKOPIE**

Kopie: m r t s dgpz ap dges die des drw  
dgis plan amad dpn dcv dio,-/afdn/ec  
deu,-/we doa,-/za jura vdo aod dav

Dir.	DRW/11/11
Ag. no.	10/1003
Dossier	D13.339.2 Pakistan

Londen 28ujun 79

afkomstig van: amb. Londen  
bestemd voor : min. v. b.z.

onderwerp: urengo/pakistan

volgt tekst vragen van Lagerhuislid Leo Abse (Labour)  
inzake urengo d.d. 27-6-79, en het antwoord van  
minister van energie, David Howell.

q u o t e

vraag:  
-----

mr Leo Abse (pontypool):

1. to ask the secretary of state for energy, whether any foreign subjects from countries who are not parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty are engaged in research at urengo establishments at Capenhurst, Marlow or Almelo., and whether any bi-lateral agreements exist for the exchange of research information or research workers between urengo and Pakistan.
2. to ask the secretary of state for energy, what funding is provided through urengo by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd. as agents of Her Majesty's Government to the Almelo Institute in Holland., whether responsibility for security surveillances at the Almelo Institute is shared with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd., and whether he is satisfied that the existing security arrangements adequately protect the interests of the United Kingdom.
3. to ask the secretary of state for energy, what discussions he has had with the Dutch Government referring to the activities of Dr. A.Q. Khan, a Pakistan subject formerly working at Almelo Institute, Holland., whether a review of Dr. Khan's activities will take place at the next meeting of inter-governmental joint committee of urengo., and whether, in view of public concern, he will make a statement.
4. to ask the secretary of state for energy, whether he is satisfied with the security surveillance urengo possesses, over work and research given by urengo to outside laboratories., whether any confidential research worked was passed by urengo to any laboratory or research cent

= = 2 = =

**AFGESCHREVEN:**

employing or using the services of a pakistan subject dr. a.q. khan., and what communications he has had with the dutch government over the issue of the subcontracting of urencos research work with outside laboratories.

antwoord:  
-----

the background to the allegations that a national of a fourth country had access to classified information about the centrifuge project though employment at almelo were discussed by the centrifuge joint committee last week. the netherlands government are making a full investigation of the circumstances of this occurrence.

in the light of the outcome of this, and of a review of detailed security arrangements by urencos which will include sub-contracting arrangements, the 3 governments will consider whether action is needed to strengthen the existing tripartite arrangements for protecting classified information.

under a mutual financing agreement between the commercial partners, bnfl contributes on its own account to the capital cost of the almelo plant, and receives contributions from the corresponding netherlands and german organisations to the cost of capenhurst. security practice is based on rules agreed by the 3 governments and applied by each with its own territory. there are no bilateral agreements for the exchange of research information or research workers between urencos and pakistan or any other country.

u n q u o t e

fack 625 838  
-----

# ONTVANGEN TELEXBERICHT

nr 342.329

**DOSSIERKOPIE**

Kopie: m r t s dgpz ap dges dgis plan  
amad dpm dev dip, /afdn/ec  
deu, -/oe doa, -/za jura dev vdo aod

**AFGESCHREVEN**

Dir. <i>ICV</i>	Visie
Ag. no. <i>183.349</i>	
Dossier <i>183.349</i>	
	<i>U.C.</i>

moskou 29 juni 1979

afkomstig van: ambassade moskou  
bestemd voor : min van b z

onderwerp: commentaar in prawda van 29 juni over nucleair  
beleid van pakistan

prawda van heden bevat commentaar onder het opschrift 'op de gevaarlijke weg' waarin wordt vermeld dat nederlandse autoriteiten onderzoek instellen naar ontvreemding door pakistan van geheime gegevens betreffende het procedé ter verrijking van uranium, waarmede dat land een grote stap heeft gedaan op weg naar de mogelijkheid om een atoombom te vervaardigen. er wordt op gewezen dat pakistan met dit soort berichten niet voor het eerst in het nieuws is geweest en verontrusting heeft veroorzaakt bij velen, vooral bij zijn buurlanden. ondanks de ontkenningen die van tijd tot tijd officiële pakistaanse kringen laten horen blijven, aldus de commentator, mededelingen over deze gevaarlijke activiteiten uit verschillende bronnen aanhouden. hij citeert de 'daily telegraph' die had bericht dat met in europa en andere plaatsen in het geheim gekochte componenten pakistan een installatie bouwde voor de verrijking van uranium, waarmede naar het oordeel van deskundigen een atoombom zou kunnen worden vervaardigd. de vraag dringt zich op naar het doel van die inspanningen, in het bijzonder gelet op de niet aflatende inmenging van bepaalde pakistaanse kringen in de binnenlandse aangelegenheden van afghanistan en hun aanspraken jegens andere landen. in dit verband herinneren sommige organen van de wereldpers terecht aan de verantwoordelijkheid van hen die pakistan voorzien van uitrusting en technologie die voor de vervaardiging van kernwapens kunnen worden gebruikt. ook peking levert daaraan zijn bijdrage. commentaar besluit met opmerking dat het behoud van de vrede niet aflatende inspanning vereist ter beteugeling van de bewapeningswedloop en met verwijzing naar singuliere betekenis die een versterking van het non proliferatie regiem heeft.

reinink 342.329



~~SECRET~~  
8

KOPIE:

m s  
 dgpz  
 dges dgis  
 chef dio } p  
 chef drw } e  
 hfd drw/at } r  
 chef doa } s  
 hfd dio/pi } o  
 dio/ov (drs } o  
 verbeek) } n  
 l.

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

ONTVANGEN  
CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN ONTVANGST:

2 juli 1979

BESTEMD VOOR:

min. van b.z.

REFERENTIE No: 814847	KOPIE No: 8
Dir./Afd.:	
Visie	
Ag. No:	
Dossier:	

DATUM VAN AFZENDING:

2 juli 1979

AFKOMSTIG VAN: i s l a m a b a d

PARAAF/OPM.:

onderwerp: pakistan u.c.

~~SECRET~~

op 30 juni heeft foreign affairs adviser agha shahi, in bijzijn voorzitter pakistan atomic energy commission, persconferentie gegeven met als doel het ontzenuwen van artikel in "eight days - middle east international" inzake pakistans nucleaire ambitie.

agha shahi beschreef artikel als een voorbeeld bij uitstek van de sensationele en zorgvuldig georchestreerde westerse campagne gericht tegen pakistans' vreedzame kernenergieprogramma.

het persverslag, waarvan kopie u toegaat per e.v. koerier, bevat onder meer volgende uitspraken: "no pakistani had ever worked at the almelo plant, nor had access to it. this has been confirmed by urencos itself". "no banned item of equipment had been purchased by pakistan in foreign countries". "the statement that the explosion was scheduled to be carried out in autumn this year was utterly false".

op een vraag van de b.b.c. correspondent naar de aard en het doel van de special works organization: "it was unfair and misconcieved to put tendentious questions of this nature", "it was unfair and discriminatory to single out pakistan and to put it under pressure to throw open its research centres".

in reaktie op vraag of bij plaatsen van order voor "inverters" gesteld was dat deze voor textiel industrie waren bedoeld antwoordde voorziter p.a.e.c.: "the inverters were accepted by everyone as multi-purpose and with a wide range of application".

aan slot volgde vraag over een in aanbouw zijnde windtunnel, waarbij zij aangekondigd dat een dergelijke tunnel alhier met steun van stork-werkspoor diesel wordt gebouwd voor ministry of defence. volledigheidshalve zij eveneens vermeld dat in het verleden a.g. khan thomassen holland b.v. heeft benaderd voor levering gasturbine voor kahuta. daaropvolgend is echter bestoten kahuta rechtstreeks aan te sluiten op elektriciteitsnet.

van der kroon 57

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.  
 4. Lijstnummers, welke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.

Afchriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

1. Op een codeber. mag teleg. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

# MINUUT TELEXBERICHT

Ministerie van: BUZA  
Redakteur: Verbeek Datum: 2/7 Par: *[Handwritten initials]*

Vastgesteld: *[Handwritten mark]* dat: *[Handwritten mark]*

Visie na verzending:

Medeparaaf en datum:  
1. *DIO/PT* 4  
2. 5  
3. 6

Informatiekopie aan:  
(voor posten aangeven **seinen** dan wel **per koerier**, dan wel — bij voorkeur — **uiterste datum van ontvangst**)

Bestemd voor: (aangeven **seinen** dan wel **per koerier**, dan wel — bij voorkeur — **uiterste datum van ontvangst**)

amb. Londen

*[Handwritten checkmark]*

Departementsonderdeel: DIO

Datum: *D 22/MT*

Onderwerp: Pakistan en het ultra centrifuge-procédé

Kenmerk: DIO/OV-184898

Aanvulling/Wijzigingen:

Volgens persberichten zou in het 23 juni j.l. nummer van het sinds kort te Londen verschijnende weekblad (editor: Bill Harcourt) "8-days" uitvoerig worden ingegaan op de "affaire Pakistan". In het vierehalve pagina beslaande artikel zouden ook een aantal geheime Pakistaanse documenten worden weergegeven. Verzoeken toezending bovengenoemde.

Van der Klaauw

*621435*

**AFDELING VERBINDINGEN**

*[Handwritten signature]*

Z.O.Z.

# VERZONDEN TELEXBERICHT

Kopie:

Dir.	Visie
Ag.no.	
Dossier	

VERZONDEN  
AVE/BR

'79 JUL -2 22:16

28812 netemb g  
33230x buza nl

dio,-/pi agis

afkomstig van: min van bz  
bestemd voor : londen

onderwerp : pakistan en het ultracentrifugeprocede

volgens persberichten zou in het 23 juni j.l.  
nummer van het sinds kort te londen verschijnende  
weekblad (editor: bill narcourt) '8-days' uitvoerig  
worden ingegaan op de 'affaire pakistan'. in het  
vierenhalve pagina beslaande artikel zouden ook een  
aantal geheime pakistaanse documenten worden weergegeven.  
verzoeken toezending bovengenoemde.

van der klaauw 621 435

's-gravenhage 2 juli 1979 +scb+  
verz: 22.05 uur

28812 netemb g  
33230x buza nl

Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.

4.

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

1. Op een codeber. mag telegr. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

KOPIE:

m s  
dgpz dges  
dgis  
chef drw } p  
hfd drw/at } e  
chef doa } r  
chef dio } s  
hfd dio/pi } o  
dio/ov(drs) } o  
verbeek } n-  
Lijk

# MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

## VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN VERZENDING:

4 juli 1979

AFKOMSTIG VAN:

min van b.z.

REFERENTIE No: 9174	KOPIE No:
Dir./Afd.:	
Visie	
Ag. No:	
Dossier:	

MINUUT GEPARAFFEERD DOOR:

ett/tvs

BESTEMD VOOR: islamabad

PARAAF/OPM.:

~~CONFIDENTIEEL~~

ter informatie aan: pv new york. p.v. geneve

ter informatie per koerier aan:  
Londen, new delhi, parijs amb., washington, wenen pv iaea

onderwerp: vreedzame kernexplosies

voor de goede orde moge bij pakistaanse vertogen dat pakistaans nucleair programma slechts dient "for peaceful purposes only", de volgende voetnoot worden geplaatst. met deze formule zijn niet uitgesloten zgn. "peaceful nuclear explosions" (pne's), d.w.z. het ontwikkelen en detoneren van nucleair explosiemiddelen voor civiele doeleinden. uit de opgegeven vreedzame intentie wordt dan afgeleid dat het hier om een honorabele zaak gaat.

"pne-devices" zijn evenwel essentieel niet verschillend van kernwapens en de ontwikkeling van een kernwapen-capaciteit. verklaringen inzake "peaceful purposes" zijn dan ook niet eerder bevredigend dan wanneer ook expliciet "explosive purposes" worden uitgesloten.

van der klaauw 30 ++

van een pne-capaciteit komt neer op de ontwikkeling

CONFIDENTIEEL



17

SPOED

11448-1094/1706  
CFS/vp

2 ex. weekblad "8-Days", d.d. 23-6-79 en  
30-6-79.

AFGEHEVEN!

De Minister van  
Buitenlandse Zaken  
te 's-Gravenhame

104098

x

Uw telex 621 435  
d.d. 2-7-79

12

BUIENLANDSE ZAKEN	
DRUUKT	VISIE:
6 JULI 1979	
NO.: 109400	
DOSNIER:	XXX

013.539.2 Pakistan

Londen, 5 juli 1979

Offenders are chained to the window above the cell door.

Isolation, lack of sleep and enforced inactivity soon add up to effective torture. The walls come alive with psychedelic patterns, the scratched lines of your 'calendar' on the wall behind your bed get muddled. The prisoner wonders how long it will take him to unhinge the cell door by scratching with paper clips stolen from the interrogation room. Depersonalising, they call it. After two and a half days the warders consider you ripe for the first interrogation.

