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The Turkey Connection
Military Build-up of
a New Regional Power

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Military Build-up of a New Regional Power

Written
by staff members
of AMOK

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Understanding

From the lullabies the mothers sing
to the words of the newsreader on TV
Conquer the lie everywhere in the world
In our hearts, in books, in the streets.
What a great gift it is to understand, my love,
to understand what is happening around us.
Nazim Hikmet

Colofon

The Turkey Connection Military Build-up of a New Regional Power

Antimilitaristies Onderzoekskollektief

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Introduction A Bloody New Year

Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel had spoken some reassuring words beforehand, "I celebrate Newroz with everyone that wants to celebrate." However, the Kurdish New Year turned extremely bloody on March 21, 1992. The fighting in Irak lasted for three days. Thirty-eight people were killed. The trouble started when male soldiers searched a group of women on their way to Cumhuriyet Square. When demonstrators protested, security forces opened fire. During the riots, fighter jets flew over the city at low altitude. Shock waves caused extensive damage as they broke through the sound barrier.

In retrospect, these events turned out to be a mere prelude to the violence that hit the city later the same year. On August 18, 19 and 20, Turkish security forces swept through the streets shooting and committing arson. What caused this explosion of violence has never been discovered. The army stated they reacted to an attack of 1,000 à 1,500 PKK fighters, the Kurdistan Labour Party, but this is refuted by independent investigation. After three days, almost three quarters of Sirkak had been demolished. Even government buildings had been subjected to fire. Practically the entire population had fled. Army and police had picked up five hundred people. The 44 they kept were tortured and forced to make statements. During the shooting, a total of 26 people were killed, among them five children, one policeman and three soldiers.

On January 1, 1989, two activists forced their way onto the military airbase Woensdrecht in the south of the Netherlands. Using an axe, they badly damaged an NF-5

fighter aircraft. Through this action, a large audience was confronted for the first time with the existence of a special kind of arms export. The Netherlands donated 60 of these fighters to Turkey in connection with a NATO aid programme. The Dutch government regards these machines as obsolete, but in Turkey they can apparently be put to use.

This aid programme, started at the end of the eighties, caused much controversy - albeit rather belatedly. For the most part, those questions concerned the use made of the planes and Dutch responsibility. It is a well-known fact that Turkey uses military force to suppress the Kurdish resistance, in particular the guerrillas of the PKK. Hence it is quite probable that the Turkish armed forces also use the NF-5 planes for this in bombing missions.

The transfer of these planes is part of a much larger programme to increase Turkey's military power. Why? What Turkish and Western interests are involved? According to former Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans van den Broek, the Dutch arms exports had nothing to do with the military approach to the Kurdish problem. But why then does Turkey need these arms in times of disarmament? Is there a connection with its regional ambitions? Is Turkey preparing for war?

This book gives an overview of Western military exports to Turkey and, more generally, the military build-up of this country. The emphasis of this study will be on the issue of the present political and military development of Turkey.

The construction of a large Turkish arms industry started after the military coup of 1980. Since then, the country has developed into a democracy - according to the Turkish government. **Chapter 1** deals with the Turkish politics of this recent period in particular. The main focus is on the question of how a seemingly democratic country can carry out policies against its own citizens which are, in fact, quite repressive. For this, Turkey has been repeatedly condemned by human rights organisations. Apart from these internal policies, this chapter also deals with Turkish foreign policy. It seems that Turkey wants to crown its economic revival by becoming a leading regional power. This chapter also deals with the way in which Turkey's relations with the European Community and the United States influence Turkish politics.

The possession of arms is very important in conducting power politics. The following three chapters deal with the expansion of Turkish military power. **Chapter 2** goes into the deliberate policy on which this is founded. **Chapter 3** shows how Turkey is building its own arms industry with Western aid. **Chapter 4** gives an overview of arms suppliers, country by country.

Turkey is a country that usually remains outside of the general public and political debate. This is probably due to the fact that we are dealing with an important Western ally with a superficial system of parliamentary democracy. The authors of this book seek to provide information for a public debate on a country in which violence is always threatening to escalate.

1/ A dictatorship With a Democratic Mask

If we want to become a civilised nation, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk had said, then we have no other option than to bend towards the West. This has been the guiding principle of the Turkish state since its creation in the 20s. At the moment, Turkey is one of the few countries in the Middle East with what at least appears to be a democratic system.

As the founder of Turkey, Atatürk was a typical example of an authoritarian leader, quite a few of whom gained power in Europe around 1930. He was also a pasha, a general. This tradition still survives in present day Turkey. The Turkish army is still a factor in society and its power is often bigger than that of democratic institutions. Soldiers are quite unwilling to engage in a debate on the niceties of human rights and the oppression of the Kurds. They don't need to. For Europe and the United States, the fact that Turkey serves Western interests in the region is of greater importance.

The Kemalistic State Ideology

Modern Turkey was born violently after World War I. The new country was founded on the remains of the Ottoman Empire. From the 15th to the end of the 19th centuries, this empire controlled large areas in the Arab world and in the Balkans. The country had lost a large part of its territories in the course of the nineteenth century and finally fell apart during the first World War, in which the Sultan took sides with Germany.

During that war even the heart of the Ottoman empire, Thrácia and Anatolia (the European and Asian parts of present-day Turkey, respectively) were not spared. Parts

of it were occupied by Greek, Italian, English and Russian troops. The Russians left as early as the end of 1917, after the revolutionary coup in St. Petersburg. At the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), the Turks had to relinquish part of western Anatolia on the Egyptian coast.

Atatürk

An opposition movement made headway against the concessions of the Sultan. Under the leadership of general Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk (father of the Turks), the foreign troops were driven out of the country. After this war, the new Turkey was internationally recognised in the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) and it gained the boundaries it approximately has today.

Atatürk instigated a policy aimed at steering Turkish society in a Western direction. A prerequisite for this was independent self-determination within national boundaries. The fear of surrounding countries that Turkey might want to annex parts of their territories had to be removed. The 'National Pact' of 1919 formulated this principle: invasions into other countries, as well as separations from Turkey, were forbidden. Minorities, such as the Kurds, Armenians, Arabs and Greeks had to adapt to Turkish culture. In due course, they would have to merge with the Turkish people.

One of the major points of Kemal's policy was the separation of church and state. Kemal increased the grip of the state on social life at the expense of the influence of Islam. The religious law was replaced by a Turkish variation on Swiss civil rights and Italian criminal law. Secular courts of justice replaced religious courts of justice. Religious schools were closed and education was secularised according to a unified national sys-

tem. Religious leaders lost their power outside of the mosques. In addition, women were given equal rights, traditional costume was forbidden and the Latin script was introduced.

There were many similarities between the authoritarian leadership of Atatürk and that of the autocrats who came to power in many other places in Europe in the 20s and 30s. The Republican People's Party of Atatürk was the only party allowed. It kept a close watch on any possible opposition to the new measures. Other political parties would not come into existence until after 1946 and even then all subscribed to the Kemalistic principles.

The Power of the Army

As democratic structures began to develop at the end of World War II, the army turned itself into the guardian of Kemalism. Three times it organised coups, in 1960, 1971 and 1980, to keep the country on the right track. To this day, the military have a decisive influence on government policies through the National Security Council. This council was set up after the 1960 coup. The constitution of 1961 allowed for another civilian government, but at the same time legitimised the National Security Council as an instrument with which the military could maintain its hold from behind the scenes.

