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A WALLED WORLD
TOWARDS A GLOBAL APARTHEID

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

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Towards the end of 1989, two historic walls tumbled, astonishing and inspiring people worldwide. The first, on 9 November 1989, was the fall of the Berlin Wall after 28 years. The second wall was more symbolic, but equally important in the way it divided people and segregated lives – the system of apartheid in South Africa. Even while Berliners started to dismantle the wall that separated them piece by piece, the newly appointed president of South Africa, F.W. de Klerk, had begun negotiating with the African National Congress (ANC), starting a process of ending apartheid. In February 1990, de Klerk unbanned the African National Congress, released Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, and ended the state of emergency.

It is sobering, therefore, that 30 years later, the world has more walls than ever. From six in 1989, there are now at least 63 physical walls along borders or on occupied territory across the world, and in many countries, political leaders are arguing for more of them. Many more countries have militarised their frontiers through the deployment of troops, ships, aircraft, drones, and digital surveillance, patrolling land, sea and air. If we counted these 'walls', they would number in their hundreds. As a result, it is now more dangerous than ever before for people fleeing poverty and violence to cross borders, after which the border apparatus is still an active threat.

We are truly living in a walled world. These fortresses segregate people, protecting privilege and power and denying others human rights and dignity. This report argues that 30 years after its dismantling in South Africa, our walled world is creating a new kind of global apartheid. Such borders are constructed on racist ideologies, deny groups of people basic rights and perpetuate violence. As this report argues, the concept of global apartheid 'helps explain tendencies and structures of power and global segregation' in which 'walls are just one of the physical and visible dimensions of the growing cultural, structural and physical violence that

this system creates in the world'.

The report examines the expansion of walls built by a growing number of states, the underlying causes of the emergence of a global apartheid, and the corporations that are seeking to profit. As well as providing a global overview of border walls, the report looks at seven case studies: Australia, India, Israel, Mexico–Guatemala, Spain, Syria and Western Sahara. It shows that:

- There has been a steady increase in the number of walls since 1989 with notable surges in 2005 and 2015. Fourteen walls were built in 2015 alone. As of 2018, there are 63 physical walls worldwide.

- The research concludes that 6 out of every ten people in the world live in a country that has built walls on its borders.

- Asia has the largest number of walls (56%) followed by Europe (26%) and Africa (16%).

- The principal justifications for governments to erect walls are to stop immigration and terrorism – the key motives for half of the world's walls. Specifically, the reasons given are to prevent immigration (32%), terrorism (18%), contraband of goods and people trafficking or smuggling (16%), drug-trafficking (10%), territorial disputes (11%), and stopping foreign militants (5%).

- Israel has the largest number of walls (six), followed by Morocco, Iran and India (three), and South Africa, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Jordan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Hungary and Lithuania (two).

- India has three border walls of 6,540 km, covering 43% of its borders.

- Western Sahara has a wall built by occupying Moroccan forces considered 'the greatest functional military barrier in the world, 2,720 km long surrounded by nine million land mines', making it one of the world's most heavily mined countries.

- Australia's case shows that countries do not need physical walls to keep out migrants. Australia's armed forces and the Maritime Border Command of the Australian Border Force use patrol vessels and aircraft to guard the maritime borders coupled with a highly controversial offshore detention system that violates human rights. Australia spent an estimated AUS$5 billion on border security between 2013 and 2019.

- Mexico's militarised border with Guatemala does not require a physical wall. Here an extensive security infrastructure, with US equipment and funding through the Frontera Sur programme, has been constructed at and around the border, pushing migrants to embark on more dangerous routes and into the hands of traffickers and smugglers.

- Four of the five countries bordering Syria have built walls, although the situation of the civilian population is critical: 13 million are in need of humanitarian aid and 6.2 million are internally displaced.

Driving and profiting from this surge in wall-building is an entire Border Industrial Complex. This industry has reinforced a narrative in which migration and other political and/or humanitarian challenges at the border are primarily framed as a security problem, where the frontier can never be secure enough, and for which its latest military and security technologies are always the solution.

Many walls and fences are built by local construction companies or by state entities, such as the military. However, the walls are invariably accompanied by a range of technological systems – such as monitoring, detection and identification equipment, vehicles, aircraft and arms – which military and security firms provide. Autonomous and robotic systems, such as drones and smart towers, are also increasingly used (or tested) for border security, including as part of, or connected to, walls and fences.

- Our earlier research identified large arms companies such as Airbus, General Dynamics, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, L3 Technologies, Northrop Grumman and Thales as the major beneficiaries of contracts connected to the building of border walls and fences in Europe and the US. This report shows that a range of companies, including CSRA, EDat-Con, Elbit, Indra, Leidos and Raytheon are also hugely involved in the global market for walls and fences.

- Israeli companies such as Elbit and Magal Security are globally significant in building and supporting walls, often promoting their work internationally by highlighting their 'field-tested' involvement in the building of Israel's extensive infrastructure of walls and fences within its occupied territories.

Behind the rise in walls and the border industry lies a powerful and manipulative narrative that has become hegemonic. It argues that migrants, in particular, are a threat to a way of life in particular countries, rather than victims of economic and political policies perpetuated and promoted by some of the world's richest

countries that force people to leave their homes. This narrative uses a language of fear to persuade citizens to support security-based solutions, in particular the militarisation of borders, and to turn a blind eye to its deadly consequences. It is manipulative, because it distracts people from the real causes of insecurity – the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of a small elite, a system that exists only because of the exploitation of the world's poorest populations – that prevents the provision of housing, health care, education, and livelihoods to all that would ensure lasting security and peace.

The narrative of fear and security is clearly beguiling, as shown by the increase in walls worldwide, but the historical experiences of the fall of the Berlin Wall and apartheid 30 years ago show that it is not immutable. Changes in public opinion, particularly as a result of successful mobilisation of popular movements, can undermine even the strongest systems of oppression. Walls that divide us may seem permanent but education and political action can bring them down. It is time for a new wave of mobilisation – against the walled world that merely serves a small elite and betrays the hopes of the vast majority of humanity who want to live in dignity and with justice.



INTRODUCTION

This report follows the work initiated by the Centre Delàs d'Estudis per la Pau in 2018 with the publication of *Raising Walls: Policies of Securitization and Fear in the European Union*, which analysed the numerous walls that have been built by the European Union (EU) to intercept migrants. In addition, the report by Stop Wapenhandel and the Transnational Institute, *The Business of Building Walls*, addressed the companies associated with the military and security industrial complex that are behind the construction of walls in the EU. Today, the global context is no better than it was in 2018. The latest data published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) shows that, at the end of 2019, a total of 79.5 million people had been forcibly displaced from their homes (UNHCR, 2019). This figure rises every year –in 2018 it was 70.8 million, an increase of over 9 million.

Despite the growing number of people seeking shelter, many countries are building border walls in order to stop migration and other 'threats' to state security issues, while continuing to follow a securitising, militarised model that casts humanitarian problems as security issues, assigning them a military character. As a result, force, coercion and security forces are used to tackle these problems.

This report seeks to analyse the progressive increase in the construction of border walls around the world – who builds them and why, and the main companies in the military and security industrial complex that profit from these massive construction projects:

- The first chapter analyses the global context of securitisation and the expansion of fear-based narratives, in addition to data on the construction of walls from 1968 to 2018. It does not examine walls built before this period, which would show that the total number of border walls is much higher.

- The second chapter analyses the different meanings attached to the concept of 'apartheid', and the relationship between wall construction and the violent structures of apartheid-based regimes. Some examples of walls have been selected owing to their paradigmatic nature (Australia, India, Israel, Mexico, Sahara, Spain and Syria), which help to explain several common trends. Other examples show how border walls are established without the need for a physical structure.

- The third chapter examines the most important corporate players in the military–industrial security complex involved in the construction, advancement and consolidation of border walls and fences, based on those involved in the cases covered in Chapter 2.

Our analysis of walls built during the 1968–2018 period draws on newspaper articles, academic works that focus on the phenomenon, such as those by Reece Jones or Elisabeth Vallet and by researchers specialising in in the investigation of walls, such as the historian David Frye (2009) as well as Andrea Mubi and Mattias Kärholm. Gathering information on walls is a complex task because of the lack of reliable data. For this reason, all the data are based on estimates, although various sources have been consulted in order to provide the most accurate approximation possible. Some walls have been included as 'border walls', although their demarcation may be a matter of dispute or the result of a territorial conquest that is not recognised by all parties involved.

In relation to the role of corporates involved in creating Global Apartheid, we referred to diverse sources: government documents, contracts, company websites, military and security sector media, the press and work by non-government organisations (NGOs) and researchers. It was not possible to identify all the companies involved in every construction presented in this report. Sometimes there is a lack of government transparency, or the wall or fence was built long ago, or most of the work was undertaken by the military or the security forces, with unknown companies providing material and equipment. There is little to be found, for example, on companies involved in the Western Sahara barrier. Similarly, the military regime of Myanmar, which has built a fence on the border with Bangladesh, is not known for its transparency.

The research seeks to address the following questions:

- How many walls that create violence between peoples have been built over the last 50 years?
- What are the main reasons given to justify this wall-building process?
- Are we heading towards what could be described as Global Apartheid?
- Which companies are profiting from the increasing wall-building process worldwide?

In sum, this research aims to improve understanding of current international border-management security policies, and of the violence that is generated against people who have fled their homes, often due to violence. The construction of border walls and the walling-up of states is exacerbating inequality by creating enclosed areas that separate people who appear to enjoy the privileges of protection from those who remain unprotected on the other side of the wall.

1. WALLS, SECURITY AND FEAR

1.1 THE GLOBALISATION OF FEAR, INSECURITY AND RISK

The new threats in border areas and those that affect migratory flows from the perspective of securitisation and from the paradigm of the risk-averse society have been defined by Léonard (2010: 231) as an 'extreme politicization of migration and its presentation as a threat to security'. This politicisation and the securitisation of migration is characterised by a risk-averse society that fosters a culture of fear.

The risk-averse society is one that is increasingly concerned about its future and its security, which entails the need to co-exist with risks that 'remove the veil of latency and gain a new, central meaning in social and political discussions' (Beck, 2006). The new risks (unlike the business and professional risks of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) are no longer limited to specific places and social groups, but tend to be global and universal: nuclear risk, pollution, global warming, epidemics and environmental degradation. Societies view themselves as being more insecure and new types of risks emerge that fundamentally affect the dispossessed, but from which the powerful are not immune.

Risk and fear are closely linked. Noam Chomsky (1996) writes about the culture of fear, and details strategies that are based on imposing silence and sowing fear. In this work he analyses Colombia, where in 1996 the top 3% of large landowners possessed over 70% of the country's arable land, while 57% of the poorest farmers subsisted on less than 3%. In this country, where 40% of the population lives in 'absolute poverty', the strategy of promoting fear has worked for decades, with mechanisms that have established a permanent culture of fear that has been highly effective in silencing protests and social dissent. In recent decades this culture of fear has spread across the planet, sowing racism and xenophobia and appealing to the basest of human instincts.

Uncertainty about the future and instability in the present are the bases of fear, but also of political action. Social scientists consider that some anxiety may motivate people to support policies that help solve problems (Perceval, 2018). At present, however, we face the paradox that those who promise immunity, protection and tranquillity are also those who manage fear for their own benefit (Perceval, 2018: 222). In this regard, Noam Chomsky (2016) explains the strategy of the powerful and the rich defending their castle when he says 'as the world ended for us and we can no longer colonize or prey on new lands, the powerful can only attain more and more by increasing inequalities and protecting their privileges with armies'. The subtlety of this strategy is, that rather than explicitly demanding the need to safeguard their power and privilege through methods of force and violence, these powerful and skilful fear-mongers create discourses and scenarios of fear so that the general public demands to be protected, as Hobbes argued in *Leviathan* (cited in Perceval, 2018: 224). A

generalised culture of fear does not aim to protect the general public, but is a perverse mechanism whose objective is to maintain and increase the power and the inheritance of the elites.

It could be said that being safe involves living free of fear and being able to cover essential needs (housing, food, health, education, etc.). Security is therefore closely related to the concept of risk (threats to values and our current way of life) and to the absence of fear. Clearly, threats and risks may be objective or subjective; fear, on the other hand, is always subjective, and often linked to the perception of the risk of dying, being attacked or losing what we own. Since safety and fear (unlike risk) are not easily quantifiable, objective risk assessment is one of the key factors in understanding and objectively evaluating hazards, risks and levels of safety.

The analysis undertaken by Chris Harris (2018) of the results of the 2017 Eurobarometer regarding the subjective social perception of the number of immigrants in EU countries is highly revealing. With the sole exception of Estonia, the proportion of immigrants that people believe reside in their country is much higher than the true percentage. In Italy, for example, the social perception is that the percentage of immigrants is 24.6%, whereas in fact it is 7%. In Spain, these perception gaps are 23% and 9%, and in the Netherlands, 12.5% and 9%. In Poland, the perception is 10% while the real percentage is 1% and in Slovakia, they are 8% and 0.6%. This is a clear example of the amplified perception of subjective risk, with its corresponding contribution to increased collective fear. Even from the perspective of a xenophobic discourse that claims that the immigrant population increases risks, in many countries the objective proportion of immigrants is so low that any arguments regarding insecurity and associated risks would not hold water. Our hypothesis is that, in some countries more than in others, the powers with an interest in promoting a culture of fear have effectively used this discourse to increase social perceptions of subjective risk. This is the only way to explain cases such as Poland, where the average perception of immigrant numbers is ten times higher than the true figures.

The concept of securitisation is a recent one. According to Zygmunt Bauman (2016)

> 'Recently, the hitherto unknown term' securitisation 'has appeared in public discourse. This buzzword refers to the increasingly frequent trend to reclassify something that was previously considered to belong to another phenomenal category as an example of "insecurity". This re-categorization almost automatically entails the transfer of this thing to the sphere of responsibility and the supervision of [state] security organs. Securitization, although it may not have the expected effects, helps politicians convince their voters that they are taking their complaints seriously and acting swiftly'.

Threats and risky situations create fear. But a fear of others is not a spontaneous feeling. It is motivated by interests, and it is fostered, because without fear there is no market for security. There are important interests with respect to promoting discourses that allege the existence of new and greater threats and, therefore, that sow fear among the general public, with the aim of aiding the political agendas and the economic interests of sectors linked to security. The intentional promotion of fear, which is often based on the myth of insecurity associated with immigrants, facilitates militarised responses, with an approach to securitisation that is highly profitable for some and which at the same time may lead to violent extremism. As Bauman (2016) explains,

> 'securitization is a magic trick calculated to be nothing more than that: it is a trick that consists of diverting anxiety away from the problems that governments are unable to face, too recalcitrant to tackle. However another 'latent' objective also exists within this securitization: that of business. The business of fear, which is nourished by social demand, and which is induced, seeking protection from the 'other', i.e. the foreigners. This is the business that makes politicians and their friends wealthy in northern countries, it is the business that puts up borders and walls, closing them off from people while leaving them permeable to the flow of capital and of arms'.