The interrogating officer behaves correctly, he never raises his voice. But he leaves you in no doubt that looking out for Amin means espionage — if not worse: a preparation to kidnap the illustrious fugitive. He makes it clear that the prisoner's position is hopeless: 'We have caught your accomplices. They have confessed everything.'

He also has the whole film of photographs which you secretly took of the Amin family.

### Arrests are expected

On the evening of the third day they bring along Mick, Dimitri and Singh, three mechanics who are under suspicion because they shared a meal with the suspect. Further arrests are expected, says the interpreter.

The food is not bad. There are black beans and meat and bread. But the stomach refuses food. To keep the prisoner fit for interrogation, a special ration of sleep and medical treatment is prescribed. The therapy consists of a sedative injected into your backside. You don't see the doctor. For reasons of security you are blindfolded, with your hands tied at the back.

All the same, the break in the routine and a few hours of sleep delay the investigations. The inquisition must go to great lengths once again to reduce the prisoner to the state of depression necessary before interrogation.

The worst aspect of prison life is the uncertainty. Since we have located Amin in Tripoli, the regime must feel trapped. The reporter becomes a confidant, and a nuisance. The way to get rid of such a nuisance in this country was demonstrated — according to some reports — in the case of Imam Musa Sadr, head of the Lebanese Shiites. Musa Sadr disappeared nine months ago and has not been seen since.

But this time helping hands intervene before it is too late. On the afternoon of the eighth day there comes the order for release. No explanation, no condition. The interrogating officer himself is surprised — and annoyed. Another couple of days and the prisoner might have confessed how he had planned to kidnap the two and a half hundredweight of Amin, his two wives and approximately twenty children out of Qaddafi's country.

# Oil prices to hold?

*THIRTEEN of the world's most powerful men — the ministers of the oil producing countries — meet in Geneva on Tuesday to set a new world price for oil. 8 Days sets the scene for what could be the most important of all the Opec meetings.*

THEY ARE probably the most powerful men in the world today. Thirteen men in dark suits and an occasional burnoose, shoulder-bumped by security guards as they edge their way to fix a new world price for industry's lifeblood — oil. Another Opec conference is in session.

The meeting, which opens in Geneva on Tuesday 26 June, is the first oil parley since last December, and promises to be particularly important for two reasons:

First, the oil ministers are meeting at a moment when western consuming governments are ambiguous in their feelings about the oil cartel. The big rise in prices so far this year now promises to deal their economies the bitterest blow they have suffered since the price explosion in 1974.

Western governments appear to fear price cuts even more than further increases, because current price levels — or even slightly higher prices — they hope will force their industries and consumers to conserve energy, a move critical to their over-heated and inflated economies.

Second, while the current oil price rise reflects an accident of history rather than the intrinsic power of Opec, a whole new constellation of economic and political forces promises to restrict the amount of oil available to the West, pushing oil prices steadily higher in the future.

The urgent business of the meeting will be to try to restore some order to the disorder of world oil prices, as Opec members leap-frog one another to add surcharges to the official Opec reference price of \$14.55 per barrel for Saudi Arabian light crude.

Officially, these surcharges are merely temporary additions that reflect the tightened world market conditions created by the cutback in Iranian exports. But already they have raised overall world oil prices more than thirty per cent in the first six months of the year.

Price hawks like Algeria and Libya which now get over \$21 barrel for their premium crudes that traditionally sell at \$4 above the Saudi Arabian market price want this basic price lifted to \$17 or \$18 a barrel. Thus the current surcharges would become incorporated into the official Opec price structure and cease to be 'temporary' additions to it.

Traditionally, Saudi Arabia favours price

moderation; with its huge reserves it has the power to lower world oil prices at any moment. Sheikh Zaki Yamani, the Saudi oil minister, will therefore come under strong pressure in Geneva to restore a coherent Opec price structure by lifting the basic reference price for his light crude.

Iran is now charging \$17.17 a barrel for its crude, which traditionally sells for within a few cents of the Saudi price.

Overall, the rise in oil prices so far this year remains small in comparison with the fourfold increase Opec inflicted on the world in 1973 and 1974. But it already threatens to do serious damage to the economies of the industrial and the developing countries.

However, oil consuming countries now have an interest in insuring that oil prices stay at about current levels, after adjustment for inflation, in order to force industries and private consumers to economise.

In essence, western governments now hope that by a combination of drastic conservation action and appeals to Opec's own stake in a successful world economy they can restrain the upward price spiral.

The eyes of the world will be upon Geneva.

● THE ITALIAN state-owned hydrocarbons agency ENI has concluded a deal with Saudi Arabia under which it will get 12.5 million tons of crude oil for the next 2½ years.

The crude will be supplied directly and will thus bypass the customary channels of the oil companies. The arrangement represents a major step for Italy to replace Iranian crude.

The deal involves the sale of 2.5 million tonnes this year, followed by 5 million next year and in 1981.

The agreement will increase Italy's overall imports of Saudi crude to almost 35 million tonnes this year. Italy will probably pay official market rates for the oil but the agreement is understood to include exports at a later date of Italian technology.

IRAQ appears to be leading the way to a significant departure from a long-held tenet within Opec — the same price for all customers, *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly* reports.

In effect, Iraq is deunifying its own prices, raising them for the rich and holding them steady for the poor.

The preferential treatment Iraq is giving its poorer customers reflects a consensus shaping up in Opec on the need to win back support of less-developed countries with some sort of aid for their soaring oil cost burdens.

■ IN SWEDEN last year, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the renowned independent watchdog of arms and nuclear proliferation, gave its considered assessment of Pakistan's progress towards acquiring an atom bomb. 'More than 95 per cent of the plans for a plutonium reprocessing plant have been delivered to Pakistan by (the French company) Saint Gobain Techniques Nouvelles.' Pakistan, SIPRI considered, had clearly chosen the 'plutonium route' to the bomb, but since matters were still in the planning stage there was not too much to be concerned about.

SIPRI was wrong. Pakistan's purchase from France of the 200 million franc plutonium reprocessing plant was, as far as the bomb was concerned, a blind. Pakistan had not chosen the plutonium route to a nuclear weapon and all evidence that she had was a careful piece of misinformation calculated to throw the western powers off the scent, to dull their protests and protect the secrecy of what Pakistan was really doing.

Well aware that if Pakistan could successfully explode a nuclear device then the whole balance of power in Asia and the Middle East would be irrevocably changed, Pakistan's leaders set out five years ago to spin a web of deception around their efforts to make their country a nuclear power — the first in the Muslim world.

So while the major powers monitored Pakistan's painful progress with its plutonium reprocessing plant, writing in safeguards to the French contract to ensure against 'misuse' of the refined plutonium, and while the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna was insisting on rigorous 'control procedures', the Pakistanis were up to something entirely different. They were pressing ahead, secretly and with great determination, to produce not an atom bomb but a hydrogen bomb. They were taking not the plutonium path but the uranium path, enriching the uranium by the centrifuge process.

And they were buying the technology they needed to do this from — and behind the backs of — the very countries trying to stop them from becoming a nuclear power.

INDIA, Pakistan's main enemy in Asia, exploded an atomic bomb in the Rajasthan desert on 18 May 1974. The then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, heard the news within hours. 'Gentlemen', he announced to a hastily summoned meeting of top Pakistani officials, 'The Hindus have got the bomb. That means we'll have to build a bomb too — even if we have to eat grass.'

Bhutto was exaggerating. The difficulties in putting together a nuclear device are no longer as daunting as when the United States tackled the task in the nineteen for-

# HOW PAKISTAN FOOLED THE WORLD AND GOT THE BOMB

*Pakistan's General Zia intends to explode a nuclear device this autumn.*

*Behind this shock news lies a story of international intrigue and deception. For five years — ever since India exploded its atom bomb 1974 — the Pakistanis fooled the nuclear powers into believing that they had neither the scientists, the materials, nor the know-how to make a bomb. All the while, using a series of 'front' companies, bogus purchasing orders, shadowy intermediaries, and foreign trained scientists, the Pakistanis got all they needed to out-trump the world and build a hydrogen bomb. Those resources came from the very western countries who were trying to stop them joining the Nuclear Club. 8 Days special investigators went to Germany, Holland, and France, to discover exactly how Pakistan fooled the world, and got the bomb.*

ties. As Professor Abdus Salam, one of the world's leading physicists who was then Pakistan's chief scientific adviser put it: 'There's no secret about the technology. It's a question of putting the bits and pieces together.' He could have added, and of finding the necessary cash.

As far as technological know-how was concerned, Pakistan was well placed. It already had a 137 megawatt nuclear power reactor, supplied by the obliging Canadians, generating electricity for Karachi. There was also a 5MW research reactor in Islamabad's Institute of Science and Technology. A 600MW reactor was being built on the banks of the Indus at Chashma northwest of Islamabad. Pakistan also had substantial natural deposits of uranium.

The money was quickly forthcoming. The Libyan leader, Colonel Qaddafi, had earlier pledged support for Pakistan's nuclear effort and in April 1974 backed his pledge with an offer of \$40 million.

Two months later the chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of Pakistan, Dr Munir Ahmad Khan, announced that

Pakistan was embarking on a vast nuclear power development programme based on a network of imported nuclear power stations and domestic uranium supplies.

A by-product of nuclear reactors is plutonium, which, after reprocessing, itself used as a reactor fuel. If Pakistan was going to embark on a vast nuclear power programme it would need, therefore, a plutonium reprocessing plant. But these reprocessing plants can also be used to refine plutonium to 'weapons grade' for use in the core of an atom bomb. (The vastly more powerful hydrogen bomb depends on enriched uranium). Was Pakistan's 'vast nuclear power development programme' to be the basis of a case for buying a plutonium reprocessing plant that could then be used to help develop an atom bomb?

It was. In October 1975 Bhutto went to Paris and finalised a deal to buy a turn-key plutonium reprocessing plant. Despite strong American protests President Giscard approved the deal subject to IAEA control for 20 years. (Bhutto resisted a last minute attempt by American Secretary of State, Dr



Kissinger, to persuade him to abandon the project, highlighting his refusal by giving Kissinger a large metal sculpture that looked remarkably like an atom bomb).

Bhutto had anticipated correctly that when Pakistan bought a plutonium reprocessing plant everyone would assume it had chosen the plutonium route to the bomb. All the safeguards would then be focused on the reprocessing plant. To encourage this deception, he ordered Pakistan scientists to work in secret on building a miniaturised version of the plant. Equipment for the smaller version was ordered in Europe and the United States and then the whole deal carefully 'leaked' to the press.

Secure in the belief that they knew exactly what Pakistan was doing — and that they could control it — the western powers bought Bhutto's bluff without question.

THE ALMELO Institute in Holland is part of the European Troika — Britain, Netherlands, and West Germany — that specialises in the enrichment of uranium by the centrifuge method. Britain at an experimental station at Capenhurst, and West Germany in one at Gronau, had developed separate variations of the standard centrifuge process. The work at the Almelo Institute has been to find the most efficient way of combining the best parts of the British, Dutch and the German methods.



By sheer chance one of the scientists working at Almelo was a Dr A Q Khan, a prominent physicist from Pakistan. Moreover, Dr Khan's role was directly involved with the construction of the Almelo centrifuge. When Dr Kahn's work was finished he returned to Pakistan, taking the invaluable knowledge and experience he had gained in Holland.

All Pakistan needed now to build a centrifuge that would incorporate some of the most advanced techniques in the world was the equipment. Here too, she began with several factors in her favour. Firstly, unlike a plutonium reprocessing plant, centrifuges are widely used in industry and are not subject to international control. The parts and equipment are available virtually 'off the peg' in both the United States and Europe. Next, thanks to Dr Khan's knowledge, a list of companies which could supply this material was readily available.

There was no reason why the purchase of the centrifuge parts should attract international attention, but if the West *did* learn about it, they could stop it, so Pakistan proceeded with caution. A cover organisation was set up — the Special Works Organisation of the Ordinance Service of the Government of Pakistan, located in an innocent looking office at 169 Kitson Road, Westridge, Rawalpindi. Its boss was Major Gen- ▶

---

Subscription rates — see page 19



eral Amir Ali Said. Under his direction, the Special Works Organisation instituted an elaborately constructed security programme to conceal what Pakistan was doing.

The real work on the hydrogen bomb went on at Nellore, in the northern suburbs of Islamabad where the Pakistan Institute for Science and Technology (PINSTECH) worked on an experimental reactor sealed from public view by barbed wire fences, electronic intruder alarms and round the clock army patrols.

And to buy the vital equipment for the centrifuge a clandestine purchasing network, operating independently of Pakistan diplomat missions, was set up behind a series of 'shell' companies operating out of Swansea in Britain, Amsterdam, and a series of German cities and towns. Many of the companies made only a single order, resold the equipment to Pakistan and then went out of business. Tracing Pakistan's purchases for its bomb has been a time consuming business, a mixture of detective and intelligence work.

ON 11 JANUARY 1977, a Mr Ikram-ul-Haque Khan, of the Pakistan Ordnance Service arrived at Flat C, No 8 Hauptstrasse Watchberg-Pech, a small village 20 kms from Bonn. Flat C was Haque Khan's office and residence. From here a stream of orders for centrifuge equipment went out all over Europe.