The Kemalistic principles have, to a large degree, determined Turkish politics over the past seventy years. These principles were affected by the rise of the Kurdish movement, the labour movement and the advent of political currents and parties based on Islam. The army coup of September 12, 1980 was explicitly directed against the internationalism of communism, the cry for an Islamic legal system and disturbances of

the peace by fascists and left-wing extremists. In 1982, the junta proposed a new constitution, which was put to the vote in a referendum and then made part of the power structure. After general elections in which only a limited number of parties were allowed to participate, a civilian government was installed.

The National Security Council

The leader of the coup, general Keman Evren, was elected president on November 7, 1982. The heads of the different branches of the armed forces took up positions in the National Security Council. At present, the council consists of the president of the country, the prime minister of the government, the chief of intelligence, the chief of staff of the army and the commanders of the branches of the armed forces. As chairman, the president convenes the National Security Council.

The issues this council deals with range from the Kurdish question to foreign affairs, human rights, democratisation and the use of force against civilians. The six security services and the so-called 'special units' fall under the direct responsibility of the council. The generals who are members are not accountable to the civilian authorities. The constitution states that the Security Council may only advise the executive. In practice, however, the council operates as the voice of the army and is quite powerful. In fact, the Security Council sets the boundaries within which the government can formulate its policy.

Although the government has chosen to ignore recommendations of the council a number of times in the 80s, president Özal vetoed a reform of the criminal law in 1992, on the advice of the council. As a result,

changes in the detention procedures, some of which would have reduced the risk of torture in police cells, were not introduced. The dissolution of the National Security Council is not among the democratisation measures of the current government, nor is the abolition of the position of chief of the general staff, which ranks higher than that of the minister of defence.

There are in fact two governments in Turkey: the formal government which derives its power from the elected parliament and a shadow government.

The Economic Power

The power of the army in Turkey has been confirmed through legislation, but it reaches beyond that. The military is an economic factor of significance in Turkish society.

After the 1960 coup, the military officers gave themselves a salary increase. A part of these higher wages was skimmed off by a compulsory contribution to the new pension fund OYAK (*Ordu Yardimlasma Kurumu*). OYAK grew into a very large investment corporation. At present, it is among the hundred largest Turkish enterprises and owns a chain of supermarkets as well as other property. Apart from this, OYAK companies often serve as service industries for the Turkish defence apparatus. This makes the army its own customer and ensures a regular market. Apart from being an extra source of income through profit-sharing, for many retired officers Oyak provides the key to a job in commercial enterprises. The economic involvement of the officers increased further, beginning in the 70s. To stimulate the Turkish defence industry, the three army units set up three special funds.

For this reason it is of direct interest to the army that the labour force is quiescent and

the economy booming. The economic crisis had reached a dramatic low point just before the 1980 coup. Inflation was almost 100%, there was widespread unemployment, a lack of basic essentials and foreign debts could no longer be paid. Turgut Özal, who was appointed minister of economic affairs after the coup and would later become president, introduced wide-ranging budgetary cuts and a policy based on free enterprise. As a result, direct regulations and controls by the authorities were abolished.

Left Wing and Kurdish Opposition

Two of the most important opposition movements of the past thirty years are the Kurdish and the labour movements. Both challenged the Turkish state to introduce reforms.

The Turkish Labour Party (TIP, *Türkiye İsci Partisi*), a communist party linked with Moscow, entered parliament for the first time in 1965. At the time it won 15 of the 450 seats. Reacting to this, the government changed the electoral law, which left the communists with only two seats by 1969. After the military coup of 1971, the party was banned temporarily.

It was the specific aim of this coup to destroy the left wing movement. Although this was by no means achieved, it left the left wing opposition very fragmented. According to sources in the secret services, there were seven Marxist-oriented parties and 50 different factions among the Marxists in 1978. The reason for this fragmentation was, on the one hand, that the different groups were not willing to cooperate with one another and, on the other, their suppression by the state and the violent opposition of the extreme right. The 1980 coup was the

last nail in the coffin as it almost completely wiped out the radical left wing movement.

The Kurds

Left wing Kurds, together with a few left wing Turks, formed a party which was determined to engage in a struggle for an independent and socialist Kurdistan. In 1978 the Kurdish Labour Party was founded, the PKK. This party originated in the left wing youth organisation *Dev-Genc*. There were, and still are, other Kurdish organisations, but the PKK has gained a lot of respect among the Kurds since its foundation. It acquired quite a fierce reputation, especially since it began its armed struggle against both the Turkish state and Kurdish leaders who cooperated with it. However, its reputation is not entirely positive because of its unremitting use of violence.

Another important representative of the Kurdish movement is the HEP, the Labour Party of the People. Members of this party took part in the elections of October 1991 as candidates on the list of the social-democratic party SHP. Having been elected to parliament, they formed their own faction. Thus, the HEP provides the Kurdish movement with a forum in Turkish Parliament. On July 16, 1993, the HEP was banned by the Turkish Constitutional Court. The HEP parliamentarians remained in parliament, however, because they had formed a new party just before the ban, the DEP.

The Turkish Kurds live in the mountainous area in the south-east corner of Turkey. They have been striving for independence, or at least more autonomy, since the formation of the Turkish state. In 1920 their right to self-determination was acknowledged in the Treaty of Sèvres. Three years later, this right had been swept under the carpet in the

Treaty of Lausanne.

The Turkish state wants to solve the Kurdish issue by turning Kurds into Turks. To achieve this, a 'super governor' was installed a few years ago, who was given dictatorial powers. In addition to this, there has been a permanent state of emergency in the south-eastern provinces since 1984.

In 1992 and 1993 the Turkish state intensified the oppression of the Kurds and in this period the PKK suffered severe attacks. In 1992, 296 Turkish-Kurdish villages were razed. Five cities (Sirnak, Cukurca, Kulp, Dicle and Cizre) were largely destroyed. Kurdish human rights organisations counted 385 murders by Turkish contra-guerrillas.

The Instruments of the Army

The contra-guerrilla is one of the strategies with which the Turkish state has tried to control the opposition movements since the 60s. Many political assassinations of the last decades have been carried out under obscure circumstances. A few years ago a secret NATO network was uncovered. As it was first mentioned in the Italian media under the name *Gladio*, it is now also referred to in Turkey under that name. It is the Turkish branch of this network that is suspected of being responsible for these attacks.

Soon after the founding of NATO, most of its member states set up so-called *stay-behind-networks*. These were intended to organise internal resistance after a Soviet invasion. The secret personnel received special training for this purpose, and secret weapon arsenals were installed. Democratic monitoring was minimal. As a result, the *Gladio* units evolved into separate, uncontrolled entities in several countries.

In Turkey an Anti-Terror Organisation

was created in 1953, one year after the country joined NATO. This organisation was financed by the CIA. From the Turkish side only the secret service MIT and a select group of officers were involved.

In 1964 the organisation received the name *Department for Special Warfare* (ÖHD, *Özel Harp Dairesi*), and was placed under the direct command of the Turkish General Staff. It was in this same period that the ÖHD was given a broader role. After the communists had entered parliament in 1965, a manual for anti-Communist action was issued. In it all left-wing organisations were declared to be enemies of the state. The struggle against communism became a task that had to be carried out even before a communist occupation.

Cihat Akyol, one of the top within the ÖHD, explained the methods in the *Magazine for the Military Forces* in September 1971, "For successful propaganda, conspiracies are often put into practice, such as rapes, looting, and murders. The impression has to be given that these crimes were committed by left-wing rebels. [...] In order to alienate the people from the resistance movements, the armed forces have to undertake actions that exceed brutality in the name of the resistance movements."

One notorious incident is the blood bath that was brought about during the May 1st celebrations in Istanbul in 1977. From surrounding buildings 38 people were shot dead. It was attributed to the radical left wing, but all the evidence leads in the direction of the contra-guerrillas.