The events of 11 September 2001, 9/11, provided security discourse on migration and borders with the perfect setting for its expansion. It reached into sectors normally distant from racist theses, thus contributing to the amplification and perception of new threats. In the absence of a true understanding and analysis of border phenomena or of specific elements that generate global insecurity, border areas become a place where different fears and prejudices are implanted, which in reality may have nothing to do with borders and their associated phenomena. This is how certain social sectors propose border reinforcements – in order to provide a fictitious sensation and an immediate and short-term sense of security, based in part on the construction of border walls.

The security discourse attempts to claim a victory over the risk-averse society, with a utopian vision of total security and 'zero risk' for those who wish to live 'protected' by walls. This is, of course, impossible, given that achieving zero risk comes with an infinite cost. The fact of wanting to eliminate all risks, be they real or fabricated, requires a mobilisation of resources that could better be used to deal with the true threats to our societies, such as housing shortag-

es, unemployment or gender-based violence. In short: the security discourse reduces resources that should be allocated to policies for human security that are based on the needs of all members of society, and on the protection of their rights and dignity.

As will be explored in the next section, the main justifications governments give for border walls include immigration (32%) and terrorism (18%), totalling 50% of all cited reasons. They focus on national security rather than on citizens' human security. The issue is centred on risks and not on the profits made by the security industries and those associated with building and maintaining 'protective' walls. The discourses on immigration, terrorism and risks intentionally depart from the real data and objective values in order to foment subjective social perceptions that bear no relation to reality (Harris, 2018). Social support for the construction of border walls is based on an intentional amplification of risks, with political and media discourses that promote a generalised culture of fear of immigration and immigrants.

The walls try to stop the 'other' – those we fear, the strangers that we believe may disturb our existence, the human beings that the official discourse wants us to view as generators of insecurity. Curiously, in a world in which economic power, information and communication are all global, governments and politicians speak of fortresses and castles – ignoring the fact that our home is the planet – while at the same time concealing their own economic interests. The security-based discourse is presented as the great solution that will allow us to overcome fear, by building walls that will protect us from threats and avoid risks. This specious argument can be challenged by a simple analysis based on the objective quantification of risks. Because life itself is a risk, the human condition is to understand how to live with it, by calibrating our fears on the basis of objective risks in the world around us. The objective risk of suffering housing problems, of not having a job, or dying of an illness, is of a far greater order of magnitude than might arise from immigration or terrorism. Furthermore, the security discourse threatens the dignity of the 'other'– immigrants, human beings just like those of us who live inside fortresses. A comparative analysis of the quantitative value of the various objective risks we face clearly indicates that those associated with areas of human security (food, housing, health) are much higher than those put forward in the discourses of militarised security (Brunet, 2017). In this context, it seems obvious that the security budgets used to build walls should be invested in areas related to genuine human security, and which represent a greater risk for the population at large – such as health, for example – although this would significantly reduce the business and the profits of many actors in the realms of global power.

Citing philosopher Kwarme Anthony Appiah, Zygmunt Bauman argued that

> [T]he challenge is to transform the hearts and minds that have been formed over millennia and equip them with ideas and institutions that allow us to live together as the global tribe that we have finally become. A great challenge, by all means: a challenge of life and death (joint life, joint death). We are approaching, or perhaps we have already reached, a fork in the path of our possible futures: cooperative well-being or collective extinction. And we are still unable to become aware of the global interdependence of our species, which will certainly not revert [...], the conversations that may take place between both sides of the borders may be either pleasant or simply irritating, but more so than anything, they are inevitable.

If cross-border dialogue is 'inevitable', security solutions that maintain, expand, and construct border walls no longer make sense. The walls should fall, in order to give way to agoras, or assembly places, for dialogue and transit.

1.2 BUILDING WALLS IN THE WORLD

The narrative used to justify the development of the security process and of a society governed by the concept of risk, creates societies that perceive themselves as insecure, which ultimately leads to segregation (Melgaço and Botello, 2015: 150). This segregation arises from social sectors that seek isolation from supposedly threatening elements in order to achieve a form of security.

The consequences are that the dynamics centred on fear, security and risk serve to divide and fracture different sectors and layers of society, based on their perceived risks and the resources at their disposal to tackle them. In this way, the physical division of space becomes a common policy and the creation of barriers is the means to implement it. Walls are then essential artefacts in a world moving towards isolation.

Table 1 shows the number of border walls built during the 50-year period between 1968 and 2018. At the time of writing (October 2020), the data was valid and so do not account for any walls that have since been dismantled.

Table 1. Border Walls built Worldwide from 1968 to 2018

Region	Sub-regions	Wall-building state	State/Area	Year begun (approx)	Government justifications
AFRICA	Northern Africa	Morocco	Saharawi territories (51) (99) (111)	1987 (1) (111)	Territorial conquest, Territory in dispute (1) (5)
			Algeria (10) (12) (118)	2015(19) (203)	Drug trafficking, Immigration (11)(20)
			Spain (Melilla) (75)	2014 (75)	Immigration
		Tunisia (17)	Libya (15) (71) (72) (73) (111) (76)	2015 (71) (203)	Terrorism, Contraband (15) (16) (71) (73) (74)
		Algeria	Morocco (12) (18) (7)(8)	2015 (9)	Contraband, Terrorism (13) (14) (20)
		Egypt (25)	Gaza Strip (28) (51)	2009 (1) (25)	Contraband (25) (26)
	Eastern Africa	Kenya	Somalia (158) (157) (159) (a)	201 (158)	Terrorism, Contraband (158) (157) (159)
	Southern Africa	South Africa	Zimbabwe (99) (160) (164) (b)	1985 (160) (164)	Immigration (160) (161)
			Mozambique (99) (118) (166)	1986 (118)	Entry of militants, Immigration, Poaching/ Contraband (118) (167) (168)
		Botswana	Zimbabwe (111) (118) (161) (99)	2003 (161) (163)	Immigration, (118) Animal health (161) (163)
	Western Africa	Nigeria	Cameroon (205) (208) (209)	2014 (205)	Terrorism ,Contraband, Territorial tension (205) (208)
AMERICAS	North America	United States (4)	Mexico (51) (78)	1990 (4)	Immigration Drug trafficking (4)

Region	Sub-regions	Wall-building state	State/Area	Year begun (approx)	Government justifications
ASIA	Western Asia	Israel	Palestine (West Bank) [36]	2002 [1]	Terrorism
			Egypt [27]	2011 [27] [42]	Immigration [27] [28]
			Gaza Strip	1994 [1]	Terrorism,
			Jordan [33] [34]	2015 [36]	Immigration Terrorism [32]
			Lebanon [28][29] [30] [31]	2012 [35] [39]	Terrorism [29] [39]
			Syria (Golan Heights) [27] [36] [37] [42]	1973/2013 [27] [41] [42]	Immigration, Terrorism [27]
		Saudi Arabia	Iraq [44] [50]	2006 [209]	Terrorism, Trafficking [43] [44]
			Yemen [43] [46]	2013 [45] [46]	Immigration, Terrorism [45]
		Oman	Yemen [47] [49]	2013 [47] [56]	Contraband [47]
		United Arab Emirates	Oman [48] [55] [56] [148]	2005 [148]	Immigration [55] [56]
			Saudi Arabia	2007 [209]	
		Jordan [58]	Syria [60] [62] [111]	2008 [61] [63]	Terrorism, Immigration, Contraband [58] [60]
			Iraq [60] [62] [111]	2008 [61] [63]	Terrorism, Immigration, Contraband [60]
		Turkey	Syria [6] [63][64] [75]	2013 [207]	Terrorism, Immigration [63] [65] [66]
			Iran [64] [66]	2017 [64]	Immigration, Contraband, Entry of militants [64]
		Iraq	Syria [68] [69] [75] [148]	2018 [67] [68] [69]	Terrorism [67] [68] [69]
		Kuwait	Iraq [51] [77] [80] [118]	1994 [79]	Post-invasion [77] [79]
		Azerbaijan	Armenia [209] [214]	2015 [115]	Territorial tension
		Cyprus	North Cyprus – South Cyprus [51] [230]	1974 [1][7] [111]	Territorial conquest, Territory in dispute [230] [231]
	Southern Asia	Pakistan (Durand Line)	Afghanistan [51] [89] [90] [117]	2005 [209]	Terrorism, Immigration [89] [91] [117], Territorial tension
		Iran	Iraq [97] [98]	2015 [112]	Terrorism [97] Contraband [98]
			Afghanistan [54] [95] [112]	2000 [112]	Drug-trafficking [54]
			Pakistan [54] [92] [93] [94]	2011 [112]	Drug-trafficking [54] Immigration [92] [94]
		India [1]	Pakistan [3] [51] [111] [118] [121] [123]	1992 [118]	Territorial dispute, Terrorism [3] [118]
			Bangladesh [125] [123]	1989 [1] [112] [124]	Immigration [1] [120], crime [119], Drug trafficking [122] [123], Entry of militants [125]
			Myanmar/Burma [124] [112] [148]	2003 [124] [112]	Drug trafficking, Entry of militants [124] [125]

Region	Sub-regions	Wall-building state	State/Area	Year begun (approx)	Government justifications
ASIA (cont.)	Central Asia	Turkmenistan	Uzbekistan [99] [102] [104]	2001 [99] [116]	Immigration [99]
			Afghanistan [101] [103]	2014 [101]	Terrorism [101], Contraband, Drug trafficking [103]
		Uzbekistan	Afghanistan [99] [112] [114] [116]	2001 [212] [213]	Immigration, Terrorism [115] [116]
		Kazakhstan	Uzbekistan [99] [105] [106] [112]	2006 [107] [116]	Drug trafficking [99] Immigration, Drug trafficking [107], Territorial dispute [116]
			Kirghizstan [108]	2010 [109] [209]	Contraband [108]
		Kirghizstan	Kazakhstan [109]	2015 [258]	
	Eastern Asia	China	North Korea [111] [128] [130] [131]	2006 [130]	Immigration [128] [130] [131]
	Southeast Asia	Myanmar/ Burma	Bangladesh [136] [137] [140]	2009 [138] [140]	Expulsion and entry prevention of Rohingya [136] [137] [139] [141]
		Thailand	Malaysia [118] [148] [150]	2004 [148] [149]	Contraband, Drug trafficking, Entry of militants, Terrorism [142] [143] [150]
		Malaysia	Thailand [118] [145] [146] [149]	1991-2004 [118] 1997 [144]	Contraband, Drug trafficking, Entry of militants, Terrorism, immigration [142] [143] [144]
		Brunei	Malaysia (Limbang) [147] [148] [112] [124]	2005 [148] [112]	Territorial dispute [151]
EUROPE	Western Europe	Austria	Slovenia [24] [51] [178]	2015 [185]	Immigration [51] [185]
	Eastern Europe	Bulgaria	Turkey [51] [178] [184]	2013 [52] [182]	Immigration [52] [183] [184]
		Hungary	Croatia [51] [178] [185]	2015 [185] [202]	Immigration [51] [202]
			Serbia [6] [23] [51] [178]	2015 [201] [202]	Immigration [6] [23] [51] [201]
		Ukraine	Russia [84] [165] [238] [239]	2015 [84] [238] [240]	Tension with Russia, Immigration, Contraband [165] [240]
		Russia (South Ossetia)	Georgia [248] [253] [254]	2009 [248]	Territorial tension, Borders in dispute [80] [82] [83] [248] [254]
	Northern Europe	Latvia	Russia [178] [210] [213]	2015 [210] [212]	Territorial tension, Immigration, Contraband [210] [211] [212]
		Lithuania	Russia (Kaliningrad) [216] [217] [219]	2015 [217] [218]	Territorial tension, Contraband, Immigration, EU External border [216] [217] [218] [221]
			Belarus [209] [220] [222] [223] [224] [225]	2005 [209]	Contraband, Immigration, EU External border [222] [223]
		United Kingdom	France (Port of Calais) [51] [178] [226]	2016 [228] [229]	Immigration [5] [226] [227] [228] [229]
		Norway	Russia [22] [176] [178]	2016 [235] [237]	Immigration [22] [235] [237]
		Estonia	Russia [255] [256]	2018 [255] [257]	Territorial tension [255]

Region	Sub-regions	Wall-building state	State/Area	Year begun (approx)	Government justifications
EUROPE (cont.)	Southern Europe	Greece	Turkey [178] [184]	2012 [182] [185]	Immigration [179] [180] [181]
		Slovenia	Croatia [178] [232]	2015 [232] [233] [234]	Immigration [232] [233] [234]
		Spain	Ceuta-Morocco [178] [245] [246]	1993 [182] [247]	Immigration [51] [245] [247]
			Melilla-Morocco [178] [244] [245]	1996 [182] [247]	Immigration [51] [244] [245]
		Macedonia	Greece [51] [178] [188]	2016 [187]	Immigration [51] [186]

Source: Author, using the sources shown (see Annex 1).
*Walls built before 1968 are not included, although they may still exist (e.g. between North Korea and South Korea)

AFigure 1 shows the evolution of wall construction with respect to the information in Table 1. From 1968 to 1973 no border walls were constructed. In 1973 Israel built a wall in the territory of another state – Syria – and in the area of the Golan Heights, which consolidated a territorial conquest. As will be seen, Israel plays a prominent role in building walls around the world. The next wall was constructed by Turkey in Cyprus in 1974, and which divided the north and south of the island, also based on Turkey's territorial conquest.

As can be seen from Figure 1, the construction of walls was maintained and increased throughout the period studied. The year 2005 shows a marked rise from 17 in 2004 to 21. The greatest increase was between 2014, when there were 42 walls to 56 in 2015. Most of the 14 walls built across the world in that year were in the EU, coinciding with the arrival of thousands of people seeking to enter Europe.

Figure 1 shows that the world has progressively been moving towards what could be defined as 'global apartheid', even though the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 – one of the most renowned and symbolic walls in living history. Since then, the number of border walls rose from six in 1989 to 63 in 2018, and which still remain at the time of writing.

Figure 1. Border Walls built Worldwide from 1968 to 2018



Source: Author's calculation

Of the regions that have been the most enthusiastic promoters of border walls, Asia stands out as with 56%, followed by Europe with 26%, Africa with 16%, and 1% in the Americas, representing the US wall on the Mexican border. It is only the countries of Oceania that have no border walls, although, as will be seen later, in Australia the sea serves as a border barrier (Hyndman and Mountz, 2008: 253; Paz, 2017: 610). Paz (2017) argues that it is important not only to analyse which walls are built and why, but also to analyse the policies applied in border issues, and which may cause other elements to act in the same way as a wall, and for same reasons.

Figure 2 shows that the most noteworthy by far is West Asia (which includes the countries of the Middle East) with a total of 19 walls. A long way behind is South Asia with just six walls in total, in Pakistan, India, and Iran. North Africa, Central Asia and northern Europe, account for six each, while four sub-regions have only one each –West Africa (Nigeria), North America (the US and Mexico), East Asia (China), and Western Europe (Austria).

In order to analyse the global expansion of border walls, one needs to address the main justifications governments make for them – bearing in mind that governments do not always reveal their true policy agendas. Figure 3 presents a general framework of the justifications used for the construction of the border walls.