The first order was for '31 inverters and uninterrupted power supply systems' worth £133,566, placed with Emerson Electric Industrial Controls, a subsidiary of an American company, based in Swindon, in Britain. Emerson specialises in inverters and supplies them to British Nuclear Fuels Ltd.

### Contact Mr Pffle . . .

In a procedure that was to become standard, Haque Khan did not place the order with Emerson direct. Instead a West German firm of commission agents, Team Industries, of 27 Karlstrasse, Leonberg Eltingen, near Stuttgart, arranged to send one of its principals, a Mr Pffle to make the initial contact. Pffle returned later to Emerson with, as an Emerson official remembers, 'a Mr Khan and three other Pakistanis'.

Terms were agreed and Emerson told to deliver the equipment to Schimitar Engineering Ltd of Swansea. But before the contracts were signed, Schimitar suddenly dropped out and was replaced with Weargate Ltd also of Swansea. Eventually the equipment was shipped in August 1978 from Tilbury, and according to Emerson invoice No 878531, consigned to the Director General, Special Works Organisation, Rawalpindi.


In the meantime, Team Industries placed a further order with Emerson — S05666, for 31 sets of input transformers. These

were airfreighted to Rawalpindi by Schenkers Transport, a subsidiary of West German railways, and who have an office at London's Heathrow airport.

Haque Khan was equally busy in Europe. On his orders, Aluminium-Walzwerke Singen GmbH, of Singen, West Germany supplied 10,000 small aluminium parts for the centrifuge. Other aluminium parts came from Van Doorne Transmissie Bv of Tilburg, Holland. Parts for centrifuge rotors were supplied by another Dutch company, Leifeld and Co of Ahlen. Vacuum equipment, a key element in the centrifuge, was bought from Leybold Heraeus, of Hanau, West Germany.

By the middle of last year Haque Khan's purchases from his tiny office in West Germany totalled \$11 million. The suppliers all insist that they regarded the transactions as straightforward, over the counter deals for materials which were not covered by any government regulations. They add that they had no reason to suspect what they call the equipment's 'end use'.

As far as can be discovered, only one company refused a Haque-Khan order — Rohstoff-Einfuhr GmbH, of Dusseldorf, a specialist in radioactive and stable isotopes. Approached by Team Industries to supply UF6 (uranium hexafluoride), used in the gas centrifuge, the Dusseldorf company refused the order. It has connections with Technabexport, of Moscow, and the Soviet Union has a reputation of being extremely



◀ Copies of the apparently innocent orders placed secretly by Pakistan to get vital equipment for its centrifuge. Weargate's order for 31 inverters and uninterrupted power supply systems (left), Team Industries' order for 31 sets of input transformers (centre) and, the order that blew Pakistan's secret wide open when Emerson workers went on strike (right). All these orders originated in the house (above left) at 8, Hauptstrasse in the tiny German village of Watchberg-Pech near Bonn, where Ikram-ul Haque Khan of the Pakistan Ordinance Service set up his office.

The combined output of 31 inverters already supplied and installed was sufficient to power cascades of more than 10,000 centrifuges which in turn could produce 150 kgs of enriched uranium a year — sufficient to make six to seven thermo-nuclear bombs.

The United States immediately raised the matter through its ambassador and after discussions in April the Administration announced a gradual reduction in economic assistance to Pakistan. In Paris, earlier this month at a World Bank meeting, the United States said it would give only \$40 million to Pakistan instead of the hoped for \$120 million. There is no evidence that this pressure has changed Pakistan's intentions. Haque Khan was still operating last week from his tiny office in Watchburg-Pech. Team Industries was still refusing to answer any enquiry about its work for Pakistan. And in Mulsatan, 475 kms south of Islamabad a joint military-scientific team was assessing the area's suitability for a nuclear explosion.

IN A REMARKABLE 200 page document smuggled out of his cell shortly before he was hanged in April, former Prime Minister of Pakistan, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, spelt out the reason for his dedication to his country's race for the bomb: 'We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability,' Bhutto said. 'The Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilisations have this capability. The communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilisation is without it. But that position is about to change.'

If it does change, what are the implications for world peace? It would be unrealistic to imagine that Pakistan can produce a bomb she will keep to herself. As Bhutto said, Pakistan's bomb is an Islamic bomb, and as such would certainly be used as a strategic counter to Israel's nuclear capability. (Israel has never carried out an atomic ▶

careful not to help nuclear proliferation in any way. It seems likely that the Dusseldorf company's Russian connection made it unwilling to deal with Haque Khan.

THERE WAS a hiccup in the progress of the project in the last days of Bhutto's period as Prime Minister in 1977. Bhutto, fighting for his political life, had not been able to devote sufficient attention to the development of the bomb, and red tape, particularly in the Pakistan audit department, was beginning to slow down purchases in Europe.

● **a takes over**

Bhutto's successor, General Zia, tackled this in his first week in office. He sent his nephew, Abdul Waheed, to Germany, to act as the project's paymaster. He appointed Tariq Mustafa, a senior officer in the Pakistan Finance Ministry's defence production division, to the Atomic Energy Commission.

Mustafa's brief was to by-pass the normal audit processes, to tighten security, and to speed the project's paperwork. His first order was to authorise senior officers in the purchasing network to incur expenditure of up to one million dollars without audit check.

This not only speeded the buying of the equipment Pakistan needed for the bomb but made it much easier to deal secretly. In fact, it now appears that none of Pakistan's

secret deals would ever have come to light if it had not been for an industrial dispute in Britain last year.

EMERSON, the Swindon company, were working in September 1978 on their third order for Pakistan. This was for 100 Accuspede AS1604 HF inverters and spares valued at £1.25 million, again to be processed through Weargate of Swansea. Shipments were to be made over a four month period beginning on 4 December.


But in September, during a minor industrial dispute at Emerson, someone told Frank Allaun, a Labour MP, about the Swindon company with inverters on its production line all clearly marked 'Pakistan Special Project.' Allaun realised the implication of Pakistan's purchases and raised the matter with Britain's then Energy Minister, Tony Benn.

Benn intervened immediately and slapped an Export of Goods Control order on shipments abroad of high frequency electrical control equipment. Emerson 'froze' the Pakistan order but Weargate Ltd had still not cancelled it last month.

Benn's action alerted Germany and the United States and both governments put special investigators on to the Pakistan case. In March this year the CIA told the American government that its enquiries had confirmed that Pakistan was building a centrifuge to produce enriched uranium of weapon grade.

# 8 Days

## MIDDLE EAST NEWS



Medical explanation at the opening

## Arab money launches major study into liver disease

A £750,000 (\$1.5m) gift from the United Arab Emirates has pushed Britain to the forefront in liver research facilities and given a major boost to international research into liver diseases.

The Sheikh Zayed Centre at King's College Hospital, London, was officially opened last week by Princess Alexandra. The gift from the UAE, personally initiated by the president, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al-Nahayan, made possible the construction of the unit. It represented the largest donation ever given by an Arab country to Britain for such a project.

The centre adds 700 square metres of laboratory and other research space to the existing liver unit at King's Hospital. With its team of more than fifty British and over-

seas doctors, scientists and supporting staff, the unit is already one of the world's leading centres for research into diseases of the liver.

The Sheikh Zayed Centre will link the researchers with their counterparts in Abu Dhabi. Researchers from the UAE will visit the centre, exchanging information and developing their skills in scientific techniques. They will also take part in a major study to investigate liver disease in countries which have not undergone rapid social change.

The major aim of the centre is to find ways of preventing and curing diseases such as liver cancer and hepatitis, from which many thousands of people are dying throughout the world, including the Middle

East, Far East and Europe.

Primary liver cancer has always been a major problem in parts of the third world, particularly Africa and South East Asia. The two major fields of research and treatment are transplantation, and a non-surgical approach which involves sealing off the arteries carrying essential blood supplies to the liver tumour, so starving the cancer cells to death.

Eighty six patients have already undergone liver transplants at the King's Hospital unit and, of these, 12 are leading normal or near normal lives as a result. One of the main lines of the cancer research at the Sheikh Zayed Centre will be a comprehensive study of a population which has a high incidence of liver cancer, but which has not undergone any significant social change. Research will also be undertaken on the varying types of virus which cause hepatitis.

Alcoholic liver disease is an additional area of research. Doctors at the centre have already confirmed that women are more susceptible to alcoholic liver disease, and that in general, not all people who drink heavily develop liver disease.

Persons with certain definable genetic characteristics have also been found to enjoy some natural protection against this type of disease.

Research is being directed towards identifying the kind of people who appear to be most at risk from a high intake of alcohol, and then to define the safe levels of consumption for the different levels of risk within the population. Researchers claim that the safe level of alcohol consumption per day is 80 grams — that is, one bottle of wine, four double scotches or four pints of beer.

The new unit, which has been built on top of an existing ward at the hospital, cost \$1m to build. The remainder of the UAE donation will be used to provide additional research staff.

## THE BOMB

*continued from page 11*

test but experts believe that she has manufactured several Hiroshima-type bombs).

The Saudis seem to be the most likely beneficiaries if Pakistan is successful. It is no secret that Saudi Arabia gives Pakistan substantial financial aid. Pakistan in turn looks to Saudi Arabia as the guardian of the holy places in Mecca and Al Madina. The mutual faith of Islam would make the sharing of nuclear success virtually obligatory.

As well as a weight in the balance of power calculations in the Middle East there

is another factor in Islam's possession of such a weapon that, no matter how fantastic it might seem, cannot be overlooked. The president of Opec, Dr Mana al Oteiba, spoke last week (8 Days, 16 June) of suggestions in Britain and the United States of western military intervention if the West felt starved of oil. 'If anybody tried to occupy our fields they will get fire, they will not get oil,' Dr Oteiba said. 'A book of matches is all we need.'

Oil technicians agree that Dr Oteiba was simplifying the feasibility of making Arab oil unavailable to any invading power. But if the oil producers — Saudi Arabia for example — were to have access to a nuclear device, especially a 'dirty' atomic bomb, the detonation of which would render Saudi oil

radioactive for years to come, the hawks, so keen on seizing the oil fields, would have to think again.

For India, the implications of Pakistan joining the Nuclear Club would be painfully straightforward. Her near neighbour, the country with which she has so frequently been at war since 1947, would be able to match her nuclear capacity. But there are ameliorating factors. There are nearly 70 million Muslims in India and for religious reasons alone a nuclear war between Pakistan and India seems highly unlikely.

In fact it could be argued that the boost that a successful nuclear explosion would give to Pakistan's self esteem would make a war on the sub-continent less likely than before.



# Can a \$1,500m transfusion stave off blood letting?

*The crucial operation to review 'the sick man of Nato' is underway. If it fails trouble-torn Turkey could be open to a right-wing takeover - Cal McCrystal reports*

AFTER a lengthy period of observation and conflicting diagnoses, Turkey, one of the West's most chronically-ill patients, is about to receive some badly needed medical treatment, including a \$900m transfusion from the OECD, \$400m from western banks and \$150m from the World Bank, providing the patient can tolerate some unwelcome side effects — and a reassuring pat on the shoulder from Uncle Sam.

While the prognosis is uncertain, there is a reasonable chance that the sick man of Nato may soon begin to show signs of stability, despite a continued irregular pulse. Progress, however, will only follow a number of further alarms requiring urgent interim treatments and the patient's determination to stick rigidly to a new diet and life-style. There may even be a need to abandon the wonder drugs, Ecevit I and Ecevit II, which until now have kept the haemorrhaging under control.

The rescue of Turkey, which is about to enter a crucial phase, follows many months of recrimination between Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit and the International Monetary Fund, between Ecevit and big western bankers, between Ecevit and his own cabinet and, it seemed at times, between Ecevit and Ecevit. Disaster has dogged the man in the form of bloody sectarian civil strife, rising inflation and unemployment, increased tension with Turkey's western neighbour, Greece, increased suspicion of her eastern neighbour, Iran, an almost disintegrating government in Ankara and a widespread feeling among his people that has changed from frustration to disillusionment to fear and to hatred.

There is no chance that Ecevit can reverse totally all these trends. All he can

hope to do is prevent them becoming so uncontrollable that the country slides into greater anarchy, requiring an outright grab for power by the armed forces. And if Ecevit swallows his considerable pride and accepts the terms of the OECD aid package agreed last month by leading industrialised countries and the World Bank, then Turkey may regain just enough of her former strength to remain a democracy. But at the same time, she may lose the very leader who has proved to be the most dynamic and hard-working since Kemal Ataturk.

It is being suggested in some quarters in Ankara and Istanbul that only a right-wing government under army control could administer the aid package to the satisfaction of the international business community. That is not a unanimous view.

The aid is conditional on Turkey concluding a new standby agreement with the IMF whose proposals for a hefty devaluation of the Turkish lira were first rejected by Ecevit. Yet agreement came in the end. American banking sources admitted privately to me recently that, 'many of us would really prefer Ecevit. He's making a genuine effort to stabilise his country and despite some aspects of his policies which cause misgivings, he is, generally speaking, considered a more reliable bet than the army — or anyone else in the political arena at the moment.'