The Grey Wolves

An escalation of violence took place during the 70s, especially in the big cities. Radical right-wing and left-wing youths came to

blows in bloody clashes. In 1980 the number of deaths from these confrontations rose to 2,000. The violence was actually encouraged by the fascist party MHP, through its commandos, the *Grey Wolves*. This party was under the command of Alparslan Türkeş, a colonel who participated in the coup of 1960. The government of which he was deputy prime minister turned a blind eye to the crimes of the *Grey Wolves*. When a near-civil war situation arose in 1980, the army restored order harshly through a coup. Later, however, it became clear that the army was in close contact with the extreme right through the contra-guerrillas. Their idea was to use the right wing's commandos in the fight against the left.

Village Guards

To stop the activities of the PKK the government recruited 20,000 *village guards*. These are villagers paid and armed to fight the guerrillas. They must also prevent the PKK fighters from receiving logistical support from the villages in the Kurdish area. Most villagers are reluctant to become village guards, fearing retribution from the guerrillas. But they also fear the violence of the security forces if they refuse. Theoretically, joining the village guards is a voluntary act, but a refusal is regarded by the army to be an admission of support for the guerrillas.

Since the winter of 1991-1992 the system of village guards has been going through a period of crisis. Hundreds of guards have left their job. At the same time the Kurdish resistance went through a period of growth.

The Special Unit

Besides these semi-soldiers recruited from the local population, the Turkish state has at its disposal a *Special Unit*. According to

official figures there are about 60,000 regular gendarmes and 2,500 members of the *Special Unit*.

The members of this *Special Unit*, who are nominally accountable to the local police commander, are trained for close range fighting with the guerrillas. They may wear uniforms and often wear masks. Many members of the unit speak Kurdish and are dressed according to local custom. Unlike other soldiers, they are allowed to have long hair and grow beards or moustaches, and often wear sneakers. Members of the *Special Unit* are also said to pose as PKK members in the villages, testing the villagers' loyalties by asking for food for example.

Human Rights

All governments after the elections of 1983 have stated that at worst only incidental cases of human rights violations have occurred. They add that these violations should be regarded as the excesses of individuals and that there is no underlying system. Yet, over and over again, Turkish and international human rights organisations publish reports listing numerous cases. Their accusations are directed especially against extra-judicial executions, disappearances, torture and maltreatment. Everyone held prisoner for political reasons runs a great risk of being maltreated by means of beatings, electric shocks and sexual abuse.

Turkey has signed a number of the most important international treaties and protocols concerning the protection of human rights. In addition to this, according to the constitution of 1982, the international human rights treaties are part of the internal laws. The constitution guarantees the freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and opinion, freedom of speech,

freedom of public assembly. These rights, however, are subjected to a whole range of limitations. None of the freedoms may be used to violate the unbreakable unity of the state, to endanger the existence of the Turkish state.

The Demirel government, installed in November 1991, promised to greatly improve the human rights situation. "We are about to become an immaculate champion as far as human rights are concerned and the other countries will limp far behind," were the words of Suat Bilge, minister of justice. The new Turkish government even has a minister for human rights, Mehmet Kahraman. Amnesty International unreservedly calls him a "whitewasher of the unrelenting terrible circumstances in Turkish police stations and prisons." In addition to this, a parliamentary commission for human rights has been installed. Being hindered in its attempts to visit police stations and prisons, this commission has directed its activities to situations abroad.

The problem with effective action against violations of human rights lies in the fact that Turkish legislation intentionally leaves a large amount of leeway for the brutal repression of alleged enemies of the state. In conflict with international laws, the criminal law does not guarantee visits of a lawyer to an arrested suspect. In addition, a detainee need not be taken before a judge right after being arrested. Because of this, there is no supervision of the police in the first 16 days of detention.

Another important obstacle is the Anti-Terror Law of April 1991. This law offers a new definition of the concept 'terror'. It resulted in the elimination of a number of articles from the Code of Criminal Procedure, which in turn meant a significant

curtailment of the freedom of speech. But the new law also prohibits "written or verbal propaganda, meetings, protests and marches that aim to damage the indivisible unity of the state."

In addition, the Anti-Terror Law protects all civil servants who are involved in the combating of terrorism, by making the Law on Prosecution of Civil Servants applicable to them. This entails that a 'local administrative council' investigates almost all complaints filed against these civil servants. This council has the power to stop progress of suit, and thus the power to prevent complaints concerning torture being taken to court.

In March 1992, the Constitutional Court decided that this application of the Law on the Prosecution of Civil Servants is contrary to the constitution. The protection of fighters of terrorism as described above does, however, remain intact in the area in south-eastern Turkey where the state of emergency exists.

Attacks by Death Squads

Since the intensification of the Kurdish revolt in 1991, a new phenomenon has begun to appear: disappearances and extra-legal executions. Villagers who have refused to be recruited as guards are the main targets of the anonymous attackers. These attacks take place primarily in those villages that are suspected of having links with the PKK. But the death squads also aim at local politicians, especially members of the HEP/DEP and journalists investigating the executions.

Official sources ascribe these murders in Kurdistan to the Hezbollah. Although there are groups of dedicated believers in the Batman and Nusaybin regions who organise themselves under the name of Hezbollah,

the existence of the Hezbollah as an organised armed force in Turkey is doubtful. Human rights organisations are of the opinion that the security forces and the Special Unit are behind the attacks. Journalists, as well as a lot of Kurds, also mention the contra-guerrillas in this respect, the ÖHD.

In some cases, eyewitnesses have recognised the murderers as being members of the military. In many cases, people have seen death squads leaving army or police buildings, passing roadblocks (in cars without number plates) without being stopped. Furthermore, a remarkable number of attacks and abductions take place without any hindrance from the public authorities. People who had been kidnapped, were later found in governmental prisons. The actions of the death squads are seldom investigated in a meaningful way by the authorities.

The Economic Population Policy

Turkey is carrying through a population policy specifically aimed at transforming Kurdish areas into Turkish ones. The Turkish state is using the South Anatolia Project, the GAP (*Güney Anadolü Projesi*), as part of its policy of suppressing any pursuit of Kurdish autonomy. This extensive dam project was designed in the late 70s by the Demirel government. It has far-reaching consequences, both for the local Kurdish population, and for the political strategic situation in the entire Middle East.

The GAP plan involves the construction of 22 dams and 17 hydro-electric power stations on the upper courses of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers. It encompasses six provinces and covers an area which runs from a point close to the Mediterranean shore, across to the eastern border with Iran. Eventually, power generation is projected to

reach 8.9 kilowatt-hours a year. The scheme will cost an estimated \$18 million. The Turkish government promises that the GAP will create 1.6 million jobs. This will turn it into the workhorse of the Turkish economy.

The idea is that by the end of the 90s, the GAP will allow the irrigation of 1.6 million ha of land. According to Turkish agricultural experts, the yields per ha will increase 17.5 times. Further reaching agricultural innovations are to increase crop production another 50 to 60 times.

Increasing the scale of agricultural production is one of the aims of the project. Only large enterprises run with modern machinery will be able to hold out in the agricultural market of the future. Thus, Turkey is following the instructions which the World Bank gave in 1981, when it said agricultural yields should be increased.

Kurdish construction workers are not being employed at the dams. Turks from the overpopulated cities in the western part of the country are lured to the project with all kinds of privileges concerning taxes and education. A large number of Kurdish villages will also have to be moved because of the reservoirs; 19,000 people from 92 villages had to make way for the Kaban reservoir. The relocation is often badly organised. People were being offered housing on the outskirts of the region, in such places as Konya, 250 km south of Ankara, and even in Izmir.