As can be seen, the main reasons given are Immigration (32%), Terrorism (18%) Goods and People Trafficking (16%), Drug Trafficking (10%), Territorial Disputes and Tensions (11%) and the entry of militants from other countries (5%). The remaining reasons given include the fact that the country is on the EU's external border, Territorial Conquests, Animal Health and Poaching. Addressing immigration and terrorism are the main justifications, accounting for half of all these walls worldwide (Table 2).

Figure 2. Border Walls by Sub-region



Source: Author's calculation.
Source for regions: United Nations' Statistics Division

Table 2. Number of Walls, according to Governments' Reasons

Main Reasons Advanced by Governments	Walls Built
Immigration	38
Terrorism	22
Smuggling	19
Drug Trafficking	12
Territorial Tension & Disputes	13
Entry of Militants	6
External EU Border	2
Territorial Conquest	2
Animal Health	1
Poaching	1

Source: Author's calculations

Are wall-building policies effective in addressing immigration and terrorism? For reasons pertaining to immigration, a total of 38 walls were built between 1968 and 2018, 22 to counter terrorism, 19 to prevent smuggling, 12 to halt drug trafficking and 13 owing to territorial tensions or disputed territories. Some walls were built for more than one alleged reason, which is why the total number of walls showen in Table 2 does not coincide with the total built during the 1968–2018 period.

Finally, Table 3 ranks countries according to the number of border walls that they have built, and that are still standing today.

As Table 3 shows, Israel tops the list for the most border walls built (six), followed by India, Iran and Morocco three each. Countries with two border walls are South Africa, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Hungary and Lithuania – the latter two are EU member states. We have been unable to look at the length of each wall because of the difficulty in obtaining data, or the number of walls compared to a country's total borders with other countries, which would highlight their degree of isolation from its neighbours. For example, if a country has four national frontiers and builds three walls, it suggests the political determination to close its borders.

Frye (2019: 291) calls this the 'Second Era of Walls' and argues that in the twentieth century, these 'eclipsed … in every way' (2019: 296) the first wave (which began with the constructions of Ancient Greece and ended in the late nineteenth century).

Countries worldwide have moved towards a policy of building walls in order to curb problems of various kinds. Above all, the entry into a globalised world has brought more walls than in the history of humankind raises many questions about their value, meaning and functions for contemporary societies.

Figure 3. Governments' Main Jusifications for Border Walls



Source: Author's calculations

Table 3. Ranking of countries by Border Walls Built between 1968 and 2018

Israel	6
India	3
Iran	3
Morocco	3
Saudi Arabia	2
United Arab Emirates	2
Spain	2
Hungary	2
Jordan	2
Kazakhstan	2
Turkmenistan	2
Turkey	2
Algeria	1
Austria	1
Azerbaijan	1
Botswana	1
Bulgaria	1
China	1
Cyprus	1
Egypt	1
Slovenia	1
United States	1
Estonia	1
Greece	1
Iraq	1
Kenya	1
Kyrgyzstan	1
Kuwait	1
Latvia	1
Lithuania	2
Macedonia	1
Myanmar/Burma	1
Nigeria	1
Norway	1
Oman	1
Pakistan (Durand Line)	1
United Kingdom	1
Russia (South Ossetia)	1
South Africa	2
Thailand	1
Tunisia	1
Ukraine	1
Uzbekistan	1

Source: Author's calculations



2. WALLS FOR A GLOBAL APARTHEID

2.1 THE CONSTRUCTION OF A GLOBAL APARTHEID

Walls are such a familiar part of our daily life, mediating and shaping the cities and environments in which we live, that their true significance is often overlooked. Walls play a greater role in societies than is always recognised, making them relevant to analysing and understanding the world around us. Some have observed that analysing the functions of walls could contribute to social and political studies by examining socio-spatial relationships, the forms of institutionalised power, and the creation and organisation of regions at different spatial scales they represent (Mubi and Kärrholm, 2019: 1).

According to Young (2019: 17), walls are essential in creating shelter against the inclemency of the outside world, providing protection and security, although their characteristics and functions depend on their context and complementary elements, which define their functions and meanings. For instance, walls may be used in order to oppress, or contribute to oppression, and consolidate systems and policies that support various forms of violence. Walls can therefore, serve both to protect and to segregate (Mubi and Kärrholm, 2019: 1).

The South African apartheid regime is one of the most egregious examples of segregationist policies. In Afrikaans, 'apartheid' means 'apartness' (Levine and Streamlau, 2001: 576). South African apartheid was consolidated with policies based on the fallacious concept of race that that had previously been imposed by successive colonial governments (Levine and Streamlau, 2001: 576). The apartheid government built walls on its borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique, but these were geographically and politically marginal rather than being a central plank of the regime.

The whole system of apartheid was based on three types of violence, as defined by Galtung (cited in Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2011: 51). *Structural violence* was evident, given that native black and 'non-white' citizens and residents originally from other parts of the world, such Asia, were denied the right to participate in any political process, while legislation allowed settlers to plunder native lands. Separation and segregation policies of all kinds were implemented, and black labour was exploited (Levine and Streamlau, 2001: 576). *Cultural violence* was based on the broad social acceptance of racism based on the assumed superiority of whites over the rest of the population. Finally, *physical violence* was used to impose cultural and structural violence, based on extreme repression and militarisation (Levine and Streamlau, 2001: 578), consolidating the policies of segregation through the use of force and social control. The outcome was an entire network of institutionalised racism that was deeply rooted in the colonial model in the South African apartheid system.

This experience and the fight against apartheid in South Africa led to the creation of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid. In 1973, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Convention in which the signatory states recognised apartheid as a crime against humanity (United Nations, 1973). This later appeared in the Statutes of Rome, which led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC), a tribunal linked to the United Nations and dependent on the ratification of the states in order to deal with crimes of an international character. Article 7 mentions apartheid among the statutes of crimes against humanity:

> '(H) The term 'the crime of apartheid' is understood to refer to inhuman acts of a similar character to those mentioned in Paragraph 1, as committed in the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and the domination of a racial group over one or more racial groups and with the intention to maintain that regime;' (Statute of Rome from the International Criminal Court, 1976: 6)

These crimes include 'murder, torture, inhuman treatment and the arbitrary detention of members of a racial group; the deliberate imposition on a racial group of living conditions calculated to cause their physical destruction; discriminatory legislative measures in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres; measures that divide the population according to racial criteria by creating separate residential areas for racial groups; the prohibition of interracial marriages; and the persecution of people who oppose apartheid' (United Nations, 2020).

Although the apartheid regime in South Africa ended in 1994 with the first democratic elections, the Convention remains in force. In fact, a substantial body of expert legal evidence confirms that the Israeli government is an apartheid regime as defined in international law (Falk, 2011), and efforts are underway for the United Nations to initiate international investigations into Israel's apartheid regime regarding the Palestinian people as a whole, and into associated individual and state criminal responsibility, including through the reconstitution of the United Nations Special Committee against Apartheid and the United Nations Centre against Apartheid to end apartheid in the twenty-first century (Al-Haq, 2020).

None of the politicians who established South Africa's apartheid policies, or who were responsible for the deployment of the structures necessary for its implementation, has been brought to trial. The effects of centuries of colonialism and apartheid still mark South Africa, which remains one of the world's most unequal societies (Williams and Satgar, 2020).

The construction and maintenance of an apartheid system is required in order to build walls that are both symbolic and physical in nature. In the case of South Africa, symbolic walls based on repression, hatred and inequality, as well as the acceptance of different forms of cultural violence, showed clearly that there is no need for physical walls to consolidate segregation. One illustration of how these symbolic walls worked were the water outlets where signs indicated which were for whites and which were for others. This combination of repression and cultural violence based on symbolic walls did not require a physical wall, since segregation was firmly rooted in the cultural imagination.

Quirk (2013) analyses the spatial segregations that were applied under apartheid. Geographical delimitations or borders – in this case urban – were established to exercise sovereignty throughout the territory in question. These boundaries consolidated spatial segregation by isolating the white population, and also by separating socio-economic classes. Quirk (2013) has a graph showing that the wealthy whites were even more isolated since they were surrounded by poorer whites who in turn lived closer to the black population. The system of segregation and structural and cultural violence was therefore not only based on visions and narratives of white superiority, but also on socio-economic class, which generated different levels of intersectional access to the territory.

The model of geographical segregation under South African apartheid helps in understanding how symbolic although real walls serve to consolidate policies of violence through separation and segregation. Such policies involve constant reinforcement: individuals are made forcefully aware of which side of the wall they stand, making oppression a narrative of everyday life.

Physical walls, on the other hand, indicate a greater relationship between geography, territory and violence or, as Tyner and Inwood (2014: 771) put it, the 'intersectional existence between violence, space and place'. It is therefore not surprising that apartheid Israel furthers its ambitions by focusing on territorial annexation for demarcation, although unlike South Africa, it depends on physical walls of separation as a central plank of its policy.

This makes it important to analyse the way in which walls may become the visible and palpable form of all kinds of underlying violence that also disrupt relationships, and are experienced in human bodies and in people's daily lives (Mubi and Kärrholm, 2019: 1).

Walls may define where human rights are recognised: 'limited by a wall, human rights, on the one hand, no rights on the other' (Paz, 2017: 605). A wall can serve to consolidate, reinforce, and be a physical representation of a real difference in access to rights between those who live on one side of the wall and those who live on the other. Avdan and Gelpi (2017: 15) assert that walled borders are characterised by far more violence than those without walls, and add that various scholars have argued that walls may well exacerbate conflicts between neighbouring countries. Frye (2019: 20) argues that for some communities a wall will never be long enough, as they associate it with protection, while for others it is a physical and a symbolic barrier that negatively affects their daily lives, and serves to consolidate and legitimise policies of exclusion, segregation and oppression, and so foment the dynamics of violence.

2.2 THE CONCEPT OF GLOBAL APARTHEID

There are similarities between the mechanisms deployed by the South African apartheid system and dynamics that have been implemented in other parts of the world, and even in the implementation of global policies and structures. For several decades, the concept of apartheid has become increasingly complex, comprising a regime of specific policies and structures that are defined as a crime against humanity in the Rome Statute. While 'Global Apartheid' is a concept that serves as a tool for study and analysis in order to explain and interpret a social structure typical of globalisation, for political analyst Mutasa (2004), the concept of 'Global Apartheid' and 'globalization' encompass a new paradigm.

Along the same lines, Köhler (1995: 403) states that political concepts have different meanings, which depend on the discourse in which they are used, and that in the case of 'Global Apartheid', the concept helps to explain the structures of global society. For Booker and Minter (2001), the concept arises when anti-democratic institutions (using the term 'anti-democratic' in a broad sense to refer to a wide spectrum of institutions that are not or could not be considered as such) [1] systematically generate economic inequality. In this manner the structure is created in order to refer to a 'world apartheid' which, for the authors, makes it possible to determine the dynamics of the global world. They conclude that 'global apartheid' is in the end 'government by the minority'.

Authors like Samir Amin (2001) also ask: 'Globalization or apartheid on a global scale?', going on to argue that those countries that form part of the 'centre' in the context of globalisation, exercise forms of domination that explain the reasons behind a 'growing polarization and inequality between peoples', so that this form of globalisation is in reality, according to Amin, the organisation of an apartheid on a global scale that began with colonisation. Here the author provides tools for further analysis showing that different policies when applied on a global scale, and which expand under globalisation (such as the growing monopoly with respect to the extraction of natural resources) contribute to creating inequalities between peoples. Therefore, behind the construction of a global apartheid, the first things we find are colonisation and policies of inequality on a global scale.

This 'global apartheid' therefore appears to be a system that maintains global structures in order to preserve the inequity and violence that allow some populations and communities to maintain dominance and power over others – from cultural and economic domination, to a monopoly over resources, privileges and hierarchies in the movement of people and cheap labour, among others.

What is the relationship between the concept of 'global apartheid' and national borders? Nevis (2008: 189), who has extensively studied this relationship, argues that growing inequity is a key element within this system, but focuses primarily on the role of borders in constructing a global apartheid. Although in the age of globalisation, borders are essential in building and reinforcing a concept of class and race based on the nation (ibid.: 189), race, nation and social class intersect in the construction of specific spaces, such as borders. Borders, according to Nevis, have a role in regulating the labour market and, as seen earlier, contribute to creating a concept of the migrant as a threat to security (securitisation), which then leads to racist border policies. The reinforcement of migration and border policies in recent decades, especially in the US and the EU, has led to what the author describes as a system of apartheid.

The views advanced by Nevis are corroborated by the rise in border walls in recent decades. Looking at the construction of walls from 1968 to 2018, it appears that the world is increasingly committed to policies of separation and segregation that mainly affect the movement of people, especially those who migrate in order to improve their living conditions, whether fleeing economic hardship, armed conflicts or political persecution. In a globalised world in which, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, there was a narrative on the free movement of people, more than 60 border walls have been built since 1968.

1. The authors refer to multinational pharmaceutical companies and to cases in which their interests have been prioritised over concerns about health care, especially with respect to access to medication in order to mitigate HIV symptoms, owing to structural racism and global inequality (Booker and Minter, 2001).

Rosière and Jones (2012) argue that border walls in the globalisation process should be seen as anachronistic structures, since the narrative of globalisation promotes a world in which there is freedom of movement. Yet, they affirm, today's world is characterised precisely by societies that seem to withdraw in on themselves, tightening border controls and frontier systems (Rosière and Jones, 2012: 217–218). The authors see a development from dividing and delimiting borders for the military defence of states, towards borders as a system of enclosures for the privileged classes (Rosière and Jones, 2012: 220). Likewise, in the modern world, being outside the wall such as those who are expelled, deported or denied entry, may mean also being exempt from the protection of human rights, as is the case for the millions of asylum seekers each year, and that those on the inside take for granted (Paz, 2017: 603).

What this means is that the dynamics of what we are calling 'global apartheid' have evolved, especially throughout the twentieth century, to new definitions of the concept today. The similarities between the original apartheid system in South Africa and the appearance of 'global apartheid' explain the global trends and structures of power and segregation. Wall-building policies are only one of the most visible and physical forms of the expansion of cultural, structural and physical violence that this system produces.

2.3 SIGNIFICANT CASES IN THE GLOBAL APARTHEID REGIME

This section analyses specific cases of border walls in different parts of the world. We start with Israel, which has built more border walls than any other country, six in total. All its borders have sections comprising a fence or a separation wall, making it a truly walled country. Second, we look at the case of the border between Mexico and Guatemala, which shows how it is possible to build significant, militarised border barriers without the need for a wall. The next case, that of Spain, is paradigmatic, given that it was the first EU country to build border walls (Ceuta and Melilla) and its border-management model was later used to design what is known as 'Fortress Europe'. The case of Syria is unique since its neighbouring countries have built walls along their shared borders, which has a major impact on Syrians fleeing from conflict. India has completely walled up two of its largest borders, with Pakistan and Bangladesh, and has also built fences on the border it shares with Myanmar to become the most walled state in Asia. Finally, we look at the case of Australia, which is of interest because its lack of land borders allows it to use the sea as if it were a walled space.