The US government, too, is anxious to remove as soon as possible the last vestiges of the arms embargo, imposed in retaliation for Turkey's violent incursion into Cyprus in 1974. There are good reasons for believing that full arms and financial aid will be



**Ecevit: coffee-drinking days are over**

restored shortly: for one thing the collapse of the Pahlavi regime in Iran; for another, US — and Israeli — concern over the threat to American listening posts in Turkey.

There is still a problem in combating the powerful Greek lobby in Washington, but I understand that this lobby has toned down its activities lately on the grounds that the Cyprus problem will soon be resolved. In Athens recently, I gathered that the Greek government, whose patience with Nicosia has become somewhat strained (despite a visit to Athens by Kyprianou), was hoping for a Cyprus settlement this year in return for a settlement of the Greco-Turkish dispute over the Aegean.

So there appears to be at least some forward movement to offset Turkey's misfortune: severe food shortages (including the amazing disappearance of Turkish coffee), the generally rundown, slogan-smearing appearance of the major cities, the appalling dedication with which the extreme right and left are butchering one another. But changes which his office has wrought in Bulent Ecevit are dramatic.

The idealism is still there, but gone is the smiling popular figure who, during his first premiership, used to sneak down to his favourite Ankara bookshop to drink coffee with his old buddies, journalists, poets and other friendly intellectuals. Today, Ecevit concentrates on speeding up his footwork.

## Overwhelmed by events

Certainly he cannot carry all the blame for the state of the nation today. Events, dictated by forces beyond his control, overwhelmed much of what he had set out to accomplish. On coming to power for the second time in January 1978, the Republican People's Party leader in some ways resembled the rather whacky 14th century Catherine of Sienna who though she could 'change furious wolves into lambs', Ecevit failed to get wholehearted backing from the army, the police and big business who, like the nobility in Catherine's day, preferred the mailed fist, the lance and the axe. As a result, the Turkish wolf — the *Grey Wolf* — has rampaged, *furiosus et melancholicus*, throughout the major cities, forcing Ecevit finally to impose martial law in 13 of the 67 provinces, including Ankara and Istanbul. The prime minister, in short, has no soft options.

Appropriately, it was the German Chancellor, Helmut Schmidt, who proposed to the Guadalupe summit earlier this year that the time had come to do something about Turkey: unless Ecevit was propped up by economic aid, his administration might lose control and 'we would then have a solid headache from the Bosphorus to Afghanistan.'

The German factor is crucially important.



# Bomb: rush to plug the Pakistan gap

REACTIONS in western capitals to the news, revealed exclusively in *8 Days* last week, that Pakistan is on the threshold of becoming a nuclear power have been fast and furious.

The main row has centred on a Pakistan physicist Dr Abdel Quader Khan who was able to penetrate apparently with comparative ease, a succession of Europe's top government-backed scientific companies in the years 1973 to 1975. He operated in the Netherlands where he managed to sidestep the normally stringent security checks by claiming that he was about to become a Dutch citizen.

It appears that Dr Khan's mission was to acquire technical know-how on the construction of a centrifuge necessary to produce the enriched uranium essential for the construction of a hydrogen bomb. He worked for a short period at Almelo, where Holland, Britain, and West Germany had established Urenco, a commercial company whose job it is to integrate the research of the three countries into a so-called ultra centrifuge to enrich uranium. One of Dr Khan's jobs was to translate German research work for other Urenco scientists. Only last week security around the Almelo plant was tightened, on the orders of the Dutch Economics Ministry.

Dr Khan also worked for the government backed VMF Werkspoor which concentrates on dynamics. He then moved to the engineering office of another Dutch company, Comprimo, which specialises in the construction of centrifuges. And, curiously, Khan's personal file at Comprimo has now disappeared.

The Dutch government has been aware of this amazing security breach for some time. An interdepartmental enquiry was set up last October and, in the face of growing rumours, ministers told the Dutch Parliament earlier this year that Dr Khan had not had access to any nuclear secrets while working on metal cooling methods at an Amsterdam research laboratory.

However, following the revelations in *8 Days* and a forceful letter from Israel's Prime Minister Menachem Begin, pointing out that Libya's Colonel Qaddafi had helped finance Pakistan's nuclear ambitions, the Dutch government has intensified its inquiries. The Dutch Foreign Minister, Dr Chris van der Klaauw, has announced that Holland is cooperating in an international inquiry into Pakistan's acquisition of a nuclear capability.

Once Dr Khan had returned home with his knowledge, the Pakistanis set about buying the bits and pieces for their centrifuge. Using front companies, a number of orders for equipment were channeled through Emerson Industrial Controls, a subsidiary of an American company, based in Swindon. Last week Labour MP Leo Abse tabled a question in the House of Commons concerning possible breaches of security. Abse told *8 Days*: 'I am very concerned at the ease with which Pakistan appeared to get materials from Britain and I think regulations should be made much stricter.'

In fact it was another Labour MP, Frank Allaun, who last year spotted that Emerson inverters were going to Pakistan and he persuaded the then Energy Minister, Tony Benn to ban their export. Benn told *8 Days*: 'Although I had no hard information about Pakistan building a bomb — that was not my department — my responsibility was to see that no equipment that could be used for nuclear proliferation should be allowed abroad. I therefore instructed the Department of Trade to stop the export.'

However, by then Pakistan's Special Works Organisation had already taken delivery of an earlier shipment for inverters. These are believed to be working in an experimental reactor at Nellore, in the northern suburbs of Islamabad.

It was then Prime Minister Bhutto who decided in 1974 that Islam should have its own bomb 'even if we have to eat grass': the Indians had just exploded an atom bomb. Pakistan already had a number of nuclear power reactors, now it announced a vast increase in its nuclear power programme. A by product of nuclear reactors is plutonium, which, after reprocessing, is itself used as a reactor fuel. If Pakistan was going to embark on a nuclear power programme it

would need, therefore, a plutonium reprocessing plant. But these reprocessing plants can also be used to refine plutonium to 'weapons grade' for use in the core of an atom bomb.

Bhutto ordered a reprocessing plant from France, well aware that the West would assume that he would also use that plant to try to build an atom bomb. In fact he was determined to acquire a much more powerful hydrogen bomb which depends on enriched uranium. With a little encouragement from Bhutto, the West assumed Pakistan was taking the 'plutonium route' to the bomb, and careful safeguards against 'misuse' were written into the contract for the reprocessing plant. Certain that Pakistan was now 'tied down' the western powers stopped worrying about an Islamic bomb. Behind their backs, however, Pakistan set about finding first the know-how and then the equipment to build a centrifuge.

Reports from Pakistan now indicate that a scientific team is assessing suitable sites for a nuclear test near Mulatan, 475 kilometres south of Islamabad. However, informed sources in Holland, said last week that Pakistan's ambassador to the Netherlands, Sajjad Hyder, had told the Dutch Foreign Minister that his country had no intention of making its own nuclear bomb. A spokesman for the Pakistan embassy in London said: 'We are trying to acquire technology and nothing more. We back the US in its non-proliferation policy.'



Van der Klaauw: tighter security

## Hot wind blows cold for grain market

INTERNATIONAL GRAIN markets may now be heading for a crisis of proportions not far short of the 1973/74 debacle. The total Soviet grain crop for 1979 will fall short of the official target of 226.8 million tons. The only question is by how much. The previous year's production was a record 237.2 million tons.

The most recent US Department of Agriculture estimate puts the crop at between 170 and 210 million tons.

At last week's Chicago close, wheat for July delivery was quoted at 484.50 US cents

per bushel, and the September and December positions traded respectively at 490 and 505.50 cents per bushel. These figures are striking compared with quotes even on 1 June, when July, September and December were quoted at 370, 374.50 and 385 cents a bushel.

Maize prices show a similar although slightly less pronounced upward drive.

The trouble is the feared 'Sukhovoy', a hot dry wind currently sweeping the Soviet grain belt and causing anything up to 55 or 60 million tons worth of damage to the crop.

# 8 Days

## MIDDLE EAST NEWS

### Carter steps into Afghan heat

PRESIDENT CARTER is reported to have used the 'hot line' to get President Brezhnev to cool down when Russian anger over the religious upsurge against the marxist regime in Afghanistan threatened to spill over into neighbouring Pakistan recently.

Although the Russians backed down on that occasion, there is still a possibility that the deteriorating Afghanistan situation could involve the two superpowers in a dangerous new confrontation.

Last weekend's heavy fighting in Kabul, with government helicopters and tanks brought in to crush an armed demonstration, was followed by a verbal onslaught from Kabul Radio on Pakistan's President Zia. The broadcast implied that Zia, by refusing to visit Afghanistan, was rejecting talks for a settlement of mutual differences.

Last month Muslim rebels had some startling successes against the government forces of President Taraki; an entire brigade of Afghan army engineers — some 2,500 men — had gone over to them, and there were indications that even more desertions were imminent. The tide seemed to be turning against Kabul's marxist

regime which, with some justification, blamed Pakistan for its reverses.

Thousands of Muslim 'freedom fighters' from Afghanistan involved in a jihad against 'the godless clique in Kabul' have found strong support from among their co-religionists in Pakistan. The traditional free movement across the unmarked frontier has also enabled them to operate from safe havens against the Kabul army and its Russian advisers. Last month the Soviet Union added its own warning.

'The warning was couched in such strong terms,' a Pakistani official explained, 'that it amounted to an ultimatum.'

The United States was consulted because it is still linked to Pakistan by an open-ended bilateral treaty. Pakistani sources say the Americans thought the situation grave enough to warrant a public 'hands off Pakistan' statement to the Soviet Union.

While such a declaration would normally have delighted the Pakistanis, it came at an extremely embarrassing time. The group of non-aligned nations was about to meet in Colombo to consider Pakistan's request for membership, and the proposed American statement could have been embarrassing if not damaging. So Jimmy Carter got on the hot line to Brezhnev.

(Red rag to Kabul rebels, page 10)

### US stirs up oil anger

THE STATEMENT by the new Nato military commander, General Bernard Rogers, that the US is drawing up plans for a large force to undertake military action to safeguard oil supplies in the event of a war in the Middle East or the third world, is expected to cool US-Arab relations even further, following the general Arab antipathy to the US-sponsored Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

According to Rogers, a corps of some 110,000 men together with supporting ships and aircraft has been established specifically to intervene wherever the oil flow is threatened. The force would not be used in the event of a war in Western Europe.

Despite the fact that the US is engaged in security talks with 'moderate' Arab states, which, according to US Defence Secretary Harold Brown, 'are concerned understandingly about the possibility of intervention from outside,' the fear of possible unilateral intervention in the Middle East by the US to safeguard oil supplies has been increasingly voiced by the Arab press. Many of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia — previously the US's strongest ally in the region — have indicated their opposition to such a move.

The only dissent has come from Sultan Qabous of Oman who last month called for increased US involvement in the Gulf, following the overthrow of the Shah's regime. Qabous's call — rejected by other Arab Gulf states — should, however, be seen in the context of internal Omani politics rather than concern for oil security. If he is to



Assad (left): sect violence

withstand rebellion in Dhofar province, which is threatening to burst out into the open again, Qabous must find military backing to replace the Iranians withdrawn after the Shah's overthrow.

Arab reaction to the plan for unilateral action to ensure oil supplies has so far been guarded. The only comments to emerge have come from the small pro-Soviet marxist Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), which described the plans as 'gunboat diplomacy' and from the Bahrain Gulf Daily News, which warned that it could lead to 'another Vietnam-style embroilment for the US.'

### Massacre splits Syrian front

THE KILLING of more than 50 military cadets at Aleppo, Syria, has raised the spectre of sectarian violence which the country — unlike its neighbours — has managed to avoid. The cadets belonged to the minority Shia Alawite sect.

The government has officially blamed the Muslim Brotherhood, an extremist Sunni organisation. Observers have attributed the attack as part of a campaign by the brotherhood to oust the Syrian leadership and install a right wing military government more representative of the Sunni majority.

Alawites make up 15 per cent of the population but many government and Baath party officials (including President Assad) belong to the sect.

Assassination attempts on Alawites have been gaining momentum. Another member of the sect, the deputy director of Mezze prison, Damascus, was shot dead while driving to work last week.

Diplomatic sources in Beirut doubt the allegation that the brotherhood is involved. It has denied responsibility for the massacre. But the killings are similar to an attack on a military academy near Cairo seven years ago in which 18 people died and for which the brotherhood was held responsible.

MEMORANDUM

Van: P.J.M. Verbeek

Datum: 6 juli 1979

Aan: Chef DIO

~~C E N T R A L~~

Onderwerp: Pakistan en het ultracentrifuge-projekt

Ik verzoek U de volgende wijzigingen te aanbrengen in het verslag van het interdeparle overleg op 15 juni jl. met EZ en BiZa over genoemde kwestie, dat U toeging bij mijn mem juni jl. No. 105/79. Het verslag geldt vanaf nu als definitief.