When the GAP is completed, the Euphrates will only take about one-third of its previous water supply into Syria and Iraq. Syria relies on the Euphrates for 70% of its power supply; the river is just about the only source of irrigation water for the entire north of the country. In Iraq, 1.3 million ha of arable land is dependent on the river.

There, the Tigris is a second source of water but its flow, too, will be decreasing because of the construction of a large number of dams.

For Turkey, the GAP is an integral part of its plans to become the most important power in the region, economically and politically. The project will produce a lot more energy than Turkey will ever need for itself. Plans are being made to export electricity to Iraq, Syria, Jordan and Egypt.

Furthermore, water is becoming ever more important in the economic development of the region. Turkey is developing plans to make water another export product for the Arab countries in particular. This water would be taken from two rivers that reach the Mediterranean near Adana. Turkey is already using the Euphrates as a political weapon to force Syria into a less accommodating attitude towards the PKK fighters who have taken refuge in that country.

Regional Ambitions

The GAP shows that Turkey is projecting its power in the region more forcefully than before. Two points determine the Turkish position: the economic growth of the 80s and the end of the Cold War.

The former is mainly the result of the policy of the late Turgut Özal, aimed at liberalisation of the market. Özal began as minister of economic affairs, and later became prime minister and finally, president. The end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union have changed the international relations in the region significantly. These changes offer Turkey new economic perspectives.

Turkish foreign policy is determined on the one hand by these rational economic motives, on the other hand by old Ottoman

and pan-Turkish sentiments. Turkish interests are projected in three directions: towards the Middle East, the Balkans and the area of the Black Sea, and the old Soviet republics in Central Asia.

The Middle East

After the oil crisis in the early 70s, Turkey consolidated its relations with the Middle East, especially in the field of economics. The oil crisis increased the import from the region, while at the same time a market developed for agricultural and consumer goods. In the 80s especially Turkish exporters focused on this market. Even today, the Middle East accounts for about 20% of the Turkish foreign trade. Moreover, Turkish builders entered into large contracts in Libya and Saudi Arabia in the early 80s.

This increased Turkey's political role in the region, which at that time was mainly a neutral one, maintaining contacts with as many countries as possible.

This is shown, for example, by the way in which Turkey strengthened its position in relation to Iraq and Iran when these two countries were at war with one another. Because of the war, the need for imported articles increased substantially. For both countries, Turkish roads are important overland connections. In addition, Iraq is largely dependent on the oil pipeline to Turkey for its oil exports.

It was therefore surprising in a way that Turkey took sides with the *allies* against Iraq during the Kuwaiti crisis in 1990-1991. This decision was mainly imposed by President Özal and should be seen in the light of Turkey's regional ambitions. One of these is the elimination of competing regional powers like Iraq. Turkey, still in the process of building its own arms industry, was well

behind in this field. The destruction of Iraq's arsenal was a large advantage to Turkey.

During the war, many bombing missions were carried out from Turkish territory. In addition, 120,000 Turkish soldiers were deployed at the border, thus forcing Iraq to do the same and decreasing the strength it had available on the southern front against the US and its allies.

The outcome of the Kuwait crisis shows the strategic importance of Turkey in the region, and certainly has strengthened its position in relation to the West.

Turkey fears that a weakening of the central authority in Iraq will lead to the independence or autonomy of the Kurds living there. This could make control over Turkish Kurds more difficult. For the time being, however, the Kurdish safety-zone in northern Iraq is so dependent on Turkey that the Iraqi Kurds will not even consider supporting the PKK. Moreover, in the autumn of 1992, guerrillas of the Iraqi-Kurdish parties PDK and PUK fought together with the Turkish army against the PKK. The alliance did not last long, but it was a good indication of Turkey's power.

The Balkans and the Black Sea Region

Turkish relations with the Balkans are largely determined by the Ottoman Empire's past. There are Turkish minorities in several countries. Turkey acts as the defender of Muslims in the region, for instance in Albania, Kosovo and Bosnia.

The relations between Turkey and Greece are the most problematic. In the permanent cold war between these two NATO countries, there are two potential sources of trouble: the division of Cyprus and the control of the Aegean Sea.

Since the Turkish invasion of 1974, Cyprus has been divided into a Greek-Cypriot and a Turkish-Cypriot part. Turkey is the only country which recognises Turkish Cyprus as a separate state. In recent years the parties involved have been pressed, especially by the West, to find a solution for the conflict. Against the background of a possible escalation of the war in the Balkans, it is important for the West to keep the tensions between Turkey and Greece under control.

The conflict around the Aegean Sea also dates from about 1974. Around that time both countries made serious attempts to drill for oil in the sea. Greece and Turkey differ on the position of the border running along the continental shelf. There are long-running legal proceedings on the interpretation of the international treaties which the parties consider relevant.

The collapse of the Eastern bloc has made a more autonomous Turkish Balkan policy possible. Military treaties have already been signed with a number of countries including Romania, Albania and Bulgaria. In the war in former Yugoslavia, Turkey has chosen the side of the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Speaking on behalf of the Conference of Islamic States, Turkey constantly urges increased pressure on Serbia. It suggests the arming of Bosnia-Herzegovina and has hinted at an oil boycott of the Western countries because of their slack attitude in the conflict. Government representatives made powerful statements concerning these issues, seemingly meant more for internal political effect than to be put into practice.

The collapse of the Eastern bloc and the Soviet Union in particular resulted in increased economic possibilities. Turkey can export relatively cheap products, not only to the Balkans, but also the countries north and

east of the Black Sea.

In February 1992, Turkey initiated a process of economic collaboration between the countries surrounding the Black Sea. The intention was to create a structure within which the economy in the region could develop, while at the same time facilitating integration into the European and global economy. The Black Sea Treaty aims at cooperation in the field of energy, transport, communication and ecology, as well as establishing a joint investment bank. Members include: Albania, Armenia, Azerbeidzjan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldavia, Ukraine, Russia, Romania and Turkey.

Central Asia

Returning from a trip to the five Turkish-speaking countries in the former Soviet Union in the spring of 1992, Prime Minister Demirel spoke of his surprise at realising for the first time that Turks live between the Adriatic Sea and the Great Wall of China. The increasing power of nationalism in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Turkish-speaking republics in Central Asia increased the Turkish sense of responsibility for the Turkish minorities living elsewhere. About 60% of the 50 million Moslems in Central Asia have a Turkish background. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey has used its influence over the Turkish-speaking peoples to strengthen both its own position and that of the Western allies.

The United States supports Turkey in expanding its contacts with the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia. At the beginning of 1992, US President Bush heralded Turkey as an example to the other countries in the region. He praised it as a "beacon of stability," a democratic and secular state. The most important reason underlying this

American praise concerns the competition between Iran and Iraq. Both these countries are trying to gain more influence in Central Asia, which is Islamic. It seems that the United States is trying to use Turkey to thwart Iranian politics.

Links With the West

After World War II, Turkey explicitly turned to the West. On the one hand, this choice was ideologically determined. Atatürk wanted to give his country a Western character, "there is no alternative if we want to become a civilised country." On the other hand there were, and still are, very practical reasons for the Western orientation, especially from an economic and military point of view. During the Cold War, Turkey also feared the Soviet Union. That is why, in 1952, it became a member of NATO. For economic reasons the country approached the European Community. In 1964, Turkey became an associated member, and in 1987 it applied for full membership.

The West's main interest in maintaining good relations with Turkey is military. A NATO presence in the Middle East was regarded as an obstacle to Soviet ambitions concerning the Persian Gulf. In addition, Turkish control of the Bosphorus was important, because this was an obstacle for the entry of the Soviet fleet into the Mediterranean. Finally, should there be a war, a southern front would force the Warsaw Pact to divert a large number of troops from the *central sector*.