2.3.1 ISRAEL: A WALLED STATE



As has been noted, with six border walls, Israel leads the world ranking. Although the government claims that terrorism and immigration are the main justifications, its walls are largely forms of annexation. As Riya Al'Sanah and Hala Marshood (2019) demonstrate, ever since its founding, Israel has used non-physical walls that are similar to those seen in South Africa's apartheid regime.

The policy of building physical walls began in 1973 on the Syrian border in the area of the Golan Heights, showing the path that Israel's expansionist policies were to take, by annexing a territory by military means. The wall was built to consolidate the conquest, and was extended in 2013. In 1994 the walls of the Gaza Strip were built, enclosing the entire area, completely isolating part of the Palestinian population and giving Israel total control over those leaving and entering the territory. This isolation, coupled with successive Israeli military attacks, have led to a humanitarian emergency in Gaza, as well as continued blockages with respect to the entry of supplies, which various organisations, including Israeli organisations, have declared are 'crimes against humanity '(United Nations, 2009).

The construction of the wall began in 2002. It was intended to be a border for Israel, but its design is also based on a model of territorial annexation and occupation, as it does fails to respect the border established by the 1949 agreements – the 'Green Line'. In practice, the wall consolidates the illegal expulsion of Palestinians from their lands (United Nations, 2014), and settlers' occupation of lands. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) (Abi-Saab, 2004) states that the construction of the wall is in violation of international

law, as does Amnesty International (2004). Several organisations have also denounced it as the 'Annexation Wall' or the 'Apartheid Wall' (Regan, 2016: 309) due to its implications in terms of territorial segregation and the disruption of daily life and freedom of movement it creates in the everyday lives of Palestinian people, as well as its serious effects on the Palestinian economy (Regan, 2016: 307; United Nations, 2014). These are consequences experienced under South African apartheid. This wall also incorporates panoply of technological movement-control systems: surveillance cameras, automated turnstiles, forms of remote control, biometric card reading, body scanners, and others, that are linked to a database network (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015: 159). Effectively the Palestinian population as a whole has been securitised, transformed into a threat (Pallister-Wilkins, 2015: 155), and the control of all their movements responds to this securitisation. As Arieli (2016: 495) argues, securitisation dominates the social and political discourse, together with the considerable dominance of the security industrial sector in decision-making and other political processes. As Pallister-Wilkins (2015: 158) points out regarding the wall built in the Occupied Territories it 'is a good illustration of the barrier as a disruption device [...] the occupying power is able to carry out various security practices that make the Palestinian population increasingly readable in biopolitical terms'.

Israel's other walls are those on Egyptian border (2011), Lebanon (2012), where there are frequent tensions between the two countries, and Jordan (2015). In analysing the Israeli government's speeches regarding the walls, Regan (2015: 311) notes that the government uses *fence-discourse,* which justifies their design to provide security and reinforce the separation of territories, while appealing to individual freedoms, or state freedoms in in this case, to build walls and fences for its own protection. It is clear that these walls are an example of how their construction is able to transform them into a real structure of violence for an entire community.

2.3.2 FORTRESS SPAIN, THE PARADIGM OF BORDER MILITARISATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

Walls existed in the EU before the construction of the fences around Ceuta (1993) and Melilla (1996), such as the cases of Cyprus (1974) and the poorly named 'Peace Walls' in Northern Ireland (1969), which are not border walls. Spain built fences around Ceuta and Melilla in order to control, intercept and prevent migratory movements in North Africa. Construction of the fence at Melilla began in 1996. It was raised to 6 metres after the so-called 'Fence Crisis' of 2005,

which involved an attempt by hundreds of migrants to cross into Ceuta and Melilla, during which the Spanish Civil Guard shot dead five people (Abad and Rodríguez, 2005).

In 2007, a three-dimensional wire barrier device was added to the two existing fences in Melilla. It comprises a type of braided metallic cable placed between the external and internal fences that acts as a trap and prevents anyone falling into it from being able to move (Andersson, 2015: 31). One of the most controversial additions to the fences was the concertinas (wire loops with sharp blades), which were only partially removed in 2007, and then completely reinstated. They began to be dismantled in January 2020, although these concertina wires are actually being fitted on the Moroccan side (Rivera, 2020). In this regard the debate on the mechanisms of militarisation by fences revolves around the 'humanitarianism' of these barrier systems, and whether they might injure or harm those trying to get through them. This system of fences and walls and the mechanisms deployed in them are coercive (Andersson, 2015: 30), which implies the use of force, interception and disruption of movement, and thus builds a system of violence that goes beyond physical damage.

For Spain, the Mediterranean itself has has become a wall (Pallister-Wilkins, 2017: 63) in view of how it manages its borders. Since the 1990s, both the Mediterranean and the Atlantic (via the Canary Islands) have been increasingly important in relation to border policies. This is both beyond the territorial waters corresponding to European countries, one of the aspects that constitute what is called the 'externalization of borders'' (Akkerman, 2018: 82) and through the ever-growing deployment of maritime operations in cooperation with the European Agency of the Border and

Coast Guard (Frontex). These are undertaken in the Mediterranean to control and monitor cross-border criminal activity, which includes migration, with operations such as Índalo, Hera, Sofía and West Sahel, among others.

Spain is also paradigmatic in terms of the creation of its Exterior Integrated Surveillance System (SIVE) in the 1990s, which was later used as a model in the creation of EUROSUR, a system that combines data control from all EU countries with systems radar and border surveillance, and which has also been outsourced to third countries. Surveillance systems are added to physical barriers in order to detect any movement near national waters, with cameras, infrared detectors, motion detectors and other types of sensors. In this way, Spain began to define what became the main policies of Fortress Europe, a paradigm and reference for the EU (Lancho, 2017).

2.3.3 WALLS AGAINST SYRIA: IMPOSSIBLE TO FLEE FROM WAR



The Syrian case is unique and has been little analysed in relation to defensive border walls built by four of its five neighbouring countries. The walls are most likely to have been in response to the armed conflict in the country since 2011: Israel in 1973, with an extension in 2013, Turkey in 2013, Jordan in 2008 and Iraq in 2018. Lebanon is the sole exception. All these countries justified the construction of their walls mainly to contain terrorism and immigration: terrorism due to the emergence and expansion of the Islamic State (ISIS), or Daesh, and civilians seeking to flee the violence. The situation of the civilian population in Syria is critical: 13 million people are in need of humanitarian aid and 6.2 million have been internally displaced (UNHCR, 2020).

Turkey, which built a wall two years after the outbreak of the conflict, is one the countries hosting the largest number of Syrian refugees (UNHCR, 2020), which is probably also due to the agreement signed with the EU in 2016, the EU–Turkey Joint Action Plan, which established a system to return Syrian asylum seekers in the EU to Turkey, in exchange for an aid package. Amnesty International denounced the agreement (Morengoni, 2016: 26). The guarantees that Turkey offers also raise doubts with respect to the protection of Syrian refugees, as they are not officially recognised as refugees but are considered to belong to a special regime that considerably restricts their rights, and because Turkey applies the principle of '*non-refoulement*' (not forcing someone to return to a country where they are likely to be subjected to persecution) but practices 'hot deportations' whereby refugees are simply turned back on arrival (Morengoni, 2016: 27–28). Essentially, the EU–Turkey agreement is a means for EU countries to evade their responsibilities to accept refugees. After the agreement was signed, Turkey strengthened its border policy. Around Turkey's wall with Syria, there are now informal settlements of people fleeing the war (Ashawi, 2020). It noteworthy that Israel, Iraq and Turkey or expanded their border walls a few years after the outbreak of the conflict in 2011, making it even more difficult for people fleeing the war, who are potential asylum seekers and may be stranded in the country.

2.3.4 INDIA: THE SUPER FORTRESS



The case of India could well be described as an Asian fortress. Since 1992, it has built walls along its entire border with Pakistan, and had already begun to do so in 1989 along the border with Bangladesh. In 2003, it also built a barrier along a large section of

its border with Myanmar. Of India's seven shared borders (Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and a few kilometres with Afghanistan), three have barriers along almost the entire border. The main reasons given by successive Indian governments for these walls are to prevent immigration from Bangladesh, terrorism and the territorial dispute over Kashmir with Pakistan, and the entry of militants and narcotics across the border with Myanmar.

Although there is no territorial dispute between Bangladesh and India, India alleges that militants cross its borders and that there is also arms trafficking (Carter and Poast, 2017: 242). The main reason for building a border wall, however, is to prevent the entry of Bangladeshi immigrants, who are mostly Muslims (Sadikki, 2016: 117). The result has been the complete fencing off of the 4,096.70 km border. The fence is continually being renewed. Rush (2012) states that the fence is not really to prevent the movement of people, but designed to give the image of a powerful and attractive democratic state that requires a protective barrier.

The border between India and Pakistan is more complex and marked by tension, mainly owing to the territorial dispute with Kashmir. India annexed the region in 1947, and its section of the wall represents a consolidation of the annexation. The dispute over Kashmir has led to various wars between them, and is India's most heavily militarised border (Saddiki, 2016: 114). Finally, a 2,044 km barrier has been built along the 2,912 km border with Pakistan. India and Myanmar formalised their borders with various agreements, and it has been estimated that over 400 km of the 1,463 km border has been enclosed, with new reinforcements being made in 2017, in part to prevent the entry of Rohingya (*La Vanguardia*, 2017), refugees from Myanmar who are being expelled by Bangladesh.

From 2007, India began to introduce technological improvements to all of its walls; night-vision devices, handheld thermal cameras, surveillance radars, ground sensors and high-power telescopes (Sadikki, 2016: 119).

Of India's 15,106 km of land borders, an estimated 6,540.7 km of barriers have been erected, making 43.29% of its borders walled. In addition, the government later decided that it was not enough to control the country's land borders, so satellite systems have been installed to control cross-border movement, at a cost of over US$ 2 billion.

2.3.5 THE MOROCCAN WALL IN THE WESTERN SAHARA

After its invasion of Western Sahara in 1975, Moroccan forces faced fierce resistance from the Polisario Front and late 1970s were marked by intense fighting between them. Despite their superior numbers and military power, the Moroccan armed forces suffered many defeats at the hands of Saharawis, who were more familiar with the territory (Remove the wall, n.d.). After their defeat, with advice from French and Israeli military strategists, Morocco adopted a 'clear-and-hold' strategy based on building well-defended barriers, or berms, known colloquially as 'the Berm', 'the Wall', and to Saharawis as 'the Wall of Shame' (Jensen, 2013). They were put up in six phases, each of which expanded the territory occupied by the Moroccan army. Between August 1981 and April 1987, six walls of different lengths were built, fortifying about 2,2720 km, extending from southern Morocco to the south-west tip of Western Sahara (see Map 1). It is considered to be 'the greatest functional military barrier in the world' (Zunes and Mundy, 2010: 21), and is manned by an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Moroccan forces. The World Bank acknowledged that 60% of Morocco's war costs were covered by loans and grants, with an annual contribution from Saudi Arabia of about US$ 500–1,000 million. This money funded Morocco's war efforts and in 1991 the loans were written off. Morocco's military equipment came mainly from France and the US, which provided 'about two thirds of 'Morocco's arms (Mundy, 2009: 223). The Moroccan wall in Western Sahara is also surrounded by 9 million land mines (Crowder, 2014), making it one of the world's most heavily mined territories

(UNMAS, n.d.). This endangers the lives of the local population and their livestock and blocks safe access to arable land and water sources. According to the Landmine Monitor, more than 2,500 people in Western Sahara have been victims of anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) since 1975 (Genevacall, n.d.). In economic terms, the Moroccan wall also represents a giant barrier behind which Morocco persists in its systematic plundering of the natural resources of the territory (phosphate, fisheries, minerals, agriculture, etc). This provides employment for the vast majority of Moroccan settlers and deprives the Saharawis of their resources and employment opportunities. Saharawi citizens who live under occupation suffer marginalisation and deprivation of their basic socio-economic rights (Remove the wall, n.d.). The wall has also destroyed archaeological sites due to the excessive extraction of soil during its construction (Brooks, 2007).

Neither the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) nor the Security Council have issued resolutions regarding the wall in Western Sahara. The ICJ, however, in its 2004 advisory opinion regarding Israel's wall in occupied Palestine, provided an important precedent since both the Israeli and Moroccan walls are built on occupied territory (UN, n.d.). One of the arguments the court used in the case of Palestine was that the wall created a *fait accompli* on the grounds that it could become permanent and tantamount to a *de facto* annexation. Morocco has continuously made clear its intentions to annex all of Western Sahara and, like Israel, has moved considerable numbers of civilian settlers into the territories it occupies (Mundy, 2012). Furthermore, the ICJ also argued that the wall in Israel severely impedes the Palestinian people's right to self-determination (ICJ, n.d.). It can equally be argued that the wall in Western Sahara is both a *fait accompli* that serves to entrench the occupation and to enable the future annexation of the territory. It is also a severe impediment to the Saharawi people's right to self-determination as stipulated in the 1960 UNGA Resolution 1514, or Declaration of on the Granting of Independence to Colonial countries and Peoples.

2.3.6 MEXICO–GUATEMALA: THE EXTERNALISATION OF THE US SOUTHERN BORDER

The US–Mexico border is one of the world's most militarised, including walls, fences and motion sensors (Miller, 2019). The US has also aggressively exported its border-security policies to other countries (Ackerman, 2018). Among other objectives, these policies aim to contain migrants, keeping them as far away as possible from their intended destination.

A prominent example of this is the militarisation of Mexico's southern border with Guatemala and, to a lesser extent, Belize. Though not a physical wall, the extensive security infrastructure along and around this border has similar consequences for Latin American asylum seekers and migrants, serving to prevent them from travelling northwards, with the result that they resort to more dangerous clandestine routes. As noted by the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) it has become 'the "wall" before the wall', referring to the physical wall the US has built along Mexico's northern border (Meyer and Isacson, 2019). This militarised 'wall' is not only concentrated along the border itself, but has led to the heavy militarisation of much of southern Mexico on the pretext of stopping migrants from travelling towards the US, and including a network of highway checkpoints as well as the militarisation in towns across southern Mexico in order to contain migrants (Agren, 2019).

The Mérida Initiative, a security cooperation agreement between the US and Mexico was concluded in 2007. It was initially to combat drug-related crimes, had already contributed to Mexico's increased militarisation. Under the Initiative the US provides training, equipment and funding to Mexico for a range of related issues, including the strengthening of security along its southern borders (US Embassies and Consulates in Mexico, n.d.). During the early years of the Mérida Initiative, the US financed Mexico's militarisation, including $420.7 million in foreign military financing (FMF, 2008–2010), with which Mexico purchased aircraft and helicopters for its federal security forces and other military hardware (Congressional Research Service, 2020).
Gradually the focus of US–Mexico relations shifted from stopping drug-related crime to controlling and curbing migration. In 2014 the Mexican government launched the Programa Frontera Sur (Southern Border Programme), funded through the Mérida Initiative (Congressional Research Service, 2020). Although there was no formal plan, the programme included, for example, setting up roadblocks, checkpoints and new infrastructure along migration routes and police and military raids on migrants. The US provided non-intrusive inspection equipment, a communications network, mobile biometric kiosks, police dog teams, and training, among other forms of support. US military and police personnel from the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) agency have also been deployed to Mexico and been actively involved in border security and control work in Mexican territory (Arriola, 2017).