- ad 2 : 3e zin, "heeft ontvangen" wordt "is toegezonden".
- ad 3.2 : 1e zin, schrap "een volledige".  
slotzin, "2 maanden" wordt "16 werkdagen".
- ad 3.3 : 2e zin, "en bevatten" voeg in "naar schatting".
- ad 4.1.1: 2e zin, schrap "gezien de defensieve opstelling van FDO".
- ad 4.3 : vervang "beveiliging tegen spionnage van de UC-technologie" door "mogelijke levering door FDO van hardware voor een vermoedelijk Pakistaans UC-project, welke uitvoer onder meer in strijd zou zijn met het Geheimhoudingsbesluit kernenergie".

MEMORANDUM

cc DRW/AJ  
DIO/PJ  
BiZa  
EZ (D)

Van: P.J.M. Verbeek

Datum: 6 juli 1979

Aan: Chef DIO

~~GEHEIM~~

Onderwerp: Pakistan en het ultracentrifuge-projekt

Ik verzoek U de volgende wijzigingen te willen aanbrengen in het verslag van het interdepartementale overleg op 15 juni jl. met EZ en BiZa over bovengenoemde kwestie, dat U toeging bij mijn memo van 22 juni jl. No. 105/79. Het verslag geldt vanaf nu als definitief.

- ad 2 : 3e zin, "heeft ontvangen" wordt "is toegezonden".
- ad 3.2 : 1e zin, schrap "een volledige".  
slotzin, "2 maanden" wordt "16 werkdagen".
- ad 3.3 : 2e zin, "en bevatten" voeg in "naar schatting".
- ad 4.1.1: 2e zin, schrap "gezien de defensieve opstelling van FDO".
- ad 4.3 : vervang "beveiliging tegen spionage van de UC-technologie" door "mogelijke levering door FDO van hardware voor een vermoedelijk Pakistaans UC-project, welke uitvoer onder meer in strijd zou zijn met het Geheimhoudingsbesluit kernenergie".

2 versie  
ik kan  
al verslag  
met

22 AJ

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Wednesday 27 June 1979

MR LEO ABSE (Pontypool):

To ask the Secretary of State for Energy, what funding is provided through Urenco by British Nuclear Fuels Ltd as agents of Her Majesty's Government to the Almelo Institute in Holland; whether responsibility for security surveillances at the Almelo Institute is shared with British Nuclear Fuels Ltd; and whether he is satisfied that the existing security arrangements adequately protect the interests of the United Kingdom.

To ask the Secretary of State for Energy, what discussions he has had with the Dutch Government referring to the activities of Dr A Q Khan, a Pakistan subject formerly working at Almelo Institute, Holland; whether a review of Dr Khan's activities will take place at the next meeting of Inter-Governmental Joint Committee of Urenco; and whether, in view of public concern, he will make a statement.

To ask the Secretary of State for Energy, whether he is satisfied with the security surveillances Urenco possesses over work and research given by Urenco to outside laboratories; whether any confidential research worked was passed by Urenco to any laboratory or research centre employing or using the services of a Pakistan subject Dr A Q Khan; and what communications he has had with the Dutch Government over the issue of the subcontracting of Urenco research work with outside laboratories.

To ask the Secretary of State for Energy, whether any foreign subjects from countries who are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty are engaged in research at Urenco establishments at Capenhurst, Marlow or Almelo; and whether any bilateral agreements exist for the exchange of research information or research workers between Urenco and Pakistan.

---

The background to the allegations that a national of a fourth country had access to classified information about the centrifuge project through employment at Almelo were discussed by the Centrifuge Joint Committee last week. The Netherlands Government are making a full investigation of the circumstances of this occurrence.

In the light of the outcome of this, and of a review of detailed security arrangements by Urenco which will include subcontracting arrangements, the three governments will consider whether action is needed to strengthen the existing tripartite arrangements for protecting classified information.

/Under

Under a mutual financing agreement between the commercial partners, BNFL contributes on its own account to the capital cost of the Almelo plant, and receives contributions from the corresponding Netherlands and German organisations to the cost of Capenhurst. Security practice is based on rules agreed by the three governments and applied by each with its own territory. There are no bilateral agreements for the exchange of research information or research workers between Urenco and Pakistan or any other country.



Ministerie van Economische Zaken

's-Gravenhage.  
Gen./XXXXX.  
Kenmerk  
(bouw) Toestel

24-7-'79  
BEB/DMZ  
179/7923  
2204

Onderwerp

Uitvoer van strategische  
goederen

Daar het ernstig vermoeden bestaat dat van Nederland uit export heeft plaatsgevonden van strategische goederen, met name ook in de nucleaire sector, zonder dat daarvoor de vereiste vergunningen zijn aangevraagd, vestig ik - wellicht ten overvloede - Uw aandacht op het navolgende.

Voor de uitvoer van de in de bijlage bij het Uitvoerbesluit Strategische Goederen, laatstelijk gewijzigd in 1977 (Staatsblad 586), vermelde goederen is een uitvoervergunning vereist. Hoewel dit voor alle in deze bijlage vermelde goederen geldt vestig ik met name Uw aandacht op de posten 0101 tot en met 0141. Volledigheidshalve zend ik U hierbij een exemplaar in de Engelse taal van een ontworpen nucleaire lijst die zeer waarschijnlijk binnenkort, na vertaling, in de plaats zal komen van bedoelde posten.

Voor nadere inlichtingen - ook over de interpretatie van de vermelde goederen - verwijs ik U naar de afdeling In- en Uitvoer van Strategische goederen van mijn Ministerie.

Voor een goed begrip wijs ik U er ten slotte op, dat bovenvermelde regelingen, die met name ook zijn getroffen in het kader van bestaande internationale afspraken ter voorkoming van proliferatie van nucleaire kennis en produktie, en het mede daarop gebaseerde non-proliferatiebeleid van de Nederlandse regering, in samenhang moeten worden gezien met artikel 68 van de Kernenergiewet 1963 (Stb. 82) en het daarop gebaseerde Geheimhoudingsbesluit Kernenergiewet 1971 (Stb. 420). Dit besluit werd bij beschikking d.d. 24 september 1971, nr. 671/524 (Staatscourant 187 van 28 september 1971) van toepassing verklaard op gegevens, hulpmiddelen en materialen, onderzoeken en werkmethoden, alle betreffende het ultra-centrifuge-procédé.

DE MINISTER VAN ECONOMISCHE ZAKEN,  
(w.g.) G.M.V. van Aardenne

A) Bezuidenhoutseweg 30  
B) Leen van H O.  
Indo 122  
Pr. Beestdijk 7  
Postadres  
Postbus 20101  
EC's-Gravenhage  
Telefoon  
(070) 81 1011  
Telegramadres  
ecza ov  
Telex  
31019 ecza nl

PR  
NOBEL

Van: DRW/AT

Datum: 25 juli 1979.

Aan: Chef DIO

No. 118

Onderwerp: Werkgroep "Pakistan".

In de afgelopen vergadering van de Werkgroep "Pakistan" is overeengekomen dat de eerstvolgende vergadering zal plaatsvinden op donderdag, 26 juli, om 09.30 uur. Daar zowel Uzelf als de Heren Ettema en Verbeek met vakantie zijn, zou B.Z. slechts vertegenwoordigd worden door mijzelf. Onverwacht moet ik evenwel een belangrijke vergadering in Brussel bijwonen, zodat ook ik niet beschikbaar ben. Daar ik voorts niet van de regel wil afwijken dat geen andere personen dan de oorspronkelijk aanwezigen van deze delicate materie op de hoogte worden gebracht, en derhalve vervanging door mijn medewerker niet aan de orde is, heb ik de Plv. S.G. van E.Z., de Heer Bos, verzocht de vergadering uit te stellen. Deze heeft dit pertinent geweigerd, met als argument dat hij dan problemen kreeg met andere mensen over verwachte geplande vakanties. Ik vind dit geen argument, daar op de andere Departementen, voorzover mij bekend, altijd wel iemand beschikbaar is terwijl dit voor B.Z. op de 26e uitdrukkelijk niet het geval is. Ik heb hem in ieder geval laten weten dat B.Z. zich niet gebonden voelt door wat er op de 26e in onze afwezigheid wordt besproken.

*juist*

*DT*  
*DA*

.....



# AMBASSADE VAN HET KONINKRIJK DER NEDERLANDEN

ROYAL NETHERLANDS  
EMBASSY

No. 2410/471.

Islamabad, 31 juli 1979.

Onderwerp: Pakistan's nucleair programma.

Ik moge U berichten dat President Zia op 27 dezer, in een rede over de begroting, het navolgende heeft gesteld met betrekking tot Pakistan's nucleair programma:


"You would recall that for some time past Pakistan is being pressurised to accept certain uncalled for and discriminatory restrictions on its atomic energy programme, which militate against the sovereignty and authority of an independent and sovereign nation. We have given assurances that our objectives are peaceful and that in view of the paucity of energy resources, Pakistan has no option but to acquire nuclear technology. Despite this, our economic aid has been affected.

But we have absorbed its impact and the entire nation supported the Government stand because it was united on this issue. I assure you that we shall remain steadfast in our noble resolve and will not compromise on national interest. We shall bear our vicissitudes ourselves. We shall lift our own burden. We shall eat crumbs but will not allow our national interest to be compromised in any manner whatsoever. I will Insha Allah, dilate on this subject in my next address."

MIN. VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN	
DIR. DAW/AT	VISIE
NOEK.	2 AUG. 1979
LOKA.	Agr. 211531
DUISNER 813.339 2 Pakistan	

AFGESCHREVEN:

De Tijdelijk Zaakgelastigde,



R.M.F. van der Kroon

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken  
te  
's-GRAVENHAGE

1301  
Pakistan en het UC-procédé

~~SECRET~~  
10/10/1978  
18/11/78

1. Eind oktober 1978 is de Nederlandse regering van bevriende zijde geattendeerd op de pogingen van Pakistaanse zijde om in het buitenland materialen en apparatuur te betrekken voor de ontwikkeling en opzet van een eigen uraniumverrijkingsprocédé. Deze pogingen, die in een aantal Westerse landen zijn ondernomen, hebben er toen in Nederland toe geleid, dat aan de producenten van omvormers een schriftelijk waarschuwing is uitgegaan, dat voor de uitvoer van de en gelijksoortige apparatuur een vergunning van de Overheid is vereist krachtens het Uitvoerbesluit strategische goederen. Daarbij is toen duidelijk geattendeerd op de Kernenergiewet en het daarop gebaseerde geheimhoudingsbesluit strategische goederen.
2. In een uitzending van Z.D.F. 1) van 28 maart 1979 werd de mededeling gedaan dat Pakistan er in zou zijn geslaagd via Dr. Abdul Quader Khan toegang te krijgen tot de UC-technologie van de Troika-landen. Op grond van deze mededeling is in Nederland zonder verwijl het onderzoek gestart naar Khan's activiteiten in Nederland. Daarbij zijn in eerste instantie de tot zijn normale werkteerrein behorende activiteiten gezien. Nadien is ook, in samenwerking met het buitenland getracht inzicht te krijgen in Khan's eventuele illegale activiteiten in ons land en elders.
3. De Pakistani Abdul Q. Khan ging in 1963, na een voorleiding in Pakistan en, de BRD in Delft metaalkunde studeren en studeerde daar in 1967 af. Van 1968 - 1972 studeerde Khan in Leuven en promoveerde daar op een metallurgisch onderwerp.

1) Zweites Deutsches Fernseh.

4. In 1972 ontstond een vacature bij het F.D.O. (Fysisch Dynamisch Onderzoek Laboratorium) te Amsterdam, een onderdeel van V.M.F.-Stork (Verenigde Machine Fabrieken), dat betrokken is bij bepaalde aspecten van de ontwikkeling van apparatuur op het gebied van het ultracentrifugeprocédé ten behoeve van Urenco- Nederland. Deze vacature ontstond door ontslag van een metallurg in dienst van het FDO. Er is naar huidig weten geen aanwijzing dat Dr. Khan zijn "binnen geloofst"; het ging hier om een op normale wijze ontstane vacature gevolgd door een normale sollicitatieprocedure.
  
5. Er is een veiligheidsonderzoek ingesteld door de BV naar Dr. Khan. Daarbij zijn geen gegevens aan het licht gekomen die Khan's inschakeling bij FDO in de weg stonden.  
De betrokken dienst van het Ministerie van Economische Zaken verleende vervolgens toestemming tot inschakeling van Dr. Khan bij metallurgisch onderzoek door FDO t.b.v. UC.
  
6. Over Khan's aanstelling bij FDO is indertijd geen mededeling gedaan aan de Troika-partners. Binnen het verband van de Troika was het immers niet gebruikelijk mededeling te doen over de inschakeling van zogenaamde non-nationals bij de sub-contractors van UC.
  