Financial-Economic Links

The financial-economic links between Turkey and the West are controlled through the Organisation for Economic Cooperation

and Development (OECD). Since 1962, there has been an OECD aid consortium for Turkey. Its task is to coordinate the provisions of foreign loans. Members of the consortium are the USA, the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Canada, Sweden, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, the IMF and the World Bank. From the start, the Federal Republic of Germany has had chairmanship of the group.

Turkish governments have always been quite dependent on this group as far as fundraising was concerned. Once a year, at the annual meeting in Paris, the government is to present the economic plans and indicate what currency is needed for these plans. After discussion, the separate countries confer with the chairman of the consortium and subsequently come to agreements concerning the amount of credit that is to be granted.

Mainly economic reasons underlie the Turkish application for membership of the EC. About 53% of the Turkish export goes to the 12 EC member states. From the side of the EC there are quite a few obstacles. First of all, Greek-Turkish relations will have to improve. The EC has stipulated that the Cyprus conflict must be solved. The persistent reports of violations of human rights also make the EC hesitant. A third problem is presented by the tariff walls put up by Turkey against imports. By 1995, Turkey will have to have carried through a customs union with the EC. By that time, the country will have to differentiate between import from EC states and other countries. Although in Turkey people seem to think that the creation of the customs union will imply *de facto* membership,

there are also signs that hopes for full membership are on the wane. It is not quite clear, for instance, what the consequences of the Black Sea Treaty and a trade agreement with the United States are for the relationship with the European Community.

Political and Territorial Stability

The end of the Cold War has not in any way diminished the strategic importance of Turkey for the West. This is also shown by the outcome of the Kuwait crisis. The West seems to think that through Turkey it can not only exercise its influence in the Middle East, but also in Central Asia.

Furthermore, Turkey is not just a puppet of the West. This became quite obvious in 1974, when it invaded Cyprus and relations cooled considerably. It is also indicated, for instance, by the substantial internal opposition to the Turkish position during the war against Iraq and the critical attitude towards Western policy in former Yugoslavia.

Turkey carries out a self-conscious policy in the region, which often parallels Western interests. Despite the protests that are heard regularly against the Turkish dealings with the Kurds, here too the interests are the same. For the West, the political and territorial stability of the region are the most important. Whereas in Europe all countries have started to implement substantial cut-backs in defence expenditures, the arms race in the Middle East is going on in full force. Western countries help Turkey to keep it going in just about every conceivable way.

2/ Metamorphosis into Western Policeman

The CFE Treaty that was signed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact in 1990 allowed a drastic cutback in conventional arms. The south-east of Turkey, however, has been kept out of the Treaty. Hence, it is to this day packed with many modern arms negotiated out of central Europe. The boundaries of this geographical area more or less coincide with those of Turkish Kurdistan. The arms build-up in the region is mostly aimed at Turkey's regional rivals: Syria, Iran and Iraq.

This course of action illustrates once again the strategic importance that Turkey has had since the end of World War II. On the one hand, Turkey had to be able to threaten the Soviet Union in the north, and on the other, to guard the oil fields in the south.

These two matters have determined Western policies towards Turkey for the last 45 years. Initially, it was mainly the United States which supported the development of the Turkish army and defence industry. In the 60s they were joined by the Federal Republic of Germany, followed by other NATO countries.

American Support

After World War II, the American position was greatly strengthened while that of the old super power, Great Britain, was seriously weakened. This also caused a change in local power relations throughout the world. The United States increased their influence in the Turkish region which is traditionally the bridge between Europe and Asia. American strategists had two reasons for doing so.

First, it enabled them to directly threaten the southern border of the Soviet Union, which was their only rival of any importance. Secondly, the United States and the British allies could protect the most important oil supplies in the world: those in the Middle East. These two considerations determined political strategy for the next 45 years.

New Friends

Turkey was fitted into the system of US-dominated treaties, but it was too weak to play a proper part. That is why in 1947 a military aid programme was set up to provide the Turkish army with new weapons. The new friendship was confirmed by its symbolic participation with a few thousand troops in the Korean War in 1950. In 1952, the country became a member of NATO.

The American strategy which aimed at threatening the Soviet Union on all its borders required more than just Turkish participation. On its own, Turkey would never be an actual threat to the Soviet Union. This made permanent stationing of American troops necessary. To achieve this, a *Military Facilities Agreement* and a *Status of Forces Agreement* were signed in 1953. These particular kinds of contracts were usually concluded with all countries in which the United States based its forces.

Despite Turkish membership of NATO, a large part of the military cooperation with the United States was on a bilateral basis. Between 1946 and 1974 Turkey received \$3.7 billion worth of military aid, in arms and ammunition as well as equipment.

During the 50s Turkey's place in the Western system of treaties was further strengthened by its accession to the CENTO Pact, a treaty that expanded American

influence along the southern wing of the Soviet Union from Turkey up to and including Pakistan.

The American presence in Turkey, about which the Turkish government had virtually no say, led to strong internal criticism. One incident that greatly enhanced these protests, was the withdrawal of American Jupiter missiles, which had nuclear warheads. The withdrawal was a reciprocal gesture in exchange for the removal of Russian nuclear missiles from Cuba. The Turkish government did not agree with the withdrawal, but had no say in the matter.

Flexible Response

The United States could not ignore the Turkish criticism. Besides, the American strategy towards the Soviet Union had changed in the course of the 60s. In a big war, not all nuclear arms would be used immediately. One would try to keep that war within certain limits. This is because of the threat that the United States would themselves be attacked.

The *flexible response* meant that the local allies of the United States, such as Turkey, had to be equipped with small nuclear arms and better conventional weapons. Only then would they be capable of fighting this limited war.

As a consequence a new treaty was signed on the cooperation of Turkish and American forces in the event of a local war; the *Joint US-Turkish Defence Cooperation Agreement* (DECA). It also regulated the presence of American troops in 12 bases, among them a number of air force bases. The DECA was signed on July 3, 1969 and was the basis of US-Turkish cooperation until the Cyprus crisis in 1974.

The Cyprus Crisis

During this crisis Turkey, against the will of the Americans, attacked Cyprus. The Americans quoted an agreement, the *United States Foreign Assistance Act*, which had been signed in 1961 and stated that American weapons should not be used for interventions. Therefore the United States imposed an arms embargo, upon which the Turkish government terminated the agreement on July 25, 1975.

According to General Haig, who at that time was commander-in-chief of NATO forces in Europe, as a consequence of the embargo the effectiveness of the Turkish army and the air force in particular had been halved. General Shear of the southern NATO supreme command added that Turkish war preparedness was no longer sufficient.

In stating this, they admitted Turkey's importance for American policy. At all costs, Turkish forces had to remain at a high level of preparedness. Because of this it didn't take long before a new treaty was signed (on March 16, 1976) to ensure military assistance for a period of 4 years, albeit without arms supplies. Even before this, in October 1975, Turkey was given access to loans amounting to \$175 million, followed by another \$175 million in 1976. In addition, the spare parts and arms that had been ordered before 1974, were supplied.

From September 1978 onwards arms were supplied to Turkey under certain restrictions and one month later, American operations on the large bases resumed. After withdrawing from the agreement in 1961, Turkey had put a stop to these activities, except for the large Incirlik air base.

The events accompanying the Cyprus crisis nevertheless convinced the Turkish

government of the necessity for spreading the risks. From then on, Turkey also turned to other Western countries for its arms supplies.

The Iranian Revolution

In the meantime, big changes were taking place in the Middle East. In 1979 the strongly US-oriented regime of the shah fell in Iran. This turned the country from a base of operations for American troops into an avowed enemy of the United States and its allies. Turkey's importance as an operating base for the entire area increased significantly.