US pressure on Mexico intensified under the Trump Administration; Donald Trump made stopping migration his principal 2016 campaign priority. While the

focus of the Administration's public efforts lies with the building of the wall along the border with Mexico, it further extended border externalisation. This culminated in a 2019 agreement, to which Trump coerced Mexico to accede by threatening to impose trade tariffs. As part of this, Mexico sent thousands of military personnel from the newly formed National Guard to the border with Guatemala to assist with border security (Sieff and Sheridan, 2019). Another element is the so-called Migrant Protection Protocols, under which the US can send non-Mexican asylum seekers (*refoulement*) back to Mexico while their asylum claims are handled. The US also introduced the Transit-Country Asylum Ban, which makes migrants ineligible for asylum when they have crossed a third country and did not apply for asylum there.

According to WOLA, the build-up at the southern Mexican border has been concentrated on major migration hubs, so that migrants are still able to cross the border across rougher terrain and remote areas. This has resulted in migrants taking more dangerous routes, where there are also higher risks of being confronted by criminal networks. A network of inland checkpoints, staffed by the National Institute of Migration (INM), the military police, the Mexican Army, and the Mexican Navy, has expanded the border inwards and has led to more apprehensions (Meyer and Isacson, 2019).

As the US has used COVID-19 regulations as a pretext to return even more asylum seekers directly to Mexico, there has been mounting pressure on Mexico's asylum system, expansion of makeshift camps at the US border, and a sharp increase in detention in overcrowded detention centres. The situation of migrants and refugees who succeed in crossing from Guatemala into Mexico, and evading checkpoints to make their way to the US, is far from safe. Mexico is afflicted with violence, human rights violations and crimes against refugees perpetrated both by corrupt officials and by criminal gangs.

2.3.7 AUSTRALIA: MARITIME WALL AND EXTERNALISATION

Australia does not have land borders but has created a maritime wall to prevent migrants arriving by boat. This is coupled with a highly controversial offshore detention system, a prime example of border externalisation. Australia has long been involved in strengthening the border security and control capacities of, for example, Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Indonesia (Guthrie and Kawi, 2004).

The Australian government states that 'Australia has strict border protection policies to combat people smuggling, prevent illegal migration to Australia, and deter people from attempting unsafe journeys on people smuggling boats. It is Australia's policy to turn back people smuggling boats where safe to do so. No-one who travels to Australia illegally by boat is allowed to remain in Australia' (Australian Government, n.d.).

This policy originated under the Abbott government in 2013, after its election campaign on the policy of stopping the arrival of refugees by boat. Under the Operation Sovereign Borders, the Australian Defence Forces initiated a maritime border security mission, cooperating with the border force and the federal police (Australian Government, n.d). It has been estimated that Australia has spent almost A$5 billion on border security policies between 2013 and 2019 (Bride Initiative Team, 2019). Boats with refugees entering Australian waters were either ordered to leave, often being returned towards Indonesia or Sri Lanka on their own boats or on orange lifeboats provided by Australia, or the passengers were transferred to and detained in offshore-processing centres on Nauru and PNG (Manus Island), which had been used periodically since 2001. With the government refusing entry to any refugee arriving by boat, many of them were kept in these centres for years (Refugee Council of Australia, 2020).

The prison in Papua New Guinea was closed in October 2017, after the country's Supreme Court ruled the detention of refugees there illegal and in breach of human rights. It took several years of living in limbo, however, to find, often inadequate, resettlement solutions for the remaining refugees (Baker, 2019). Some of them ended up still being detained in the Australian-funded Bomana Immigration Centre outside Port Moresby, the capital of PNG (Amnesty International, n.d.). With no new arrivals and a large proportion of the refugees either resettled in the US or transferred to Australia for medical treatment, there also remain some 180 people living in limbo on Nauru (Refugee Council of Australia, 2020).

Australia's armed forces and the Maritime Border Command of the Australian Border Force use a range of patrol vessels and aircraft to guard the maritime borders. Almost no refugee boats have managed to land since then, although in August 2018 a group of refugees, believed to have come by boat from Vietnam, were arrested and transferred to detention on the remote Christmas Island (Sexton-Mcgrath and Mounter, 2018).

Under 'Project Sentinel', the armed forces outsourced maritime aircraft surveillance to the Cobham company (see Chapter 3 on industry). Recently they have

introduced unmanned service vessels (robot boats called Bluebottles). According to the manufacturer, Ocius Technology: 'You could have a virtual fence of these between Australia and its neighbours to the north so that any vessel trying to enter Australia will trigger an alarm which could be set off by these and then you send out a man vessel to deal with the threat' (Higgins, 2019). The company expects the six Bluebottles ordered by the Department of Defence to be operational by early 2021 (Clifford, 2020).

In 2018, the Department of Home Affairs initiated the Future Maritime Surveillance Capability (FMSC) Project, inviting companies to show their capabilities in providing a new generation of maritime 'surveillance platforms and systems, mission information management and support systems' (Australian Government, 2020). Large arms-producing companies as Airbus, Leonardo, Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin put up bids, with the prospect of contracts worth hundreds of millions of dollars (Freed, 2019). While it is unclear how much money the government will actually allocate to the project, in August 2020 it announced an investment of up to AUD$1.3 billion in a new drone development programme to enhance maritime surveillance capabilities (Tillet, 2020).

3. THE INDUSTRY BEHIND THE WALLS

As the previous chapters have shown, governments use several reasons to justify walls and fences. In recent years, stopping migration has been the main argument, with some notable exceptions in, for example, India, Israel and Morocco, where other reasons predominate. In all cases, they are meant to control and keep some people, notably migrants or occupied peoples, either outside or inside national borders or other demarcation lines.

It is rare for such objectives to be attained by just constructing a simple wall, fence or other barrier. As Humble, Wright and Hayes (2015: 120) point out, a physical wall often includes 'virtual walls, monitoring and sniper towers, cameras, land radars and wireless telecommunication, infrared surveillance, carbon-dioxide probes, information technology, identification systems and immigration databases'. And then it goes further, because, as Col. Danny Tirza of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) says: 'It is not enough to construct a wall. You have to construct a whole system around it' (Miller, 2019). So, a physical wall is always just a part of an extensive security and control infrastructure. This includes not only (physical) barriers, but also a sophisticated system of control technologies, as Simon Daykin, CEO of Leidos (see profile below), said at a roundtable in 2018: 'We are at a unique junction with both policy and the enabling technology to reimagine our border. We can gain ever more detailed information faster than before, particularly by securely sharing up front passenger and customs information, fusing it with live biometrics, scanned imagery, and behavioural information to improve intelligence, flow management and early decision making' (Jackman, 2018).

While the walls and fences are often built by local construction companies, sometimes even by military or security forces, all the accompanying equipment, technologies and services provide a long list of profit opportunities for the industry.

BORDER INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

With migration cited as the mean reason for the recent construction of walls and fences, it is important to note that the military and security industry is one of the driving forces behind the ongoing securitisation of migration and militarisation of borders. Through extensive lobbying, large arms companies have framed migration as a security problem, portraying migrants as a threat that needs to be dealt with by (draconian) measures including the erection of walls and fences and widescale detention and deportation flights. Within this process of securitisation 'borders have come to be seen as exceptional spaces where emergency measures are deployed and where the movement of people and migration flows have become a threat' as part of 'the creation of a global system in which the hegemonic security paradigms are state-centric and militaristic' (Ruiz, 2019). The cause and result of these developments is the 'border industrial complex'. This is 'the nexus between border

policing, militarisation and financial interest', according to Miller (2019) or 'immigration industrial complex'. Recent market research anticipates an annual growth of the global border security market between 7.2% and 8.6% to around $65–68 billion by 2025 (Global Reports Store, 2019). Europe stands out with an expected annual growth rate of 15% (Homeland Security Research, 2017).

THE COMPANIES

Our previous report *The Business of Building Walls* identified large European arms companies Airbus, Leonardo and Thales as some of the most important providers of technology and military equipment accompanying border walls and fences. In the US, military companies like Lockheed Martin, Elbit Systems of America, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman and L3 Technologies are prominent in this area, according to Miller's report *More Than a Wall* (Miller, 2019).

Walls and fences are vulnerable, which keeps creating new business opportunities. In the US, the CBP agency asked industry for help with ideas for anti-breaching and anti-climbing technology and tools, after smugglers started to saw through sections of and climb over the wall on the border with Mexico (Marizio, 2020; Miroff, 2020).

This all means that companies from diverse sectors are involved in the construction of walls and fences and the many associated technologies and services. In this chapter we identify, where possible, the companies involved in the walls and fences described earlier. These include the companies building the fences, often national construction companies. For them it is often just a single project and not part of their core business. There are exceptions, however, as the US situation shows. The US government has issued a string of contracts to some ten construction companies, worth billions of dollars, for building parts of the wall on the border with Mexico (Mirrof and Blanco, 2020). Ersela Kripa and Stephen Mueller, who teach at the Texas Tech University, warn of ongoing consequences, predicting that 'the building industry and the built environment inherit securocratic technologies developed in the shadow of the wall' (Kripa and Mueller, 2019).

The largest single contract for the US border wall to date was awarded in May 2020 to Fisher Sand and Gravel, which received almost US$1.28 billion to build about 67.5 km (42 miles) of wall (Benth, 2020). Other major beneficiaries are Southwest Valley Constructors, SLSCO and BFBC, which have each earned over US$1 billion for wall construction.

In general, the companies providing the technology and military and security equipment directly related to the walls and fences are more important than the construction. The complete border security and control infrastructure in various countries encompasses far more aspects than those directly related to the walls and fences, but are beyond the scope of this report.

In relation to Australia and Mexico's border with Guatemala, there are no physical walls, but there are plenty of companies involved in Australia's 'maritime wall', mainly the providers of aircraft and vessels to patrol the borders and the sea. Similarly, companies profit from US-funded border security and control measures in Mexico, ranging from biometric identification equipment to patrol aircraft.

In some cases, notably India, state-owned companies play an important part in the construction of walls and fences, but mostly the work is outsourced to commercial parties. This chapter profiles the most important companies with the largest or most controversial contracts and/or are involved in wall building in more than one country. Often, governments prioritise national companies, especially in military and security matters. Rather than offering an overview of the largest global players in the field of walls and fences, the chapter provides some insights into this market and the kind of companies active in it.

ISRAEL

The research centre, Who Profits, maintains an extensive database of companies that are involved in the Israeli occupation of Palestinian and Syrian lands, including those that worked on the separation barriers. It shows the many aspects of the technical complex features of Israel's barriers.

Most of the companies involved are Israeli, but researchers from Corporate Occupation also discovered machinery from several Asian, European and US companies working on the Gaza wall. These include JCB (UK), Caterpillar, and Terex (USA), Hitachi (Japan) as well as Bauer (Germany), Doosan (formerly Daewoo; South Korea), Hyundai (South Korea) and Soilmec (Italy) (Anderson and Egret, 2018).

Apart from companies working directly on the walls and fences on Israel's borders, many others are involved in related work, for example providing surveillance, detection and monitoring technology and running or providing security services for checkpoints, another form of barrier. These include Controp Precision Technologies (Israel), whose Stabilized Panoramic Automatic Intruder Detection and Recognition

Table 4. Companies involved in the construction of Israel's separation barriers

Company	Country	Work
Ackerstein Industries	Israel	Provided concrete slabs for the construction of the Separation Wall
Ahstrom Group	Israel	Supplied construction materials for the checkpoints in the Separation Wall
Avi Cranes	Israel	Supplied cranes and machinery for the construction and maintenance of the Separation Wall
B.G. Ilanit Gates and Urban Elements	Israel	Supplied security gates for checkpoints in the Separation Wall
Bardarian Brothers	Israel	Infrastructure works along the Annexation Wall, carrying out two sections of the wall
Bobcat Company	USA	Supplied mini loaders used during the construction of the Separation Wall
Caterpillar	USA	Supplied heavy machinery used during the construction of the Separation Wall
CNH Industrial	UK	Supplied excavators used during the construction of the Separation Wall
DefenSoft	Israel	Provided the defense array design for the Separation Wall
El-Far Electronics Systems	Israel	Provided and installed fences and a perimeter defense system as part of the construction of the Separation Wall apparatus
Elbit Systems	Israel	See profile below
Eli Yohanan Engineers	Israel	Involved in construction of the Separation Wall
Falcon (WF) Technologies	Israel	Supplied control systems for the Separation Wall around Jerusalem
Geo Danya	Israel	Involved in construction of three sections of underground wall around Gaza Strip
Hitachi	Japan	Equipment documented during construction of the underground wall around the Gaza Strip
Housing & Construction – Solel Boneh Infrastructrures*	Israel	Construction of sections of wall and underground wall around Gaza Strip
JCB (J. C. Bamford Excavators)	UK	Provided track and wheel excavators and wheel loaders used during construction of the Separation Wall
Lesico	Israel	Built sections of the border walls with Egypt and Jordan, the wall around Gaza and the Separation Wall
Liebherr International	Switzerland / Germany	Provided heavy construction machinery used in construction of the Separation Wall
Magal Security Systems	Israel	Construction of 170km of the 708km long Separation Wall; installation of electrical deterrence fence as part of the Wall'; built an electrical detector fence in Syrian Golan and supplied perimeter intrusion detection system for barrier surrounding the Gaza Strip
Manitou	France	Supplied cranes used in construction and maintenance of the Separation Wall
Nesher Israel Cement Enterprises	Israel	Supplied , "in all probability", cement used in construction of the Separation Wall
Olenik Transportation Earth Work and Road Constructions	Israel	Provided bulldozers used in construction of the Separation Wall
Olizki Infrastructure	Israel	Construction of underground wall around Gaza Strip
Orad Group	Israel	Electronic detection systems and perimeter security products installed in fences as part of the Separation Wall
Taavura Holdings**	Israel	Provided heavy haulage and installation engineering services to Israeli authorities during construction of the Segregation Wall
Tandu Technologies and Security Systems	Israel	Provided security and communications services for checkpoints along the Annexation Wall
Terex Corporation	USA	Trucks and floodlights used by private contractors for construction of the Separation Wall
Volvo Group (AB Volvo)	Sweden	Provided trucks used during construction of the Separation Wall
Yehezkel Morad	Israel	Involved in construction of first part of the Separation Wall
Yehuda Welded Mesh	Israel	Provided 70 km long fence for construction of wall around Gaza Strip; involved in construction of the wall along the border with Egypt
Zoko Enterprises	Israel	Supplied Caterpillar equipment for construction of the Separation Wall

* Shikun & Binui Solel Boneh Infrastructures, formerly known as Solel Boneh.
** Jointly owned by Avraham Livnat Ltd. and Nesher Israel Cement Enterprises.

System (SPIDER) was used by the IDF for surveillance along the Separation Wall, and Israeli private security companies Modi'in Ezrachi and Sheleg Lavan, which operate checkpoints along this wall (Who Profits, n.d).