7. De opdrachten van U.C.N. aan FDO waarbij Khan betrokken was gingen over metallurgische specificaties van de centrifuges. Khan's taak was o.a. studie over het verhitten en afkoelen van metalen houders en volgens moest hij daarover kwalificatie-rapporten opstellen. Met deze werkzaamheden heeft Khan kennis kunnen verkrijgen van een beperkt deel van de UC-technologie respectievelijk UC-research.

8. In een tijdsbestek van twee maanden is Dr. Khan gedurende in totaal 16 mandagen op de kantoren van UCN-Almelo gedetacheerd geweest voor het vertalen metallurgische specificaties van de G-2. Met het oog op de vereiste goedkeuring hiervoor ha voorafgaand mededeling moeten plaatsvinden zowel a de betrokken dienst van het Ministerie van Econo- mische Zaken als ook aan de Troika-partners. Dit i volgens de betrokken veiligheidsdienst in Almelo achterwege gebleven omdat de periode dat Khan in Almelo gedetacheerd is geweest kort was (16 mandag tevens omdat Khan gedurende zijn verblijf daar bep was in zijn bewegingsvrijheid; hij had alleen toeg tot het kantoorgedeelte van Almelo en niet tot de UC-fabriek of de cascade-hall.
9. Einde 1975 is Khan binnen FDO ove geplaatst naar c andere afdeling waar hij niet meer met UC-zaken te maken kreeg. Deze overplaatsing geschiedde omdat E gesignaleerd was op de nucleaire beurs NUCLEX in B om allerlei nucleaire gegevens te verzamelen, iets waartoe FDO hem een opdracht had gegeven. FDO wis evenmin dat Khan voornemens was deze beurs te bezo Dit feit en het vermoeden dat hij wellicht een, overigens ongeclassificeerd, technisch FDO-meetrap aan de Pakistaanse ambassade te Brussel had doorge geven (welke kort daarop een zeer gerichte order plaatste bij een Frans bedrijf, waarvan de specifi caties alleen maar afkomstig konden zijn uit dat ra port) leidden tot Khan's overplaatsing. Na enige maanden nam hij ontslag.
10. Na zijn ontslag teruggekeerd in Pakistan kreeg Kha een functie bij de afdeling research and developme van het Pakistaanse Ministerie van Financiën voor driejarig wetenschappelijk project en kreeg Khan t te maken met de Special Works Organisation die ond leiding staat van de Pakistan Atomic Energy Commis Deze organisatie is hoogstwaarschijnlijk belast me de leiding van het Pakistaanse UC-programma. Over

de exacte bezigheden van Khan binnen de S.W.O. staan g  
volledige gegevens ter beschikking.

In particuliere correspondentie van Khan met een vroeg  
FDO-collega beweerde betrokkene dat zijn contract met  
Pakistaanse overheid inmiddels is afgelopen en dat hij  
overweegt binnenkort weer naar het buitenland (Austral  
te vertrekken, waar hem een functie als hoogleraar zou  
zijn aangeboden. Deze informatie wordt nagetrokken.

- 11. Uit bijzondere bron verkregen informatie kan afgeleid worden dat Khan naast zijn legale een aantal illegale viteiten aan de dag gelegd heeft. Op grond van deze informatie is een diepgaand onderzoek ingesteld, dat thans niet is afgerond.

Conclusies:

- 1. De Nederlandse Regering stelt momenteel een diepg onderzoek in naar Khan's illegale activiteiten in Nederland en elders.
- 2. Dit onderzoek strekt zich ook uit over de vraag of en zo ja welke helpers Khan in Nederland en/of in andere (Troika-)landen heeft gehad. Daarbij is er te wijzen dat de essentiële ontwerpen van het centrifugemodel, dat thans in Pakistan zou draaien he SNOR-CNOR-model; aanwezig zijn in de drie Troika-landen.
- 3. De Regering heeft ook de vraag bezien of er vanuit Nederland van belang zijnde hard-ware naar Pakista geexporteerd. Informatie uit diverse bronnen wijst op essentiële hard-ware export naar Pakistan uit aantal Westerse landen waarbij Pakistan activiteit heeft ontplooid en mogelijk nog uitvoert in België de BRD, Nederland en Zwitserland, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en in de USA.
- 4. Vooruitlopend op de uitkomsten van bovengenoemd onderzoek naar de verkrijging door Pakistan van zowel ware als van software met betrekking tot het UC-1 cédé heeft Nederland naast de al in punt 1 genoemde

maatregelen stappen gezet ter voorkoming van eventuele export van hard-ware.

18/6/79

Van: Chef DIO

Datum: 8 augustus 1979

Aan: M via Chef DRW, DGPZ, DGES en S ~~CEWREEM~~

Onderwerp: Uw bezoek aan Minister Genscher en exportbeleid URENCO

Na mijn terugkeer van verlof trof ik een memorandum aan van DGIS waarin deze mij verzoekt U van advies te dienen over de al of niet wenselijkheid om het UC-exportbeleid aan de orde te doen komen tijdens Uw besprekingen met Minister Genscher.

Inmiddels is mij gebleken dat deze zaak in die zin reeds is geregeld dat het UC-exportbeleid niet op de agenda van Uw besprekingen zal staan, met name omdat van Duitse zijde daartoe geen directe aanleiding werd gezien. In het licht van de stand der besprekingen in de Troika-werkgroep en het Joint Committee, is dit naar ik meen een juist besluit. Intussen heeft Chef DRW geadviseerd dat U en marge van Uw officiële gesprekken met Minister Genscher deze kwestie toch aanroert, waarbij het voldoende zou zijn indien U op Uw collega een beroep zoudt doen om de Duitse ambtenaren te instrueren in de werkgroep en in het Joint Committee alle medewerking te verlenen om nog voor het einde van het jaar tot overeenstemming te geraken. Met dit advies van Chef DRW stem ik gaarne in.

Wel meen ik te moeten aantekenen dat, indien in werkgroep en Joint Committee overeenstemming uitblijft, Uw Britse en Duitse ambtgenoten, naar ik meen, door U zoudt moeten worden ~~Uw~~ gesproken over de belangrijkste alsdan nog uitstaande knelpunten. Ik kan mij niet voorstellen dat de Tweede Kamer er genoeg mee zou nemen indien U met Uw beide ambtgenoten slechts in zeer algemene zin over de werkzaamheden in Joint Committee en werkgroep van gedachten zoudt wisselen. Naar ik verwacht zal U t.z.t. vanuit de Kamer worden gevraagd of U op specifieke punten zoals FSS en IPS Uw Britse en Duitse collega's hebt benaderd en hoe zij beide op de Nederlandse desiderata terzake hebben gereageerd. Zoals ik boven aangaf, is dit moment thans echter nog niet gekomen, maar het zou zich zeer wel in september of begin oktober kunnen aandienen.



Kabinet van de Minister-President

412 /

Dhr. Van Galen de st  
... ..

MINISTERIE VAN ALGEMENE ZAKEN


's-Gravenhage, Binnenhof 20, telefoon 070-61 40 31

Aan de leden van de Groep Pakistan  
-----

Nr. 287513

's-Gravenhage, 9 augustus 1979

Ingevolge onze afspraak van 6 juli j.l. treft u als  
bijlage aan fotocopicën van passages uit de Handelingen  
van de Tweede Kamer d.d. 21 juni 1979 met betrekking  
tot het uitlekken van gegevens uit vertrouwelijk over-  
leg. Deze korte maar volledige passages spreken m.i.  
voor zichzelf.



(Drs. J.W. Holtslag)

Hol/A



De heer Waltmans (PPR): Mijnheer de Voorzitter! Naar aanleiding van de mondelinge beantwoording van vragen over de plannen van Pakistan, een eigen atoommacht op te bouwen, en de ontvreemding van wezenlijke gegevens van het ultracentrifugeprocédé hebben wij gisteren mondeling overleg gehad.

De Voorzitter: Mag ik even onderbreken? Licht het niet meer voor de hand dat u opmerkingen hierover maakt op het moment dat deze vragen aan de orde komen?

De heer Waltmans (PPR): Ik wil een verzoek vooraf doen, zodat u enige tijd heeft om dat te realiseren.

In het mondelinge overleg hebben de bewindslieden gevraagd om geheimhouding. De aanwezige leden van de commissies hebben zich hiertoe bereid verklaard. Wie schetst mijn verbazing, toen ik vanmorgen zowel in Trouw als in de Volkskrant een verslag – ik mag zo lang de geheimhouding niet is opgeheven, niet zeggen of het een volledig verslag is – van de vergadering las, dat niets anders kan zijn dan en niet anders beschouwd kan worden dan als een doorbreking van de geheimhouding? Er zijn kennelijk enkele kamerleden die uit de besloten vergadering hebben geklapt.

Er zijn twee mogelijkheden. De vergadering is besloten en de leden leggen zich neer bij een verzoek om geheimhouding of zij is open. Ik vraag u, de Regering te vragen, alles wat in het mondelinge overleg ter sprake is gekomen, niet langer onder de geheimhoudingsplicht te laten vallen, zodat ik straks, bij de mondelinge beantwoording van de vragen, optimaal kan functioneren.

De Voorzitter: De heer Waltmans stelt een interessante kwestie aan de orde. Er waren in de vergadering twee partners, Regering en Kamer. Als mededelingen in de pers zijn verschenen, is het evenzeer denkbaar dat deze van de zijde van de Regering komen als van de zijde van de Kamer. Ik stel dit voorop, omdat dit in het verleden ook eens is gebelegen.

#### Voorzitter

De heer Waltmans (PPR): Het is onvoorzichtig, dit nu te zeggen. Een van de kamerleden wordt letterlijk en uitvoerig geciteerd in de Volkskrant. Hij is zelfs van uw partij.

De Voorzitter: Zelfs dat kan uit de mond van een van de andere partners komen, zoals de geachte afgevaardigde kan weten. Ik heb het artikel niet gelezen en spreek dus zuiver in theorie. Ik acht het onvoorzichtig, bij voorbaat, terwijl geen onderzoek heeft plaatsgevonden, de schuld te laden op een van de kamerleden.

Een verzoek tot opheffing van de vertrouwelijkheid zal moeten worden gedaan in de vergadering van de commissies die de beslissing hebben genomen dat de bespreking geheim was. Ik heb niet de bevoegdheid, in dezen ook maar iets te doen of voor te stellen. Dit staat uitsluitend ter beoordeling van de commissievergadering, in gezamenlijk overleg tussen Regering en commissies.

De heer Waltmans (PPR): Ik heb het voornemen, straks bij de beantwoording van de vragen geen gebruik te maken van gegevens uit de besloten vergadering, tenzij zij vandaag in Volkskrant en Trouw zijn verschenen.

De Voorzitter: Ik wacht af wat de heer Waltmans gaat doen.

---

Minister Van Aardenne: Mijnheer de Voorzitter! Mijn collega's van Buitenlandse en van Binnenlandse Zaken en ik hebben gisterenmiddag in de vaste Commissies voor Kernenergie en voor Buitenlandse Zaken wat bijzonderheden naar voren gebracht over de achtergronden die ook hier een rol spelen en met name ook over het onderzoek dat thans loopt. Wij hebben dat gedaan onder het uitdrukkelijke voorbehoud – de voorzitter van de commissie heeft dat ook met zoveel woorden vastgelegd – van vertrouwelijkheid.

Mij is gebleken, dat er toch in enkele ochtendbladen van vandaag bijzonderheden worden vermeld die vertrouwelijk waren medegedeeld. Ik hoop – van de kant van de Regering zal dit uiteraard ook worden aangekaart – dat hiernaar een grondig onderzoek wordt ingesteld. Het betekent namelijk dat de Regering, aangezien het onderzoek naar deze belangrijke aangelegenheid en het tegengaan van proliferatie vanuit Nederland niet gediend zijn met schending van vertrouwelijkheid, uitermate terughoudend zal moeten worden – ongewild – bij het verstrekken van mededelingen aan de kamercommissie. Wij zouden dat zeer betreuren.

De Voorzitter: Tenzij uit het onderzoek zou blijken, dat het lek zich aan de zijde van de Regering bevond, uiteraard.

Minister Van Aardenne: Uiteraard. Daarom heb ik om een onderzoek gevraagd en daarom heb ik gezegd dat zo'n onderzoek ook van de kant van de Regering zal worden geëntameerd.

De vergadering wordt van 18.32 uur tot 20.07 uur geschorst.

De Voorzitter: Ik wil mededeling aan de Kamer doen van de eerste en misschien moet ik zeggen voorlopige resultaten van het onderzoek, dat is gedaan naar de vermeende of echte lekkage, waarover wij aan het begin van de beraadslaging vandaag spraken, resulterend in artikelen in de Volkskrant en Trouw. Voor mij heb ik een brief

van de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken en het verslag van een bespreking, die heeft plaatsgevonden in de vaste Commissie voor Buitenlandse Zaken en de vaste Commissie voor de Kernenergie. Ik noem aan, dat ik er goed aan doe, daarvan nu mededeling te doen. De brief van de Minister van Binnenlandse Zaken luidt:

's-Gravenhage, 21 juni 1979

Hooggeacht heer Voorzitter:

In aansluiting aan onze gedachtenwisseling van hedenmorgen waarin wij elkander toezegden dat ieder voor zich zou nagaan hoe het mogelijk is geweest dat er bijzonderheden uit het vertrouwelijk beraad tussen de vaste Commissies voor Buitenlandse Zaken en voor Kernenergie en de Ministers van Buitenlandse Zaken, van Economische Zaken en van Binnenlandse Zaken d.d. 20 juni de pers hebben bereikt, en dat wij elkaar op de hoogte zouden houden van onze bevindingen, kan ik U het volgende mededelen.

De Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken en de Minister van Economische Zaken hebben mij desgevraagd verzekerd over de inhoud van het overleg met de bovengenoemde commissies geen enkele mededeling aan de pers te hebben gedaan.

Dat geldt ook voor mij.

De bij het overleg aanwezige ambtenaren hebben eveneens op de individueel aan hen voorgelegde vraag verklaard geen informatie over het besprokene aan de pers te hebben verstrekt.

Met vriendelijke groot,

(w.g.) H. Wiegel.

Het verslag van het overleg in de twee genoemde commissies luidt:

'Aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer

De vaste commissies voor buitenlandse zaken en voor kernenergie hebben zich op Uw verzoek beraden over de vermeende lekkage naar de Volkskrant en Trouw over het mondeling overleg van gisteren. De commissies hebben vastgesteld dat het mondeling overleg zoals gebruikelijk vertrouwelijk was en dat zulks, misschien ten overvloede, aan het begin van het overleg is vastgesteld.

In het bericht in de Volkskrant worden twee Kamerleden met name geciteerd. Het citaat van mevrouw Lambers-Macquebard betreft slechts haar eigen mening en kan dus naar de mening van de commissies niet als lekkage, in strijd met de vertrouwelijkheid van het overleg, worden beschouwd.

#### Voorzitter

In de Volkskrant wordt verder een weergave van mededelingen van minister Van der Klaauw over een internationaal onderzoek en de termijn daarvan, in de mond gelegd van het Kamerlid Ter Beek. Deze mededelingen zijn echter door minister Van der Klaauw, blijkens het concept-verslag en hetgeen de aanwezigen zich ervan herinneren, tijdens het overleg niet gedaan, zodat ook hier niet van lekkage, in strijd met de vertrouwelijkheid, kan worden gesproken.

Trouw vermeldt een bezoek dat de Pakistaanse ambassadeur bij minister Van der Klaauw heeft gebracht. Dit bezoek is inderdaad tijdens het mondeling overleg aan de orde geweest, maar de mededelingen van de Pakistaanse ambassadeur zijn door de minister Van der Klaauw niet met die toevoegingen overgebracht als zij in Trouw zijn weergegeven. Trouw noemt ook niet een Kamerlid als bron. Deze beide omstandigheden tezamen genomen geven de commissies onvoldoende reden om te concluderen dat hier lekkage, in strijd met de vertrouwelijkheid heeft plaatsgevonden.

Resteren de beide mededelingen die zijn verwerkt in de eerste alinea van het artikel in de Volkskrant. De eerste mededeling betreft het feit dat de Pakistaanse metaaldeskundige zestien dagen heeft gewerkt op de Uraniumverrijkingsfabriek in Almelo. De commissies achten het aannemelijk dat dit feit ook langs andere weg door het mondeling overleg bij het Kamerlid Ter Beek en anderen bekend heeft kunnen zijn.

De tweede mededeling betreft het feit dat minister Wiegel tijdens het mondeling overleg bevestigde dat zijnerzijds een intensief onderzoek naar het verleden van de Pakistaanse metaaldeskundige zou zijn gedaan, als hij van de tijdelijke detachering in Almelo had geweten. Dit feit kan allen door mededeling uit het mondeling overleg aan de Volkskrant bekend zijn geworden. Het Kamerlid Ter Beek heeft aan de commissies medegedeeld dat hij de bron hiervoor is geweest en zijn spijt hiervoor betuigt.

Samenvattende stellen de commissies vast dat de lekkage in strijd met de vertrouwelijkheid slechts één mededeling betreft. Zij menen dat die mededeling voor de hand ligt en daarom niet een zeer groot gewicht had. Andere mededelingen, die naar de mening van de commissies van grotere betekenis waren en die ook in het concept-verslag zijn weergegeven, zijn niet in de beide krantartikelen terug te vinden.

De commissies concluderen derhalve dat hier een schending van de vertrouwelijkheid op beperkte schaal heeft plaatsgevonden.

De voorzitter van de vaste commissie voor buitenlandse zaken, (w.g.) P. Dankert.

De voorzitter van de vaste commissie voor kernenergie, (w.g.) J. van Houwelingen.

~~GEHEIM~~

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

REFERENTIE No: 410678	KOPIE No:
Dir./Afd.: dio/pi	
Visie	
Ag. No:	
Dossier:	

# VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN VERZENDING:

13 augustus 1979

AFKOMSTIG VAN:

min v b z

MINUUT GEPARAFEERD DOOR:

ett/kru/tvs

BESTEMD VOOR: islamabad

PARAAF/OPM.:

onderwerp : pakistan u c / dr. khan.

~~GEHEIM~~

r u c 63 in fine.

door u ware over voornoemde aangelegenheid geen contact te zoeken met v s ambassade, tenzij kennisname van brief mij alsnog aanleiding zou geven u daartoe te instrueren.

voor uw eigen orientatie diene dat aan beweerde onschuld van khan geen geloof kan worden gehecht.

celer 34

GEHEIM

Over de inhoud van bericht per telefo...

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbin...

De afzender mag teleg. niet in open taal worden afgegeven, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie richtlijnen).



# ONTVANGEN TELEXBERICHT

350.756

Kopie: m r t s dgpz ap dges drw dgis plan amad  
dpr dev dic, -/adn/ec doa, -/za  
dwhp -/nz jura dav aod

Dir.	Visie
Ag. no.	
Dossier	

new delhi, 16 aug 1979

afkomstig van: amb. new delhi  
bestemd voor : min van b z

onderwerp : speech premier charan singh,  
nucleair beleid.

tijdens speech, uitgesproken tijdens massale bijeenkomst ter gelegenheid onafhankelijkheidsdag op 15 dezer, is charan singh ingegaan op nucleaire beleid in india in licht van pakistaanse nucleaire aspiraties. hoewel bijeenkomst door medewerker werd bijgewoond kan, in verband met feit dat speech in hindi was en geen vertaling werd gegeven, het volgende slechts aan de pers worden ontleend.

indien pakistan een atoombom zou vervaardigen, aldus de prime minister, zou india zijn besluit er geen te maken in heroverweging dienen te nemen. pakistan's enige doel om een atoombom te produceren zou zijn om hem tegen india te gebruiken. quo pakistan has friendly relations with china, it has no serious differences with the soviet union and it is absurd to think that the bomb will be used against afghanistan. the bomb is obviously aimed at us and it poses a danger to our peace and security unquo, aldus de door de indian express weergegeven passage uit de rede van charan singh.

commentaar van uw vorige ambtgenoot, nu in oppositie zittende vajpayee luidde volgens reeds genoemde krant quo the statement hinting at revision of the nucleair policy would harden the american attitude towards us and may effect the next instalment of enriched uranium supply for tarapur unquo.

stel mij voor hierop binnenkort nader terug te komen.

leopold 350.756

46

~~GEHEIM~~

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN  
AFDELING VERBINDINGEN  
16-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28  
TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

REFERENTIE No: 410816	KOPIE No: 7
Dir./Afd.: dio/pi	
Visie	
Ag. No:	
Dossier:	

# VERZONDEN CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN VERZENDING:  
16 augustus 1979  
AFKOMSTIG VAN:  
min v b z

MINUUT GEPARAFEERD DOOR:  
ett

KOPIE.

1. Op een uddelbet, naar ...  
geantwoord, tenzij aan ...  
voldaan (zie Richtlijn ...)

2. ...  
3. ...  
4. ...

5. ...

6. ...

7. ...

8. ...

9. ...

10. ...

11. ...

12. ...

13. ...

14. ...

15. ...

16. ...

17. ...

18. ...

19. ...

20. ...

21. ...

22. ...

23. ...

24. ...

25. ...

26. ...

27. ...

28. ...

29. ...

30. ...

31. ...

32. ...

33. ...

34. ...

35. ...

36. ...

37. ...

38. ...

39. ...

40. ...

41. ...

42. ...

43. ...

44. ...

45. ...

46. ...

47. ...

48. ...

49. ...

50. ...

51. ...

52. ...

53. ...

54. ...

55. ...

56. ...

57. ...

58. ...

59. ...

60. ...

61. ...

62. ...

63. ...

64. ...

65. ...

66. ...

67. ...

68. ...

69. ...

70. ...

71. ...

72. ...

73. ...

74. ...

75. ...

76. ...

77. ...

78. ...

79. ...

80. ...

81. ...

82. ...

83. ...

84. ...

85. ...

86. ...

87. ...

88. ...

89. ...

90. ...

91. ...

92. ...

93. ...

94. ...

95. ...

96. ...

97. ...

98. ...

99. ...

100. ...

BESTEMD VOOR: islamabad

PARAAF/OPM:

Onderwerp: Pakistan u c / dr. Khan.

~~GEHEIM~~

16 augustus 1979

Verzoeken opgaaft van koerier waarmee en nummer  
van onder brief van Khan is/wordt verstuurd.  
Zending alhier nog niet traceerbaar.

celen 35 ++

GEHEIM



40

MINISTERIE VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN

AFDELING VERBINDINGEN

's-GRAVENHAGE, LANGE HOUTSTRAAT 28

TEL. Nos: 465622; 614941 - 2531

ONTVANGEN  
CODEBERICHT

DATUM VAN ONTVANGST:

17 augustus 1979

BESTEMD VOOR:

min van buitenl. zaken

REFERENTIE No: 817449	KOPIE No: /
Dir./Afd.: dio/pi	
Visie:	
Ag. No:	
Dossier:	

DATUM VAN AFZENDING:

17 augustus 1979

KOPIE:

dgpz  
 dges dgl  
 chef drw  
 hfd drw/at  
 chef dio  
 hfd dio/pi  
 dio/ov (drs.)  
 verbeek

NOOS  
 nu.

AFKOMSTIG VAN:

i s l a m a b a d

PARAAF/OPM.:

onderwerp : pakistan - u.c./dr. khan

~~GEHELIJ~~

n.u.c. 35

*Handwritten initials*

brief dr. khan verzonden per q.m. dd. 13 augustus.  
dk-nummer 9. enveloppe geadresseerd aan dgpz persoonlijk  
(zendbrief nummer : 2574-12 g.s.-498).

van der kroon 64 ++

*Handwritten signature*

GEHELIJ



1. Op een codeber. mag teleg. niet in open taal worden geantwoord, tenzij aan bepaalde voorwaarden wordt voldaan (zie Richtlijnen).

2. Afschriften van codeberichten mogen uitsluitend door de afdeling Verbindingen worden vervaardigd.

3. Over de inhoud van een codeber. mag niet met verwijzing naar dat bericht per telefoon worden gesproken.

4. Dossiers, welke codeber. bevatten, dienen veilig te worden opgeborgen.







OPERATION "NUCLEAR GENIE"

E. Shashkov

Reports that Pakistan has managed to obtain secret data on the modern methods of uranium enrichment and is taking practical steps along the road of making nuclear weapons have been coming for quite a while now. Moreover, last summer in UN circles there spread information that Pakistan was preparing to carry out the explosion of a nuclear device in the immediate future. And recently Press Asia International with a reference to well-informed sources has reported that a plan envisaging the tests of an atomic explosive device has been worked out in Pakistan. Pakistani leaders occasionally deny such reports, but these cannot be left without attention and cause serious concern in all the countries that stand for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

According to foreign press reports, Pakistan started implementing its nuclear programme 25 years ago; in 1953 it set up an atomic energy commission. In 1964 a 5 megawatt reactor went into operation in the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology located near Islamabad. Then in 1972 a 137 megawatt reactor was launched. From the outset the West had assumed "patronage" over the nuclear programme of Pakistan. The Americans installed the first reactor, and the Canadians the second.

But reports have been appearing with increasing frequency that some people in Pakistan advocate a diversion of the nuclear programme from peaceful to entirely different uses. In 1976 a contract for the supply to Pakistan of a plant reprocessing the nuclear fuel already used in reactors was signed with France. The technology of this process would make it possible to obtain pure plutonium-- a potential nuclear explosive material. This deal caused a storm of indignation among the French public and serious anxiety throughout the world. The implementation of the contract was suspended.

For the production of atomic bombs, if we do not go into complex technical details, there are mainly two roads--through the obtaining of pure plutonium or highly enriched uranium. After France annulled the contract and the attempts to get the technology of extracting pure plutonium failed, Pakistan, according to foreign press reports, is now trying to solve this problem by taking the second course.