On March 30, 1980, the United States signed a new defence treaty with Turkey. This was five months before the coup that brought the Turkish armed forces back into power. In the agreement it was determined that 12 bases would remain under American control. They included Incirlik, as well as two electronic listening posts near the Black Sea, a seismic station near Ankara and the logistic and navigation facilities.

All of these bases were of great importance for the maintenance of the American intervention capability in the region. With this in mind, an American military mission was sent to the air force bases Muc and Batman in the autumn of 1980.

The US Defence Minister Weinberger visited Ankara in 1981 and agreed to the formation of a joint military council that was to improve the military cooperation between Turkey and the USA. In addition, they made mutual commitments on improving the NATO position in the region. According to this agreement, the United States would also assist Turkey in the maintenance, repair and modernisation of equipment. Additionally, they would work to-

gether on the introduction of new arms production systems.

Existing plans for intervention into the Soviet Union from Turkish territory were developed into an intervention doctrine for the Middle East. Although disguised as a plan to stop a Soviet offensive in the direction of the oil fields, this set-up allowed action to be taken against any 'troublesome' country nearby, for it entailed the development of a fast intervention force in the region. In order to achieve this, existing reinforcement plans were extended: more American troops would be directed to Turkish bases and more air force units moved in, allowing them to take the offensive to the south, if necessary.

Modernisation

After Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States, the United States and Turkey signed a *Memorandum of Understanding* in November 1982, in which the construction, improvement and joint use of several (new) air bases was laid down.

In February 1983, the Reagan Administration determined that Turkey would receive increased American support. According to this proposal, the military and economic aid would be stepped up to \$934 million. The larger part of this, \$759 million, was intended for military purposes. This included \$4 million for the training of Turkish officers in the United States. The remaining \$175 million was economic support over fiscal year 1984. The new amount of \$934 million was a significant increase in comparison with the \$650 million that Turkey had received before 1983.

However, the aid turned out to be insufficient for the larger role the Turkish armed forces themselves were required to play.

Achieving this required the solving of a big problem: despite the fact that Turkey had been sufficiently armed by the rest of NATO since the 50s, the technological quality of the army was low. This would definitely be the case should it have to fight the Red Army, but also for a strong offensive towards the oil fields in the south.

Therefore, a full-scale modernisation of the Turkish armed forces was necessary. It consisted of two parts: the supply of new weapons systems to replace the outdated equipment of the Turkish army; and the supply of technological knowledge and means to build up a relatively advanced Turkish arms industry.

The United States played a key role in this plan. In December 1986, the DECA Treaty was extended for a period of five years, retroactively valid from December 1985 onwards. As before, the treaty arranged the availability of Turkish bases for the American armed forces. At that time, the military cooperation between the United States and Turkey consisted of the following elements:

- information-gathering on the USSR;
- the authority to land in and fly over Turkish territory;
- the stationing of a US F-4 air force fighter squadron in Incirlik;
- use of the ports on the Mediterranean Sea for the Sixth Fleet;
- the obligation to send reinforcements in case of emergency;
- the presence of thousands of maintenance personnel in the country;
- Turkish cooperation in case of a Soviet attack on the oil fields in the Middle East.

Greek-Turkish Rivalry

The full-scale armament plans could not be implemented immediately. The problem

for NATO and also for the USA was that all treaties in the south-eastern area were of limited value because of certain limitations.

The most important was the Greek-Turkish rivalry which in 1989 had almost led to a military encounter between the two NATO allies. All NATO aid and certainly the American had to take this opposition into account. The United States took care of this by pronouncing a kind of *Solomon's judgement*: it determined a fixed ratio between the aid given to Turkey and that given to Greece. The American Congress decided that this ratio should be 7:10. As a consequence, Turkish aid was reduced by \$40 million and Greek support was increased from \$280 to \$500 million. This caused a unique type of arms race in south-eastern Europe, which has continued right up to the present day. As soon as one country received frigates, tanks or airplanes, the other had to get them too. Any attempt to escape this logic could result in retaliation against American or NATO installations and bases in Greece or Turkey.

The cool relations of the Cyprus crisis in the 70s returned several times during NATO exercises in the course of the 80s. An open clash along the controversial border between the two countries in the Aegean Sea was narrowly averted on several occasions. In 1989, the US Senate created another problem in the relations between the United States and Turkey by backing a resolution that proclaimed April 24th to be a remembrance day for the 'Armenian Genocide of 1915-1923'. This political step led to Turkish government reprisals against the American military presence in the country. All air missions were forbidden, some American ships were not allowed to enter Turkish harbours and improvements to a number of

US installations were frozen.

In the course of 1990 these measures were reversed when it became clear that the Senate resolution would not be carried out. So during the final Cold War years the relations between the USA and Turkey were characterised by alternating periods of arguments and cooperation, but in the end the arguments did not get in the way of cooperation.

Support of the Gulf War

From 1985 onwards a number of contracts were signed that were the key to the modernisation of the Turkish armed forces. In 1991 Turkey's supporting role in the Gulf War against Iraq was rewarded with an amount of \$635 million, plus a doubling of the textiles quota that Turkey could export to the United States.

In the spring of 1992, the editors of the American periodical *Arms Sales Monitor* discovered that Turkey had possibly received another kind of reward for services rendered. The *Congressional Record* mentioned that Pakistan had imported spare parts for C-130 and T-37 planes from Turkey. This broke the American embargo against Pakistan. A year later the same rumour was quoted in the Kurdish newspaper *Özgür Gudem*, but here it concerned the supply of Blackhawk helicopters and spare parts for the F-16 to Pakistan.

In fact, not a lot changed in the principles of American military aid. Only the nature of the aid changed. The traditional aid, which started in the 40s, has been transformed into credit facilities. There is a maximum to this credit: \$450 million, which is the amount the American government asked for in Congress. Furthermore, it was announced that eight of the 12 American bases would be closed before the end of 1993. The United

States would want to keep the radar detection station Pincirlik near Diyarbakir and the air force base Incirlik in Adanansis in south-east Turkey, the base where seismological data was collected in Belbazi and a radio communication station in Kargaburun. In response, Turkey asked for a reassessment of the DECA Treaty, which will expire on December 18, 1993, after a number of interim extensions. On April 9, negotiations on this were resumed.

At present, the military cooperation between the United States and Turkey consists essentially of preparing local facilities for the flying in of American ground and air units. That is to say, the expansion of military airfields in order to station more planes there; the storage in depots of all kinds of equipment so it does not have to be flown or shipped in case of a crisis; the opening of new installations such as electronic monitoring posts; and the exercising on a regular basis of the units involved, in the form of NATO and bilateral exercises. Additionally, a number of American nuclear arms have been installed in Turkey.

German Support

The United States has made the greatest effort to eliminate the Turkish military disadvantages. Since the 60s, however, the Federal Republic of Germany has also taken up this task. Germany rapidly became the second largest sponsor of Turkish defence. In 1969 the magazine *Wehrtechnik* reported, "In addition, the Federal Republic of Germany is the only country in the alliance that has continuously armed its partners, Greece and Turkey, from 1964 onwards, and Portugal from 1978, by means of NATO defence support, material support and special

support. Unlike the US aid, this support was given for free."

The Federal German government estimates the aid to Turkey to have amounted to 3.95 billion DM since 1980. Furthermore, in April 1993 *Jane's Defence Weekly* wrote that Turkey had received \$3.83 billion worth of military aid between 1964 and 1992. The German arms support was of course not as disinterested as it may seem: the financial injections given to Turkey indirectly boosted the German arms industry.