'FIELD TESTED'

Israeli military and security companies are known to promote their goods and services by highlighting their experience, be it on the 'battlefield' or the border. As the Stop the Wall Campaign notes: 'Companies [...] benefit from the ability to test Wall-related surveillance, detection, and scanning technologies on a captive population' (Stop the Wall, 2009: 1). In this way, for example, Elbit Systems (see below) has successfully exported its goods to the US and Europe.

In a bid for European border security contracts, Saar Koush, then CEO of Magal Security, which built the wall on the West Bank, said: 'Anybody can give you a very nice Powerpoint, but few can show you such a complex project as Gaza that is constantly battle-tested' (Zeveloff, 2016). RBTec Electronic Security Systems, which was invited by Frontex to participate in its April 2014 workshop on 'Border Surveillance Sensors and Platforms', boasted in its application that its 'technologies, solutions and products are installed on Israeli-Palestinian border' (PAD, 2014).

In 2015, Bulgaria and Hungary publicly toyed with buying Israeli-designed border fences. Although both countries eventually chose other companies, Israel's experiences offered inspiration (Williams, 2015). India's Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS) on its borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh has also been impressed by Israeli technology (Khajura, 2018).

ELBIT SYSTEMS

Elbit Systems is Israel's largest arms producer (and 28th on SIPRI's global Top 100 list (Fleurant, 2019)) and closely cooperates with the IDF. The company has been involved in constructing Israel's walls since 2000. In 2002, when the construction of the Annexation Wall started, its subsidiary Ortek won a US$5 million contract to build 25 km of electronic fence and warning systems around Jerusalem (Reuters, 2002) In 2006 this was followed by a US $17 million contract to supply advanced sensors, an electronic fence, communications, and computerised command and control posts for the wall (Homeland Security News Wire, 2006).

Elbit has also supplied surveillance systems for Israel's borders with Lebanon and Syria (Parrish, 2019). In 2013 the company was awarded a contract worth more than US$60 million to install a border defence system, based on data fusion to 'identify any suspicious indication that digresses from the established routine', in the occupied Golan Heights on the border with Syria (Inbar, 2013). Together with the arms company Rafael and the IDF, Elbit started to develop tunnel-detection technology for use on the border with the Gaza Strip (Cteh, 2018). By extension, in 2017 Elbit became the lead contractor for the 'smart' components of the 40m-deep underground part of the new wall around Gaza. Elbit, together with Israel Aerospace Industries in their former joint venture G-NIUS, also developed the Guardium for Gaza, a remotely controlled unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). Later Elbit took this one step further and developed the fully autonomous SEGEV, a UGV with cameras for border patrol (American Friends Service Committee, 2019).

Its US subsidiary, Elbit Systems of America, built on these experiences, landing a US$145 million contract in 2014 to build a network of 55 surveillance towers in Arizona on the US–Mexico border (Lappin, 2014) In 2019, Elbit was also awarded a US$26 million contract to install a multi-sensor monitoring system on the border (*Jerusalem Post*, 2019). These contracts followed the failure of the SBI-Net-project to construct a 'virtual fence' on this border. The contract with Boeing was cancelled in 2011, after about US$1 billion had been spent, because its system of towers with sensors, cameras and radars failed to work (Preston, 2011).

As well as Elbit's fences and wall-related technology, the company offers a broad portfolio of arms and security technologies, which are also used for border security. One such example is the Hermes UAV, which has been sold to Switzerland and was leased to the US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) as well as the European Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA), to fly surveillance missions, including for border patrol, for EU member states (AFP and Times of Israel Staff, 2015).

AUSTRALIA

Australia's maritime wall is principally based on the deployment of vessels and aircraft. The British aerospace and defence company Cobham, partly through its subsidiary Surveillance Australia, is the main contractor providing aircraft. This includes the A$1 billion Project Sentinel contract (2008–2021), under which Cobham Aviation Services integrated on-board mission systems for Australia's Dash 8 maritime surveillance aircraft and operates and maintains the aircraft. According to Cobham: 'Under the World's largest outsourced surveillance operation we patrol Australia's 15-million-square-kilometre Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) under contract with Australian Border Force

(ABF)' (Cobham n.d.). The contract, which concluded in 2006, built on Cobham's earlier work dating back to 1995. It was renewed for two years in 2012, for another A$163 million (Advance ADS, 2012). In addition, Cobham has received several other smaller contracts for maritime surveillance from the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (Cobham, 2017).

When the Australian Home Affairs department hinted at the use of drones for border surveillance as the follow-up to Project Sentinel, Cobham teamed up with the American General Atomics Aeronautical Systems to present the MQ-9B SeaGuardian RPAS as a candidate for the Australian Border Force Future Maritime Surveillance Capability (FMSC) programme (Cobham, 2020).

Cobham separated its Australian division, which accounted for almost 70% of its international aviation services tasks at the time, as a separate company, Cobham Aviation Services Australia, in 2017 (Milne, 2018). Surveillance Australia is one of its subsidiaries. In January 2020, Advent International, a US private equity investor, completed the £4 billion purchase of Cobham, turning it into a private business and delisting it from the London Stock Exchange (Advent International, 2020).

The P-3 Orion surveillance planes used by the Australian Air Force also play a role in border security, among other tasks. The Lockheed Martin planes were upgraded by L3 Communications and Tenix Defence. (Tenix, 2005) The through-life support programme for the Orions is run by the AP-3C Accord Alliance (Airbus Group Australia Pacific, BAE Systems Australia and the Department of Defence) (South Australia: The Defence State n.d). The planes are to be replaced by a new patrol fleet of P8-A Poseidons, built by Boeing, and MQ-4C Triton drones from Northrop Grumman (8Air Force, n.d; Air Force, n.d). The future of the Triton is unclear, however, since the US government proposed a two-year production pause in 2020 (Freed, 2020). Northrop Grumman was also contracted for A$233 million in 2017 to build a new satellite ground system for border and defence patrols. It teamed up with ViaSat Inc. (US) and Optus (Australia) for this project (Northrop Grumman, 2017). The Australian construction company Hansen and Yuncken was subcontracted for construction of the station (Sarineen, 2017). The firm also redeveloped the Villawood Immigration Detention Facility (Hansenyuncken, n.d.).

Australia's maritime patrol fleet consists of two Border Force Cutters, Ocean Shield and Thaiyak, and eight Cape Class patrol boats (Australian Border Force, 2020). The Royal Australian Navy supports the border security mission with the Ocean Protector patrol vessel (Kuper, 2019). The officers on all the ships are armed with pistols made by Glock, the Austrian gun manufacturer.

The Ocean Shield and Ocean Protector were built by STX OSV (earlier known as Aken Yards) in Romania), which went bankrupt in 2017. Australia bought both ships from the civilian market (8Ellery, 2012) The Thaiyak was built on the Vietnamese shipwarf of Australian shipbuilder Strategic Marine, which cooperated with two other Australian companies, AST Oceanics and McAlpine Marine Design (MMD) in building the vessel (AST Oceanics, 2014). Oceanics also won an in-service support contract, which was extended to mid-2021 in September 2017 (AST Oceanics, 2017).

The Australian shipbuilder Austal produced the Cape Class patrol boats. The company provides the same ships to the Australian Navy and the coastguard of Trinidad and Tobago as well as other patrol boats for 12 Pacific Island nations and Timor Leste, funded by Australia (Austal, 2020). The Australian Border Force paid A$330 million for design, construction and in-service support for the Cape Class vessels (Austal, 2015).

The Bluebottle unmanned surface vessels (robot boats) Australia will use for border protection are being developed by Ocius Technology, formerly Solar Sailor Holdings (Ocius, n.d.). The design was awarded a A$10,000 innovation grant for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) at the maritime arms fair Pacific 2017 (SBS News, 2017). In June 2020 the Australian Department of Defence awarded Ocius a new A$5.5 million contract to continue the development of the Bluebottle. Melissa Price, the Minister for Defence Industry, said: 'This technology could provide the Royal Australian Navy with a unique capability to protect Australia's maritime borders'. The contract was funded under the government's A$640 million Defence Innovation Hub programme, aimed at investing in the growth of Australia's defence industry (Australian Government, 2020).

The company's Research & Development (R&D) facilities are based at the University of New South Wales. Ocius closely works together with Thales for its defence contracts, including the development of the Bluebottle USVs (Ocius, n.d.). Thales provides underwater sensors and thin line arrays for the Bluebottle. Ulludulla Engineerring and Fibreglass, a New South Wales company, also provided equipment for the vessel (Austal, 2015).

As described in Chapter 2, Australia's 'maritime wall' is closely connected to its offshore detention programme. The detention centre on Naura was initially

run by a private contractor, Broadspectrum (owned by the Spanish multinational Ferrovial), later by Australian company Canstruct (Amnesty International, 2017). The world's largest private security company, G4S, managed the centre in Papua New Guinea from 2013 to 2014, during which time riots broke out. A G4S guard killed an Iranian refugee (Doherty and Davidson, 2016; Tlozek, 2016)), and 69 other refugees were injured (Parliament of Australia, 2014).

The British service company Serco manages the detention centre on the remote Australian territory of Christmas Island, as part of its contract for managing all of Australia's onshore detention centres (Daniel, 2019).

THALES

The French arms producer Thales is the world's tenth largest, and the fourth largest in Europe (Fleurant, 2019). The company has a broad portfolio in the field of border security and control, ranging from radar for patrol vessels to biometric passports. Thales systems were used, for example, by Dutch and Portuguese ships deployed in Frontex operations (Thales, n.d.). Thales has also deployed a complete, integrated system for border security at the Eastern Latvian border, combining command-and-control software with optronics, sensors and a communication network. In 2015 it won a contract to supply the Spanish Guardia Civil with two mobile thermal units integrated into 4x4 vehicles for border surveillance. Earlier it delivered 'fixed surveillance thermal optronic systems' for the same purposes (Akkerman, 2016).

Thales Security Systems currently provides the security system for the highly militarised port in Calais. This surveillance and access control system includes revolving doors, IP cameras (security cameras connected to a network) along one of the border fences, and a monitoring station (Bescherer, 2017). Thales is probably the producer of two military drones that carry out surveillance over the Eurotunnel site (Burt, 2018). Further, with Elbit in a joint venture called UAV Tactical Systems, Thales produced the Watchkeeper drones, based on the Hermes 450. Initially used by the British Army in Afghanistan, from September 2020 the Ministry of Defence has been flying these drones over the English Channel to intercept migrant boats (Drummond, 2020).

Thales was or is involved in at least 27 EU-funded border security research projects, often cooperating with Leonardo. In 2008, it led the consortium for the OPERAMAR project, aimed at developing 'a sufficient interoperability of current maritime security management systems' (CORDIS, 2010).

In 2019 Thales acquired Gemalto, a large (biometric) identity security company, for €4.8 million, integrated as its Digital Identity and Security (DIS) division (Burt, 2019). This divison supplies fingerprint identification technology for the EURODAC database (Gemalto, 2018). Before the acquisition of Gemalto, Thales already provided nine African countries with control systems for identification documents (Thales, n.d). Gemalto itself was contracted by Morocco for the supply, operating and securing of Morocco's new biometric passports. After training by Gemalto, the Bank Al Maghrib, Morocco's central bank, took over the production in 2013 (Privacy International, n.d). Gemalto also provided Ghana with an electronic border-control system, based on biometric identification technology, as part of the development of a national migration policy (Gemalto, 2013). The EU praised this policy as being in line with the Valletta Declaration and Action Plan (EEAS, 2016). Ari Bouzbib of Gemalto said the new system for Ghana could serve 'as a template for modernisation across many other countries in Africa' (Planet Biometrics, 2013). Other customers have included Uganda, for a Visa Management System to strengthen border security, and Algeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Lebanon, Moldova, Nigeria and Turkey, for biometric passports or ID cards (Gemalto, 2017).

SPAIN: CEUTA AND MELILLA

It is not clear which companies were involved in the early stages of building fences at Ceuta and Melilla. In 2005 and 2006, the Spanish IT and consultancy company Indra was awarded two contracts, for a total of almost US$21 million, to build additional fences at Melilla, while Ferrovial and Dragados were the primary contractors for construction and repair of the fences at Ceuta (La Información, 2015). A report by the Por-Causa Foundation lists the companies, all Spanish, that received contracts for the Ceuta and Melilla fences between 2005 and 2016 (Rodríguez and Fanjul, 2017).

Plettac Electronics Sistemas secured a string of ten smaller contracts, totalling almost €260,000 for supplying video-surveillance equipment for the fences. European Security Fencing (ESF), a Spanish producer of razor wire and concertinas, is part of the corporate group Mora Salazar. From 1998 Mora Salazar and ESF (established in 2003), have been involved in the border fences installed around Ceuta and Melilla (European Security Fencing, 2013; European Security Fencing, n.d.). ESF also delivered the razor wire for the fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia, and its concertinas were installed on the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and Austria and Slovenia, as well as at Calais, and for a couple of days on the border between Hungary and Slovenia before being removed (Marot, 2016).

Table 5 Companies contracted for work at Ceuta and Melilla border fences

Company	Description
Indra	Six contracts for construction and repair of fences at Melilla*
Dragados	11 contracts for the construction of fences and their repair
Ferrovial	Nine contracts for the construction and maintenance of fences
Proyectos Y Tecnología Sallén	Four contracts for maintenance of the border perimeter**
Eulen	25 contracts for security in Melilla
Initec Infraestructuras	31 contracts for design, projection, technical assistance and construction of border fences and perimeters
Acciona	Four contracts for works in the border perimeter of Melilla
Mora Salazar	Three contracts for installation of fences at Ceuta and Melilla

* Including one contract together with Sallen Seguridad
** Including one for the temporary joint venture with Indra Sistemas; Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía (2014) Human rights on the southern border – 2014, March.

In December 2017, Ferrovial won another contract, worth €4.5 million, for the maintenance of the fences at Ceuta and Melilla (Tenders Electronic Daily, 2018). As described above, Ferrovial was also involved in Australia's offshore detention system, after purchasing Broadspectrum. Under pressure from human rights groups, Ferrovial announced it would not renew its contracts, but was forced to accept a unilateral extension by the Australian government until finally a new company to take over was found (American Friends Service Committee, 2013; Wiggins, 2016).

In early 2019, the Spanish government contracted the arms company ISDEFE to conduct a preliminary study into modernising border security at Ceuta and Melilla, resulting in a €17.9 million plan to change again the border infrastructure at both cities (Ministerio del Interior, 2019). The razor wire from ESF on the Spanish fences was taken down by the state-owned company Transformación Agraria SA (TRAGSA), part of the state-owned holding company Sociedad Estatal de Participaciones Industriales (SEPI), only to be replaced by new razor wire on the fences on the Moroccan side (Martin, 2019). The Spanish government started to install 'smart borders' by contracting the Spanish subsidiaries of Gunnebo (Sweden) and Thales to supply a facial-recognition system on the borders of both cities, consisting of 35 cameras, four micro domes and the software platform Thales LFIS (Live Face Identification System) to control the CCTV System (Echarri, 2019). Gunnebo is an important provider for smart borders (or 'virtual walls') and biometrics. It has supplied automated border-control gates, biometric pre-security access gates and facial-recognition cameras to over 100 airports in Africa, Asia, Europe and the US (Mayhew, 2018).