The classical method of uranium enrichment is extremely complex and requires large capital investments. But an entirely new method has been discovered in the last few years. In 1970 the governments of Britain, the FRG and Holland organised a consortium URENCO on a share basis. The aim was the enrichment of uranium by the method of gas centrifuge as a potentially less costly way for obtaining nuclear fuel.

- 2 -

Over the recent years, the British newspaper Daily Telegraph wrote not long ago, Islamabad has been vigorously persuading some leading Pakistani atomic scientists working abroad to return home and take part in the national nuclear programme. Two of them left their jobs with the URENCO plants in Almelo and came back. Nowadays, the newspaper says, they live under strict police protection and are engaged in developing a nuclear blasting device.

According to the foreign press, the Pakistani government continues, judging by everything, to purchase in Europe, particularly in Britain and the Netherlands, equipment and materials for the uranium gas separation plant now under construction in the Kohata area. For these purposes, Pakistan set up the "special works organisation" headed, as foreign newspapers said, by Brigadier-General Anis Ali Sayed, and two officers of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission act as supply agents of the organisation. The project's director-general is Dr. Khan, one of the two scientists who left the Netherlands.

Official statistics show that formally Pakistan allocates insignificant funds for atomic research. Thus, as little as 48 million rupees were allocated for these purposes for the 1979/80 fiscal year. However, the scale of operations of the "special works organisation" shows that the country spends considerably more on its nuclear programme.

It is yet difficult to say how close Pakistan has come to the development of the atom bomb. However, there are reasons to think that the country is working on military uses of atomic energy. This, of course, cannot but give rise to concern all over the world.

The discontinuation of the arms race, primarily the nuclear weapons drive, would consolidate world peace. Great importance is also attached to the promotion of the nuclear non-proliferation regime because the extension of the "atom club" is fraught with a tremendous threat for mankind. This question has been discussed on many occasions by the UN General Assembly which will also take it up at its current session. The serious threat to international security, stemming from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, was underscored at the Brezhnev-Carter meeting in Vienna. Those who under the guise of the peaceful uses of atomic energy are trying to carry out altogether different plans must realise the grave responsibility they assume in this connection.

(Sovetskaya Rossia, October 24. Abridged.)

# ONTVANGEN TELEXBERICHT

nr.  
21844

volgt toevoegingsblad

Kopie: m r t s d g p z a p d ges die des drw  
d g i s p l a n a m a d d p n d e v d i o, - / a f d n / e c  
d a m, - / b u r d o a, - / z a j u r a d a v a o d

Dir.	Visie
Ag. no.	
Dossier	

djeddah, 27 aug. 79

afkomstig van: djedda  
bestemd voor minbuza

onderwerp: interview met pakistaanse president zia ul-haq in  
dagblad arab news.

dagblad arab news bracht 21 dezer uitvoerig interview met  
pakistaanse president, zia ul-haq, die van 20 t/m. 23 dezer  
saoedi-arabie bezocht.  
volgen voornaamste passages:

quote:

pakistans nuclear program is designed to acquire nuclear tech  
nology because of growing shortage of energy from other sources  
and the high cost of imported oil. by 1983 we will have to find  
alternatives or we will be in trouble. oil is running away with  
30 percent of our budget.  
my government is coming under intense american pressure to  
abandon its nuclear program. it is unfair of the united states  
to discriminate against us and they do it openly. american  
diplomats have told me that they are singling out pakistan because  
it has no nuclear capabilities yet unlike other countries that  
already possess it.  
the u.s. wants to prevent us from making a bomb even though  
we have no such intention. if we wanted to, nobody could stop  
us anyway.  
even our friends who used to help us are being pressured by the  
u.s. to curtail aid. the aid for pakistan consortium which meets  
under the aegis of the world bank is being persuaded to reduce  
its assistance. but despite this pressure we have a lot of  
stamina and we can withstand it.

vraag: wenst pakistan geen nuclear evenwicht te bereiken met  
beide grote bureu, india en china?

antwoord: they are good neighbours and relations with india  
have improved since my coming to power in july 1977. we  
are not competing with anybody. indeed it was pakistan which  
proposed a nuclear free zone in the area and offered to permit  
international supervision and safeguards of our nuclear program  
if others would do likewise.

vraag: hoe is de huidige economische toestand van pakistan?

antwoord: economically we are still not out of the woods. our  
position is precarious because of past economic policies.

production has decreased and we have enormous foreign debts running into several billions of dollars. Last year's debt service instalment amounted to us dollar 700 million. we have imported more than we export, despite massive cuts on imports of such luxury items as cars, fans, airconditioners, fridges and the like. but our import bill keeps rising, us dollar 935 million for oil, us doll 325 million for wheat, us doll. 225 million for edible oils, us doll. 80 million for tea. our industry is still import-oriented since we have to import the raw materials for it. we need help to revive our economy. this used to come from iran. the world bank and the islamic development bank also help, and we are specially grateful to saudi arabia for its assistance to us in difficult times. saudi arabia has always responded to our requests for aid.

vraag: kunt u uw plan toelichten om een burgerregering in te stellen er is toch oppositie geweest tegen uw idee een speciale constitutionele rol aan de strijdkrachten toe te kennen?

antwoord: the point has been misunderstood. i wanted the army to owe their allegiance to the head of state, rather than to the chief executive, to safeguard democracy rather than to jeopardize it. the head of state can order the armed forces to hold elections in times of trouble. the army can not act as a political arm under the chief executive and should remain aloof from the mainstream of politics with safeguards against military intervention on the nation's political life.

the armed forces are the very stable and productive institution in the country (the ex-vcsvdq mppzhtto) had prostituted almost everything else. besides i must say that no amount of safeguards can prevent an army commander from staging a coup so we should run the country in such a way as to prevent a military coup.

vraag: wat zult u doen als de meeste politieke partijen de verkiezingen zullen boycotten?

antwoord: we are actually holding two elections, one for the local self-government institutions and the other for the national assembly. we have to reach the grass roots first and hand over the power at that level before going on to the general elections. the elections will be contested by individuals not by parties. if the parties want to boycott them, they are welcome to.

vraag: volgens de politieke partijen heeft het door u voorgestelde evenredige vertegenwoordigingsplan ten doel te voorkomen dat een van hen een meerderheid in het parlement zal behalen?

antwoord: this is totally wrong, pure propaganda. proportional representation as the word implies means that the party will get the majority that it deserves, on the basis of the number of votes it has gained. very small parties which fail to get over five percent of the votes of three-seats will be discounted. if one party candidate wins 280 votes of a total number of 1000 votes thus topping three other candidates who together poll

==blad 3=nr. 21844

the balance, he will be elected outright. but what about the others whom he did not represent? will they be ignored as in the past?

vraag: zult u zich verkiesbaar stellen?

antwoord: there is nothing to stop me from doing that if i wanted but first i will have to resign from the army as chief of staff and other posts as well.

unquote.

volker 21844 *CV*

# ONTVANGEN TELEXBERICHT

Kopie:

m r t s d g p z ap d ges d g i s plan am ad op n d c v  
die des dr w dio, - / a f d n / e c d o a, - / z a j u r a v d e  
a o d

Dir.	J.R. A.T.	Visie
Ag. no.	240393	
Dossier	813.339.2	

**DOSSIERKOPIE**

afkomstig van : ambassade islamabad 79 AUG 31 11:11  
bestemd voor : min van B.Z.

onderwerp : nucleair programma pakistan.

op 30 dezer heeft president zia in een rede waarin hij o.m. nadere richtlijnen gaf voor de komende lokale en nationale verkiezingen eveneens een lange passage gewijd aan pakistan's nucleaire programma.

na de dringende energie behoeften te hebben onderstreept, verdedigde president zia het grondrecht van landen als pakistan om een nucleair energieprogramma op te zetten. over de buitenlandse druk om pakistan tegen te houden stelde hij o.m.:

"all attempts to subdue pakistan have only steeled its determination".

president zia ronderde dit onderwerp als volgt af:

"before i close this subject i would like to declare it once again that our atomic programme is peaceful and it is a question of life and death for us to acquire this technology for our economic progress. but we have no intention of using this technology for manufacturing or acquiring atomic weapons."

van der kroon 595.371

islamabad, 31 augustus 1979

via radio

2840/551.

gedeelte rede president Zia m.b.t.  
nucleair programma.

de Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken  
te  
's-GRAVENHAGE

x

dzz, telex no. 595.371  
dd. 31 augustus 1979

MIN. VAN BUITENLANDSE ZAKEN	
DIR. DRW/AI	
INGEK.	10 SEP. 1979
F. no.	249252
DOSSIER	813.339.2 xxx

Pakistan



Islamabad, 4 september 1979

AFGESCHREVEN

Handwritten notes: "1070", "1212111", "1200", and a bracketed "13!"



almost all the Islamic countries in it. In view of this, I have decided to lead the Pakistan delegation myself. Our participation will achieve for Pakistan a position which, in spite of our efforts for the last many years, we were not able to attain.

[ The next important issue is that of atomic energy. It is the desire and effort of all countries in the world to acquire modern technology for promoting prosperity and welfare of their people. A study of world history would make it manifestly clear that no technology has remained confined to any one country or a few circles. Every nation has tried to acquire each new technology according to its own capacity and resources in order to eliminate poverty and want and set itself on the path of progress. The same is true of the atomic energy. At present, there are about 50 countries which are engaged in atomic research and generation of electricity through nuclear power. Dozens of other countries intend adopting the same course.

The ratio of energy consumption in Pakistan is far less than that of the other countries of the world. The consumption of electricity in Pakistan is one-tenth of the average world consumption and one-third of the consumption in Asian countries. Pakistan is finding it difficult even to meet its present requirement because Pakistan is greatly lacking in <sup>indigenous</sup> resources of energy and has very limited means of generating hydel electric power.

The main source of generating electric power in the country is hydel power. Even if we can put all these resources to practical use we would be able to meet only one-third of our requirements by the end of this century. Our gas resources are also limited and hardly suffice our requirements of domestic fuel, chemical fertilizers and some other industries. We are short of coal and in any case it can never help fill the gap of energy.

We have to import oil from other countries in large quantities and its prices are daily rising. By way of illustration it may be stated that six years ago, we were spending 600 to 700 million rupees annually on oil imports. But as I said last time, we are today incurring an expenditure of 9,350 million rupees. This constitutes 40 per cent of our annual foreign exchange earnings while the developed countries expend at the most, only 10 per cent of their foreign exchange earnings on oil imports. In these circumstances, there is no option for us but to go in for the most modern technology to improve the lot of our poor, backward people.

Economic experts in the West have gone so far as to say that in the near future it will just not be possible to achieve industrial and economic progress without atomic energy. Pakistan wants to set itself on the path of modern progress. Pakistan is a developing country but poverty is not its destiny. How can the self-respecting people of Pakistan reconcile themselves to the position that with each passing day they should become <sup>poorer</sup> while the rest of the

Pakistan is not the only country which is trying to acquire atomic technology. Most countries of the Third World do not have it. Is it just and fair that the Third World should be kept deprived of this technology for the sake of preserving the monopoly of a few countries? Is it consistent with human rights that the developing countries should remain dependent on others? Is it not the basic right of all independent and sovereign countries that they should be able to illuminate their future with the light of this energy? Which religion, society, law or principle of this world permits that on the face of this globe, some of its inhabitants should continue to enjoy ever-new comforts of life while dozens of countries of the Third World and millions of human beings should continue to grind under the mills of backwardness, and suffer from lack of basic necessities of life.

Pakistan's atomic research programme is meant for peaceful purposes. In order to implement this programme, we entered into an agreement with France for the purchase of an atomic re-processing plant. This agreement was neither concluded in a hurry nor in a calandestine manner. For years detailed negotiations were conducted on an international level. The entire world and the International Atomic Energy Agency were fully aware of it.

During these negotiations, Pakistan willingly agreed to all those safeguards which were considered necessary by the International Atomic Energy Agency. I have gone further and said that we are willing to agree to additional safeguards provided that similar safeguards are made applicable, without discrimination, to other countries also.

I have recently written personal letters to the Prime Minister of India and the American President.

Before I close this subject I would like to declare it once again that our atomic programme is peaceful and it is a question of life and death for us to acquire this technology for our economic progress. But we have no intention of using this technology for manufacturing or acquiring atomic weapons.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let us now turn to politics. At present the controversy in the field of politics centres on the forthcoming elections. Several prominent political leaders, Ulema, intellectuals and worried citizens have repeatedly advised me that for God's sake do not hold elections in the present circumstances because they might cause harm to the country. They say that almost all our neighbouring countries are facing near crisis conditions. We must avoid it. Some people have termed the present method of elections as totally un-Islamic. Their view is that there is no concept of political parties in Islam. They feel that it is necessary to complete the induction of Nizam-e-Islam before the elections. Some of the factors which have contributed to this approach are:

- a) the bitter experience of the results of past elections;
- b) the tradition of negative politics in the country; and,
- c) the tendency towards violence and agitation.

I leave it to you to judge how many of these are facts of life and how many mere apprehensions. But I personally