Economic Links

For a very long time now Turkey has been Germany's most important trading partner. According to the Federal Office of Foreign Trade, about 25% of Turkish exports went to Germany. The countries ranked in second and third place on the list, Italy and the United States, lag behind with 7 and 6% respectively. The Germans mainly import textiles, food and leather goods.

Turkey obtains about 15% of its imports from Germany, followed by the US and Saudi Arabia with 11 and 9% respectively. Germany supplies finished textiles and leather goods, electronic articles, chemicals and cars. Trade between Germany and Turkey is still growing. In 1991 the value of Turkish imports increased by 14.3% to the amount of 6.4 billion marks. In 1991, Turkey even ranked among Germany's 20 most important trading partners.

'German' Turks

There is another field in which German and Turkish society are closely linked: 90% of Turks living abroad, live in Germany. This means 1.6 million people, 300,000 of whom are Kurds. Almost all Kurds, about 90%, are from Turkish Kurdistan, the area where the war is raging on. This is why among the

people seeking asylum, the number of Kurds is relatively high. The total number of Kurds living in Europe outside Turkey, is an estimated 800,000 to 1 million.

Human Rights

The intertwining of German and Turkish interests is obvious and it is only logical that Germany wants to keep it that way, as those links make it possible to strengthen the German position on the bridge between Europe and Asia. Even so, the cooperation between Turkey and Germany does not always pass off smoothly. During the Gulf War against Iraq, Turgut Özal, Turkey's late president, reproached the Federal Republic for refusing to send troops to Turkey, and stationing only a number of old planes in Turkey. On German television, Özal called Germany "an unreliable ally which, having been protected by NATO for forty years, is unwilling to protect Turkey now that this is necessary."

Germany in its turn regards the war against the Kurds as a problem and would like to see Turkey 'humanising' that war. For this reason Germany had high hopes when the Demirel government took office in November 1991. Demirel had promised to improve the human rights situation - the prisons were to have 'glass walls'. Additionally, with the arrival of Demirel, Germany expected a liberalisation that would make the Kurdish movement collapse.

German hopes were dashed when the 1992 celebrations of the Kurdish New Year ended in a blood bath. In reaction to this, Germany placed a ban on the sale and supply of arms on March 26. Germany was of the opinion that Turkey should not only endorse Western values, but also apply them. The embargo was intended to lend

force to this opinion, but was only intended as a lever. This became obvious on April 2, when the German Federal Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, stated, "In the past, Turkey was a cornerstone for our safety because of its position on the south-eastern flank of NATO. Today and in the future its significance will increase further in the light of developments in the south of the former Soviet Union, as well as the countries in the Middle East. A democratic Turkey can and must take a stabilising position in the future relations in that region of Europe. It is against this background that the Government of the Federal Republic has given significant arms aid to Turkey, as well as Greece and Portugal."

Turkey, however, was highly frustrated about the German criticism. In response to the arms embargo, Özal declared that the German comments reminded him of Hitler Germany, the only difference being that present-day Germany abuses her economical power. Although it had not accomplished much, the arms embargo was lifted two months later.

NATO Support

Turkey did not only receive support from the United States and Germany. NATO also supported Turkey. That aid was necessary, because Turkey, like the other poor NATO member states Greece and Portugal, did not have the technological capability to develop its own arms. Nor do these countries possess the economic power to buy arms from others.

Measured by GNP per capita, Turkey is the poorest of these three countries, but at the same time the most important strategically. Supporting Turkey, therefore, was

vital but at the same time the aid was kept at the lowest possible level. This becomes clear if one takes a closer look at the rather paradoxical way in which the Western allies support Turkey through NATO.

The LDDI Programme

In a recommendation dating from 1963 NATO stated that the southern countries needed to be aided. Only Western Germany acted on this recommendation. The support from countries other than Western Germany and the United States was ambiguous for a long time and mainly consisted of passing on superfluous equipment which would otherwise have landed on the scrap heap.

In the 80s, the *Independent European Programme Group* (IEPG), which was closely connected to NATO, tried to structure the support to Portugal, Greece and Turkey. In 1986 NATO again requested its members to give material help to the poorer allies. Through the requested structural defence aid, the *LDDI countries* (Less Developed Defence Industry) were to work on "improving their military-operational abilities" and "increasing their defence-industrial capacity," in the words of the Dutch Minister of Defence Van Eekelen in a letter to the Dutch Lower House. In practice it would entail the passing on of superfluous equipment from the richer European NATO countries and aid in the construction of the defence industry.

Additionally, the aim was to achieve a certain standardisation of NATO equipment. NATO established that countries were not particularly eager to provide that kind of support. The reason for this was that there was an overcapacity in the production of arms. Why then should countries increase

the competition by building up the arms industry in another country? NATO insisted, however, that supporting the LDDI countries was a political choice of the utmost importance. The national economic interests of NATO countries had to be subordinated to the strategic importance of a strong southern flank of the alliance. Increasing cutbacks in defence expenditures, too, should not be at the expense of support to the southern member states, according to NATO.

Economic Gain

Whether or not the NATO call would be successful was for an important part in Turkey's own hands. It reasoned that in many countries, the political decision would be implemented more readily if there was an economic advantage to be gained. The support organisation for the development of the Defence Industry (DIDA) described the creation of favourable conditions "an efficient mechanism for decisions." Later this course was also followed by the vice-secretariat of the ministry of defence (SSM). Aided by the IEPG, this policy became the driving force behind the investments.

NATO also argued in favour of making donations to the LDDI countries to improve their armies, because of "the inability of these countries to finance the improvements themselves."

The scheme, however, does not appear to have run smoothly. Apart from the United States and Germany only the Netherlands and Canada have participated. In 1991 Canada donated \$25 million to Turkey, \$10 million of which were intended for military purposes as "a sign of the cooperation and good relations between the two NATO countries." The money will be spent over a

period of three years and is especially intended to support the improvement of the Turkish air force. Of course, \$10 million for this purpose is a mere pittance. It looks very much as if the main reason for the donation is to meet the constant pressure put on NATO member states to support the LDDI countries.

Credit Facilities

When bidding for an order from the Turkish state it is important to take care of funding. In the countries supplying arms there are often regulations which can strengthen the position of national industries in the foreign market. In May 1986 e.g., Norman Lamont, who was at that time the British secretary of state for defence, was present at an Anglo-Turkish conference on defence in Ankara. Lamont warmly recommended Turkey to British enterprise. After the meeting he told the Turkish press that relations between the two countries had improved. One sign of this, according to Lamont, was the fact that the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) had raised export credits for Turkey to £150 million.

British Aerospace (BAe) had already made use of this fund in 1985. After meeting an order for Rapier anti-aircraft missiles BAe was granted follow-up order worth £140 million. This amount was partly funded by the Midland Bank International. The ECGD acted as guarantor for the credit.

Ultimate Success

For Turkey, the NATO programme for supporting the weaker partners through the LDDI Programme was certainly successful. As early as 1984 a start was made with the construction of an important factory for F-16 fighter aircraft. In addition to this, Turkey took part in the IEPG Stinger project

and the licence production of artillery shells like the M483.

The LDDI Programme did not, however, result in substantial amounts of extra aid to Turkey by countries other than the United States. National economic interests were often deemed more important than the strategic interests of NATO.

Nevertheless, the participation in the projects mentioned above boosted the development of Turkey's own defence industry. Moreover, companies began to invest in Turkey because of the profitable conditions and the greatly expanded military production. Industrialists only started looking on Turkey as a lucrative market when this development became visible. This process was accelerated by the opening up of the new markets of Turkey's northern neighbour, the former Soviet Union.

In the end, the aim of the policy had largely been attained, aided by the political developments in the countries of the former Eastern bloc and supported by Germany and the United States. Military production in Turkey was improved to the extent necessary for it to keep up with the richer NATO countries.