INDRA

Indra, which is 18.7% owned by the Spanish state (Market Screener, n.d), is one of the main beneficiaries of European border militarisation (Akkerman, 2016). Following its work on the fences at Ceuta and Melilla, the company developed the SIVE border control system, with radars, sensors and vision systems. This system is installed on most of Spain's maritime borders, including Ceuta, and in Romania and Portugal. In July 2018 Indra won a contract worth €10 million for maintenance of SIVE at several locations, including Ceuta, for the next two years (El pueblo de Ceuta, 2018). Other customers for Indra's border surveillance systems include Hong Kong, Latvia, Morocco, Poland and the UK (Indra, n.d.).

Indra is very active in lobbying the EU on border security issues, also by taking a leading role in the European Organisation for Security (EOS) lobby platform. The company is one of the major beneficiaries of R&T (Research and Technology) funding for border security projects. It coordinated the PERSEUS project to further the development of Eurosur, the EU border surveillance system, and is involved in OCEAN2020, the first research project financed under the European Defence Fund, which aims to integrate unmanned naval platforms (drones) in maritime surveillance and interdiction missions, using satellites to connect drones and command and control of naval vessels to land centres (Indra, 2011; Leonardo, 2018)

The EU also funded parts of other projects of Indra, such as the development of the Seahorse Network involving police forces in Mediterranean countries in Europe and North Africa to stop migration, including purchase of equipment by North African countries for satellite connections, and a surveillance system of infrared, motion-sensitive cameras for the fence on the border between Bulgaria and Turkey (Indra, 2010; European Parliament, 2013).

INDIA

The Indian multinational Tata Steel and the Irish company AON Fencing & Gates were contracted (Gurung, 2017; Singh, 2020) to build fences on India's borders, among other contracts. J.R. Construction (India) built part of the fences on the border with Bangladesh, but the company abandoned the project after two years in 2008, accusing a top official of the National Building Construction Corporation (NBCC), a government agency, of constantly harassing it for bribes (Rakesh, 2011).

In 2017, Tata Power (India) and DAT-CON (Slovenia) were awarded contracts for a 'smart fence' pilot project on the border with Pakistan in the occupied

A WALLED WORLD, TOWARDS A GL

Walls built between 1968 and 2018

*Source: Report "A Walled World, towards a Global Apartheid" (2020). Check and download the full report at: www.tni.org/walledworld

NORTH AMERICA

United States

1 Mexico (1990)

EUROPE

Norway
2 Russia (2016)
Estonia
3 Russia (2018)
Latvia
4 Russia (2015)
Lithuania
5 Russia (Kaliningrad) (2015)
6 Belarus (2015)
United Kingdom
7 France (Calais Port) (2016)
Austria
8 Slovenia (2015)
Hungary
9 Croatia (2015)
10 Serbia (2015)
Ukraine
11 Russia (2015)
Russia
12 Georgia (2009)
Bulgaria
13 Turkey (2013)
Greece
14 Turkey (2012)
Macedonia
15 Greece (2016)
Slovenia
16 Croatia (2015)
Spain
17 Ceuta-Morocco (1993)
18 Melilla-Morocco (1996)

AFRICA

Morocco
19 Spain (Melilla) (2014)
20 Saharawi territories (1987)
21 Algeria (2015)
Algeria
22 Morocco (2015)
Tunisia
23 Libya (2015)
Egypt
24 Gaza Strip (2009)
Nigeria
25 Cameroon (2014)
Kenya
26 Somalia (2016)
Botswana
27 Zimbabwe (2003)
South Africa
28 Zimbabwe (1985)
29 Mozambique (1986)

REASONS GIVEN FOR WALL CONSTRUCTION



WALL CONSTRUCTION PER YEAR



WALLS PER REGION

NUMBER OF WALLS BUILT BY STATES (1968-2018)

6 WALLS 3 WALLS 2 WALLS 1 WALL

KEY COMPANIES THAT PROFIT FROM BORDER MILITARISATION

COBHAM serco BOEING CIUS NORTHROP GRUMMAN THALES
AUSTAL GE Aviation SIKORSKY Alutiiq ASELSAN CSRA leidos
GRUPO EULEN acciona TATA Blighter ATHENA NBCC AON
indra ferrovial DRAGADOS Raytheon Technologies Otokar OTONOM TOKI aselsan
DEFENSOFT MAGAL LEC-FAB FALCON IAI

OBAL APARTHEID

CENTRE DELÀS D'ESTUDIS PER LA PAU

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With the support of: Ajuntament de Barcelona



SOUTHERN ASIA

Iran
- 49 Iraq (2015)

Pakistan (Durand Line)
- 50 Afghanistan (2000)
- 51 Pakistan (2011)
- 52 Afghanistan (2005)

India
- 53 Pakistan (1992)
- 54 Bangladesh (1989)
- 55 Myanmar/Burma (2003)

CENTRAL ASIA

Turkmenistan
- 56 Uzbekistan (2001)
- 57 Afghanistan (2014)

Uzbekistan
- 58 Afghanistan (2001)

Kazakhstan
- 59 Uzbekistan (2006)
- 60 Kyrgyzstan (2010)

Kyrgyzstan
- 61 Kazakhstan (2015)

EASTERN ASIA

China
- 62 North Korea (2006)

SOUTHEAST ASIA

Myanmar/Burma
- 63 Bangladesh (2009)

Thailand
- 64 Malaysia (2004)

Malaysia
- 65 Thailand (1991-2004)

Brunei
- 66 Malaysia (Limbang) (2005)

WESTERN ASIA

Israel
- 30 Palestine (West Bank) (2002)
- 31 Egypt (2011)
- 32 Gaza Strip (1994)
- 33 Jordan (2015)
- 34 Lebanon (2012)
- 35 Syria (1973/2013)

Jordan
- 36 Syria (2008)
- 37 Iraq (2008)

Cyprus
- 38 North Cyprus/South Cyprus (1974)

Turkey
- 39 Syria (2013)
- 40 Iran (2017)

Azerbaijan
- 41 Armenia (2015)

Iraq
- 42 Syria (2018)

Kuwait
- 43 Iraq (1994)

Saudi Arabia
- 44 Iraq (2006)
- 45 Yemen (2013)

Oman
- 46 Yemen (2013)

United Arab Emirates
- 47 Saudi Arabia (2007)
- 48 Oman (2005)

The layout of the wall on the map is indicative, it does not correspond to its actual layout. The companies reflected on the map correspond to the cases analyzed in the report.

Kashmir region, called the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS), 'to install an integrated border-guarding system to test technology for preventing infiltration, especially by detecting cross-border tunnels as well as possible entries through aerial and underwater routes' (Karanbir, 2017). Blighter (UK) provided ground surveillance radar to both Tata Power and DAT-CON for the pilot project. Blighter radars are also deployed at the US–Mexico border (Blighter, 2018). Athena Security Solutions (India) is also involved in the CIBMS pilot, in the field of intrusion detection. In March 2019 Athena announced it would team up with US technology company Quanenergy to promote its LiDAR (Light Detection and Ranging) sensors and smart sensing solutions for border security to the Indian market (Quanenergy, 2019). Such sensors are already in use on the US–Mexico border (Athena Security Solutions, n.d.).

Tata Power is India's largest electricity company and part of the Tata Group, which encompasses a range of companies. In 2016 Tata Power also delivered Hand Held Thermal Imaging Systems to the BSF, and Tata Motors was contracted later that year to supply 500 Xenon SUVs for border patrolling (Tata Power, 2016). Tata Steel, another company in the conglomerate, was originally selected, along with Reliance Infrastructure, for two pilot projects in the CIBMS project. However, these projects were put on hold because of high costs and doubts about the companies' qualifications (Basu, 2018).

In 2017 India also started testing Kavach, a laser- and infrared-based fencing system to detect intrusions. The poles are placed 200m apart. The information gathered by Kavachs and through other ways can be managed by the Control and Command (C&C) platform, Micron. Both devices are produced by military IoT start-up Cron Systems (Khajuria, 2017).

Alongside these companies, state-owned enterprises and government agencies often undertake the construction of border fences. For example, replacing large parts of the fence on the border with Bangladesh was assigned to the Central Public Works Department (CPWD), National Buildings Construction Corporation and National Project Construction Corporation, which finalised this in 2010 (South Asia Terrorism Porta, n.d). In 2020 CPWD was again working on replacing the existing barbed-wire fences on the borders with Pakistan and Bangladesh with a meshed steel fence (Singh, 2020). The agency's experience attracted international attention: in 2013 it was reported that Oman would probably contract CWPD, for about US$300 million, to build a fence on its border with Yemen (Bambridge, 2013). Eventually however, the project was awarded to its only contender, Indian state company Engineer Projects India Ltd. (EPIL) (Khan, 2018). In India EPIL also worked on the fence and on outposts on the border with Bangladesh (Engineering Projects, 2020).

Along the border with Pakistan, India installed dozens of laser-fence system units, developed by the Laser Science and Technology Centre (LASTEC) of the Defence Research and Development Organisation. The units can record images and videos (day and night) and are used mostly at more vulnerable border points (Ticku, 2019).

DAT-CON

The Slovenian company DAT-CON is a popular provider of systems and equipment for border security, mostly in its own region (Akkerman, 2019). It supplied a 'Local Deployable Coordination & Communication Centre and Mobile Surveillance Systems equipped with EO-IR cameras and radar' to Macedonia, under a €2.14 million contract with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in the context of the EU-funded project 'Special Measure supporting the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to manage its southern border in the context of the European Migration Crisis' (International Organization for Migration, n.d.). The EU also funded the IOM-funded project 'Reinforcing the capacities of the Government of Georgia in Border and Migration Management', under which DAT-CON was paid €1.17 million to deliver LIR Daylight and Thermal Surveillance (P/T/Z) Multi-Sensor systems. (International Organization for Migration, n.d). In March 2020 Frontex awarded a €8 million framework contract to DAT-CON and the Bulgarian company Opticon Electrogroup to supply a Mobile Surveillance System with a thermal camera and radar.

DAT-CON has also sold stationary thermal-imaging systems to Croatia, which are placed at three border locations, a coastal surveillance system to Cyprus, surveillance vehicles with thermal cameras to the Greek coastguard, the Lithuanian State Border Guard Service and the Moldovan Border Police, optoelectric systems for border security to Poland, thermal surveillance equipment to Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia and the Ukraine State Border Guard Service, and unspecified border control equipment to Albania (Data Con, n.d.). Some of these purchases were also funded by the EU under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA II) or the Schengen Facility.

MEXICO

Much of the security equipment Mexico deploys on its borders with Guatemala and Belize has been donated or funded by the US in the context of the

'Frontera Sur'programme under the Mérida Initiative, including patrol boats, helicopters, 'X-ray vans, contraband detection equipment [and] funds for … facility construction, patrol boats, night vision, communication equipment, maritime sensors and … dogs'. US authorities also train Mexican border forces (Isacson, Meyer and Morales, 2014). In 2014 Mexico bought 18 UH-60M Black Hawk Helicopters, produced by US military companies Sikorsky (subsidiary of Lockheed Martin) and General Electric Aircraft, at an estimated cost of $680 million 'to support the Government of Mexico's Southern Border Strategy to improve security on their border with Guatemala and Belize', according to US Northern Command head General Lori Robinson (Defence Security Cooperation Agency, 2014).

The Government Accountability Office lists the projects funded under the Mérida Initiative from 2014 to 2018, many of them in the field of biometrics (United States Government Accountability Office, 2019) (see Table 6). All funding went to US companies.

Table 6. Companies funded under the 'Secure Border and Ports' Mérida Initiative Line of Effort

Company	Projects	Funding (million $)
Alutiiq (Technical Services / Information Management / Advance Security Solutions)	5	75.01
American Science Engineering	1	16.19
CSRA	2	64.36
Leidos	1	9.91
Thermo Scientific Portable Analytical Instruments	1	3.51

Alutiiq is a subsidiary of the Afognak Native Corporation based in Alaska. Profiting from rules for Alaska – native firms under which they are legally entitled to federal contracts without having to tender for them – the company says it 'provided valuable biometric and biographic information exchanges between the U.S. and Mexico. This strengthened the National Immigration Institute's infrastructure for the accurate identification of persons of interest through biometric enrollment and self-service verification kiosks at three Mexican airports located in Mexico City, Cancun, and Los Cabos' (Alutii1, n.d.).

Afognak's involvement in migration services extends beyond the Mexican borders. It also won contracts from ICE for detention-related work, although it bears no 'direct responsibility for the care or detention of adults or children', according to Malia Villegas, vice president of corporate affairs with Afognak Native (Martinson, 2018).

American Science & Engineering (AS&E) is a producer of X-ray and related equipment. In the last decade the company received $377.2 million in contracts from CBP and ICE. At several border crossings, CBP deploys the vehicle X-ray machine Z Portal from AS&E, generating multiple images to detect contraband and irregular migrants (Makan, 2020). Back in 2008 AS&E won a $55.1 million contract from Abu Dhabi Customs for supplying X-ray detection systems to scan cargo trucks, passenger vehicles, and containers at strategic border checkpoints, followed by a $8.6 million order the next year (American Science and Engineering, 2008). In 2016 AS&E was bought by OSI Systems, of which it is now a subsidiary (OSI Systems, 2016). In July 2018 CBP awarded OSI Systems a five-year contract, worth some $140 million, 'for the service and maintenance of its cargo, vehicle, and parcel inspection systems'. (OSI Systems, 2018). Another subsidiary of OSI Systems, Rapiscan, produces many of the luggage and passenger-scanning machines for border checkpoints at airports and harbours, including controversial full-body scanners (White, 2019).

US assistance to Mexico under the Mérida Initiative included training as well as equipment and financial donations: 'Customs and Border Patrol provided mentors and training to GOM border officials to improve their capacity to stem the northward flow of migrants entering Mexico along its southern border' (Unites States Government Accountability Office, 2019).ited States Government Accountability Office, 2019).

CSRA

CSRA was the result of the merger of the Computer Sciences Corporation's North American Public Sector business and SRA International in 2015 (Budik, 2015). In 2018, the arms producer General Dynamics (fifth on on the SIPRI global Top 100 list of arms-producing companies) bought CSRA, which is now part of General Dynamics Information Technology (General Dynamics, 2018).

CSRA's large contracts in Mexico are connected to the Digitus Agreement between Mexico and the US, to support biometric collection of Central Americans being held at detention centres in Mexico. Officially, the US government frames the work as aimed at sharing data regarding drugs and transnational criminal activities, but its scope is much broader. The contract includes providing 'enduring biometrically-based identity management services to the Government of Mexico and its mission partners that will enable informed decision-making by producing accurate, timely and high-assurance identity information and analysis in compliance with the Digitus Agreement under the Merida Initiative' (National Immigration

Project, 2018). In the US, from 2011 to 2020 CBP and ICE spent $626 million on contracts with the company. This includes a November 2016 contract, worth $45 million, to support CBP in 'in determining the most optimal towers, camera sensors and radar systems to help detect and classify threats to the security of the nation's borders' (CSRA, 2018), and in May 2019 a $31 million ICE contract for social-media monitoring for immigration vetting (USA Spending, n.d.). Many NGOs criticise this practice of monitoring social media, arguing that it will affect freedom of speech, and that it 'will reveal private information about travelers that is irrelevant to their suitability for entry to the United States', while the context and methods used 'suggest that they will be implemented in ways that discriminate on the basis of national origin, religion, or ideology', 'in exchange for speculative national security benefits' (Letter to the US Department of State, 2018).

The parent company General Dynamics is among the largest beneficiaries of US expenditure on border security and control (Miller, 2019). A large contract encompasses a Remote Video Surveillance System for CBP, with cameras '[l]ocated on elevated fixed towers and building structures' to provide 'Border Patrol agents with persistent ground-surveillance and real-time video analytics to effectively detect, track, identify, classify and respond to missions along U.S. borders.'. As well as dozens of systems on fixed towers on the borders with Mexico and Canada, the company also built a relocatable version (General Dynamics, 2015). General Dynamics also provided security cameras for the construction of stereotypes for the Trump Administration border wall (Moran, 2019). Though it does not construct or run detention centres, the company has long been involved in the handling of migrant children entering the US. From 2010 to 2014 its Information Technology division, of which CSRA is now a part, won about $13 million in contracts to coordinate the placement of unaccompanied minors (Rosenberg, 2014). Continuing to do casework in this field, General Dynamics was also contracted to provide training and technical assistance for the now closed Homestead detention centre, where unaccompanied migrant children were imprisoned (Freedman and Roach, 2018).

LEIDOS

Leidos (formerly known as Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)[2]) is a defence IT company. In 2016 it merged with the IT division of Lockheed Martin, the world's largest arms producer (Lockheed, 2016). According to the company, '[a]s a long-term partner to the UK and US governments', it provides 'fixed and mobile scanning equipment, multi-sensor surveillance systems, and integration services that include multi-modal biometrics in the United Kingdom and United States' (Kerrigan, 2020). Leidos has been among the 15 largest beneficiaries of CBP spending in the period 2008–2019, earning $476.4 million for a string of contracts including for the supply of X-ray and other detection technologies and maintenance services for such equipment (Miller, 2019).

Like other military companies, Leidos saw the anti-immigration policies announced by the Trump Administration as a major new profit opportunity, expecting a boost in spending on border security. (Fang, 2016) After Trump presented new anti-immigration policies, including a wall on the border with Mexico, in January 2017 CEO Roger Krone told investors that immigration and border control represents a 'really strong area for us', boasting about good ties with the Department of Homeland Security (Bach, 2017). Simiarly, in the UK the company has been enthusiastic about Brexit and the arising 'need to revisit and revitalise the country's border and customs infrastructure' (Wiles, 2019).

In both countries, Leidos has been awarded large contracts in the field of migration in recent years. In October 2019, the UK Home Office contracted Leidos to move the UK's biometrics databases from the Immigration and Asylum Biometrics System (IABS) from four data centres into one public cloud platform. The ten-year contract is worth £96.4 million (Williams, 2019). In July 2020 the US CBP agency awarded the company two large contracts worth a total of over $1.3 billion. The first is a Blanket Purchase Agreement (BPA), with an estimated value of $960 million 'to provide software development services and related specialized equipment', including 'kiosks, workstations, biometric capture devices, document readers and telecommunications equipment' to 'support traveler enrollment and processing' (Leidos, 2020). The second is a contract 'to provide a non-intrusive inspection (NII) system for high-energy rail infrastructure', with a total value of $379 million for five years, to detect immigrants and contraband being smuggled into the country (Leidos, 2020).

WALLS AGAINST SYRIA

The countries neighbouring Syria have erected very different border controls, and a wide range of the (published) involvement of companies. The companies related to Israel's walls have been discussed above (see pp. 32-34).

The concrete wall on the border between Turkey and Syria was build by TOKI, the Turkish state construction company. For a part of 95 km on rough terrain in the

2. A spin-off of Leidos is still named Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC).

forested mountains of the Hatay province, the military company Alp Çelik provided its Accordion Barrier System, wire cages lined with polypropylene cloth, filled with stones, debris, sand, gravel or soil (Pitel, 2017). A 40 km part of the wall is enhanced with a Smart Border Security System, developed by a team of Turkish engineers. When the system detects a border violation, cameras turn to the spot and forward the scene to the police and an operations center (Hürriyet Daily News, 2019). Press reports that they were equipped with automatic weapons systems were denied by the Turkish authorities and in all likelihood were unfounded.[3]

The EU funded the €35.6 million purchase of Cobra II armoured military vehicles from the Turkish military company Otokar to patrol the wall (Popp, 2018), and in 2020 Turkey started deploying 17 m Doruk surveillance balloons to scan the borderlands with Syria. The aerostats were developed by Turkish technology company Otonom Teknoloji and produced within the Karagöz-product family of Turkey's largest arms company, Aselsan, that also integrated high-resolution cameras into the system (Çobanoğlu and Böke, 2019).

In Jordan, since 2009 the US has provided over $234 million to fund the Jordan Border Security Programme (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, 2020). After the initial phase of the programme, which includes the construction of several barriers on the border with Syria, was completed by DRS Technologies (now a part of the Italian arms company Leonardo), the arms producer Raytheon has been the primary contractor (Kertscher, 2019). DRS Technologies selected the High Resolution Situational Awareness (HiRSA) software from 21st Century Systems to provide the surveillance and situational awareness IT for the programme (21st Century Systems, 2008). After this company spun off its force protection arm into a new company, Persistent Sentinel, it remained active in the Jordan programme. In 2017 Persistent Sentinel was awarded a new contract to enhance the capabilities of the border-security system (America's Seed Fund, 2020: Sentinel Persistent, 2017).

RAYTHEON

Like many other important players in the border security market Raytheon is also a large arms producer, ranked as the world's fourth largest on SIPRI's global top 100 list (Fleurent and Aude, 2014). The company is often contracted by the US government to provide border security equipment and services to third countries. The contract for the Jordan Border Security Programme is the most prominent example of this. Winning a series of contracts, worth over $150 million, Raytheon constructed border barriers, patrol paths and watchtowers. The system is integrated with day and night cameras, ground radars, and a full suite of command, control and communications. The company and its Jordanian subcontractors also trained the Jordanian Armed Forces to maintain and operate the system (Opall-Rome, 2016).

Again via DTRA, the company developed surveillance systems for border security to Moldova and received a contract to 'design and construct a National Coast Watch Center (NCWC); support integration of data from various agencies into the NCWC; and provide acquisition, installation and training on an automatic identification system as well as radio communications' for the Philippines (Rathyeon, 2019). In 2019, Raytheon reported it would provide advanced surveillance towers, for both border security and guarding military installations, to an unnamed country in the Middle East, under a contract with the US Army (Ratheon, 2019).

Between 2005 and 2019, the CBP in the US awarded Raytheon 35 contracts, worth $37 million, for example for providing surveillance and radar systems for maritime drones. The company is spending large amounts of money on contributions to political candidates and Congress members (Miller, 2019).

In the UK, Raytheon was awarded a £750 million contract to provide an e-Borders system in 2007. Three years later, amidst many problems, delays and mutual accusations, the UK government cancelled the contract. A prolonged legal dispute followed, resulting in a £150 million settlement, paid to the company in 2015 (Hall, 2015).

NEW DEVELOPMENTS: AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS

An ongoing development in the field of military and security applications is the use of autonomous and robotic systems, which are also increasingly deployed (or tested) for border security, including as part of or connected to walls and fences (Worcester, 2014). The use of autonomous vehicles, including UAVs (drones or RPAS) and robots, at borders is probably the best-known part of this trend. In many instances, the use of UAVs is in the early stages, and so far has often been (geographically) limited by airspace regulations. They have long been used at the US–Mexico border, are increasingly being used by Frontex for missions in the Mediterranean and have been seen at the Eurotunnel to the UK at Calais. In May 2020 Greece signed a deal with Israel Aerospace Industries to lease its Heron drones for border security (Frantzman, 2020).

3. Correspondence from Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Campaign to Stop Killer Robots.

As with many new technological developments, Israel takes a leading role in this sector, both with its armed forces and its industry. At an exhibition and conference on unmanned systems in Tel Aviv, Lt. Col. Leon Altarac boasted that 'the IDF is the first army in the world to operationally deploy robots to secure the border […]', referring to equipment like the Guardium and SEGEV unmanned ground vehicles (Miller, 2019).

The smart towers at Turkey's border with Syria have been described above. Although some press accounts wrongly presented these as autonomous firing systems, autonomous weapons at borders to stop migration are not a complete fantasy. In a promotion mailing to Frontex, the stated-owned Bulgarian company Prono, suggested the use of a 'system for amplification of state border protection', 'recording and reporting attempts for illegal penetration across the state border'. Its offer scarily included 'manageable or automatic non-lethal impact and manageable lethal influence on offenders without requiring constant monitoring by qualified personnel'. The proposal also said that 'if requested ammo with non-lethal effects could be replaced by ammunition with lethal effects'.[4]

While not going as far as this, recent developments at the US–Mexico border wall take a step towards more autonomous border-security operations. In March 2017, the University of Arizona started a three-year project, funded by a $750,000 grant from the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, to build an integrated and autonomous surveillance system for land and aerial vehicles at this border, based on artificial intelligence (AI) (University of Arizona College of Engineering, 2017).

The tech start-up Anduril Industries, founded in 2017, received enthusiastic responses from CBP after testing its portable towers with cameras and radars, combining VR and surveillance tools through an AI-based system (called Lattice (Anduril, n.d.)) to detect unauthorised persons crossing the border (Levy, 2018). This resulted in the company being awarded a five-year contract in June 2020 to set up hundreds of solar-powered autonomous surveillance watchtowers along the border with Mexico, especially in more remote areas. CBP said its 'personnel are able to re-locate a tower within two hours, providing frontline agents with a highly flexible, autonomous system that enhances situational awareness, agent effectiveness, and safety' (US CBP, 2020). According to company executives the contract is worth several hundred million dollars (Mirroff, 2020).

In August 2020, Elbit Systems of America announced that it had integrated acoustic, vibration, and visual sensors with AI algorithms into its Linear Ground Detection System, which 'provides surface and subterranean surveillance and threat detection in support of the Border Wall System (BWS)' and as such is 'an added layer of security to the steel-and-concrete constructed physical border wall' (Elbit Systems of America, 2020).

4. Email exchanges between Frontex and industry representatives, as released under a Freedom of Information request to Frontex; see: http://www. asktheeu.org/en/request/contacts_with_the_defence_and_se_3#incoming-8354

4. CONCLUSIONS

The culture of fear is a widespread, perverse mechanism that seeks to maintain and increase the power and the heritage of the elites. Fear is motivated by particular social interests, as without fear there is no market for security; fear encourages and justifies securitisation policies that result in investing in walls for protection rather than enacting social welfare policies in order to achieve human security and global justice.

This report's main findings can be summarised as follows:

- After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the number of border and similar walls worldwide had risen from six to 63 by 2018, all of which remain standing at the time of writing.
- Walls continue to be built and their construction increased between 1968 and 2018. In 2004 there were 17 walls and by 2005 there were 21. The greatest increase was from 42 walls in 2014 to 56 in 2015.
- 6 out of ten people in the world live in a country that has built walls on its borders.
- Asia has the highest number of walls built (56%), followed by Europe (26%), Africa (16%). The Americas have only the US–Mexico wall which accounts for the remaining 1%.
- Numerically, Israel has six walls, followed by Morocco, Iran and India (three each). Hungary, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, Turkey and Turkmenistan each possess two walls.
- Governments' main justifications for building border walls are to prevent Immigration (32%), Terrorism (18%), Goods and People Trafficking (16%), Drug Trafficking (10%), Territorial Disputes and Tensions (11%) and the entry of militants from other countries (5%). The remaining include that the country is on the external border of the EU, Territorial Conquests, Animal Health and Poaching.
- Immigration and terrorism are the main reasons for the construction of walls worldwide, together accounting for of half of them. A total of 38 walls were built between 1968 and 2018 as part of immigration policies, 22 as a response to terrorism, 19 to hinder smuggling, 12 to prevent drug-trafficking and 13 because of regional tensions or disputes.

ISRAEL

- Israel is the worlds's most walled-in country with border walls with all f its neighbouring countries. Serious human rights violations were committed with the constructions undertaken in 1994 in Gaza and in 2002 in the Occupied Territories, using walls as a means of territorial annexation.

MEXICO

- Apart from the wall on its border with Mexico, the US has pushed for the militarisation of Mexico's southern border with Guatemala and to a lesser extent Belize. Though not a physical wall, the extensive security infrastructure at and around this border has similar consequences for asylum seekers and migrants.

- Under the Mérida Initiative security cooperation agreement the US has provided equipment and funding for Mexico's Frontera Sur programme since 2014. This has resulted in pushing migrants to more dangerous routes.

SYRIA

- With the exception of Lebanon, four of Syria's neighbouring countries have built border walls along several stretches of their frontier: Israel (1973, with an extension in 2013), Turkey (2013), Jordan (2008) and Iraq (2018). These barriers make it harder for civilians to flee the war and its consequences.

SPAIN

- Spain is a paradigm in the deployment of border militarisation in the EU, making it the first European country (Cyprus entered the EU in 2004), to build walls along its frontiers (1993 and 1996).

INDIA

- Of India's international borders with Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, and a few kilometres with Afghanistan, almost all have barriers along almost their entire length.

- Of a total of 15,106 km of India's land border, it has been estimated that there are over 6,540.7 km of barriers, meaning that 43.29% of the country's borders are walled.

AUSTRALIA

- Australia has no land borders but has built a maritime wall to keep out migrants arriving by boat. Australia's armed forces and the Maritime Border Command of the Australian Border Force use patrol vessels and aircraft to guard the maritime borders. This is coupled with a controversial offshore detention system in violation of human rights, a prime example of border externalisation.

- Australia has spent an estimated A$5 billion on border security policies between 2013 and 2019, with more money on the role for its Future Maritime Surveillance Capability (FMSC) Project.

THE INDUSTRY BEHIND THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL APARTHEID

- The military and security industry is a driving force behind the militarisation of borders, including the erection of walls and fences. To this end, it has pushed a narrative in which migration and other political and/or humanitarian challenges at the border are seen primarily as a security threat, to which the building of walls and fences, along with the use of military and security equipment, is presented as the solution.

- Many walls and fences are built by local construction companies or by government bodies, such as the military. The military and security industry provides technology for monitoring, detection and identification, vehicles, aircraft, arms and other equipment to enhance and protect the border barriers. Autonomous and robotic systems, such as drones and smart towers, are also increasingly used (or tested) for border security, including as part of or connected to walls and fences.

- Earlier research identified large arms companies as Airbus, Thales, Leonardo, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman and L3 Technologies as main beneficiaries of the contracts related to the building of border walls and fences in Europa and the US. The cases described in this report show that a range of companies, including Elbit, Indra, Dat-Con, CSRA, Leidos and Raytheon are also important in the global market for walls and fences.

- Israeli companies often promote their work on the international market by highlighting their involvement in the building of Israel's extensive infrastructure of walls and fences. For example, Elbit has successfully exported its goods to the US and Europe based on its claims that they have been 'field tested'.

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ANNEX

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