Economic Support

Apart from the military-industrial support from the United States, Germany and the other NATO partners, Turkey also receives economic support. The importance of this support is illustrated by a remark made by the secretary-general of NATO in 1987. He plainly stated that it was necessary for the richer NATO countries to support the poorer ones, because "in the highly fragmented government organisations economic decisions are being made affecting other allies without taking into consideration the con-

The Euro-Stinger Project

The Euro-Stinger project is a clear example of defence-industrial support to Turkey in the framework of the NATO incentives policy. Turkey participates in the Euro-Stinger group for 40.6%, and is also its largest customer. The project was started in 1990 and the production will take at least five years. Turkey contributes at least \$382 million to this project.

A Stinger is a portable missile launching device, designed by the American company Raytheon. Infantry using the Stinger can bring down helicopters or airplanes using this shoulder-launched missile. These weapons were frequently used by rebels in Afghanistan against Russian aircraft. They were so efficient that the United States government is now trying to buy them back for five times the purchasing cost, so as to prevent the Stinger technology from falling into the wrong hands.

In the early 80s, it was decided to develop a European version of the Stinger. Turkey immediately became involved in the Euro-Stinger group through a 40.6% share. The other partners were Germany, Greece and the Netherlands. Turkey, with a planned acquisition of more than 4,000 units, was the biggest partner. Being involved in the project was a good way for Turkey to acquire advanced missile technology.

Raytheon and General Dynamics issued a license to the Euro-Stinger group

for the manufacturing process. Dornier, a German company, became the main contractor. The primary Turkish contractor became Rocketsan AS which, with support from Dornier, built a plant in Elmadağ to assemble, manufacture and engage in research into missile parts. The American company ARC issued both the licence and technology for this. In compensation, Rocketsan AS now supplies Stinger parts to AEC. Rocketsan AS is now participating in Euro-Stinger with \$120 million. Other participating Turkish companies provide a joint \$283 million.

All participating countries manufacture parts, send them on to one another and partly assemble each other's parts. The Turkish enterprise Kalekalip, for example, processes parts which have been assembled by the Dutch company Philips-USFA. The final assembly probably takes place at Dornier and Rocketsan. Beside the Stinger missile itself, munitions and simulators are also produced, while a Stinger version suitable for mounting on a vehicle is also being developed.

Thanks to the international support, Rocketsan has developed into an industry with high-quality technical knowledge. Not only is it a partner in the Euro-Stinger programme, it is also involved in several other schemes for launcher and missile technology.

sequences for the security of the allied defence and political coherence. [...] But allied security is not only dependent on military deterrence, but also on the economical health of all NATO members."

In order to obtain economic aid, Turkey had to grow closer to the EC. For this reason it is important that, despite Greek opposition, Turkey has been an associated member of the West-European Union (WEU), since November 20, 1992. The WEU will, perhaps, one day be the defence organisation of the EC. But since Turkey has only been granted observer status, its position in the WEU is just as weak as that within the EC. The Turkish position is that the WEU should become the military pillar of the EC, while at the same time its links with the United States through NATO should remain firm. Most likely this policy is related to the Greek position as a member of the EC. Greece continues to object to every expansion of the Turkish army. A clear example of this was its opposition to the sale of 40 F-4E combat aircraft to Turkey. According to the Greek minister of defence, this would upset the balance of power in the region.

Countries which signed contracts with Turkey in 1980, ignoring the military coup, are still important suppliers today. The economic politics of Özal and his military confederates opened the door for a policy which made more profitable to invest. During the first four years after the coup, economic growth increased by 6.6%. The secretary for commercial affairs at the Dutch embassy in Ankara, too, assumes there have been significant changes in Turkey during the 80s. In 1980, the embassy advised against investing because, "You will not get any return." Nowadays a common complaint concerns the few investments made by Dutch compa-

nies in Turkey. The French, Danes and Italians certainly do well on this market.

In 1988 debts amounting to \$7.3 billion were paid off, a record figure at the time. In the same year Turkey had a balance of trade surplus of \$11.5 billion. Because of these developments, countries other than the United States and Germany increased their economic investments in Turkey. In the field of investments, Great Britain took over first place from Switzerland in 1989. Today, Switzerland ranks third. Second is France, becoming increasingly more important for Turkish industry. The United States, the Federal Republic and the Netherlands all follow Switzerland on this list. Conspicuous by its absence on this list is Italy, which is after all one of the ranking four arms suppliers to Turkey.

All the countries listed above are prepared to meet Turkey's need for capital, thus supporting not only the advancement of the defence industry but also the entire infrastructure. The dams in the Tigris and Euphrates are good examples of this.

Support Through the CFE Treaty

A different, less well-known but very interesting way of supplying NATO countries that are less well equipped with the latest weapons, is the transfer of arms which had to be discarded as part of the CFE Disarmament Treaty (*Conventional Forces in Europe*) through the process known as 'cascading'. The reference to a waterfall is an apt one: though the CFE Treaty disarmament process modern weapons are pouring like a cascade from the West to the poorer NATO partners Portugal, Greece and Turkey.

The CFE Treaty only mentions general categories of equipment and not specific

types. Thus M60 A1-tanks and Leopard 1-tanks, removed from the central NATO regions because of the Treaty-imposed limits (which apply to geographical zones), are sold or donated to Turkey. As a result, Turkey has discarded an equal number of outdated M47- and M48-tanks, in order to remain under the limits laid down in the Treaty. In this way Turkey received 600 M113-armoured vehicles, as well as 72 M110-cannons and 28 AH-1S Cobra attack helicopters.

The two largest suppliers of the Turkish army, the United States and Germany, do not only sell the most arms, they also transfer most of the second-hand equipment into the country. Greece, too, benefits from the CFE Treaty. Thus the CFE Treaty, intended as a disarmament treaty in Central Europe, becomes a modernisation treaty, fully in accordance with present NATO procurement policy: fewer weapons but better ones, faster and more efficient.

From an economic viewpoint, too, it is better for NATO to pass on equipment to poorer allies. It is cheaper to have the equipment revised and transported than destroyed. In addition, revision and modernisation of especially the obsolete M60 A1-tanks and the M113 armoured vehicles will provide the arms industries of the donor countries with new orders.

This, however, also has some negative consequences for the defence industry. Decisions about new arms procurement are delayed, because it is much cheaper to take over equipment which is not quite obsolete from NATO countries. Several projects have been put on hold to await developments.

The NATO cascading process will allow Russia to pass on to others those arms that are to be removed under the CFE Treaty.

For the Russians, these transactions are a way of obtaining badly needed foreign currency.

In addition, in order to provide Turkey with a strong buffer against the Middle East, those parts of Turkey not bordering on the old Warsaw Pact member states have been left out of the CFE Treaty. In this way all kinds of surplus equipment can be stationed along the borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria, in the out-of-treaty zone. The harbour city of Iskenderun, which is the terminal for the oil pipeline from Iraq, is also excluded from the treaty area. Greece has lodged a protest against the fact that the harbour of Metrsin, too, falls outside the CFE treaty zone. In 1974, Metrsin was the place from which Turkey carried out amphibious operations against Cyprus.

Nor is it insignificant that the region kept outside the Treaty area more or less coincides with Turkish Kurdistan.

3/ The Making of a Turkish Arms Industry

An arms manufacturer hoping for a Turkish arms order of any substance has a chance of obtaining the contract only if he or she undertakes to manufacture the weapons in Turkey. In this way Turkey gains both the technological knowledge for manufacturing arms and the factories in which to build them. Thus, slowly but steadily, an arms industry of enormous proportions is being developed. This is a deliberate goal of Turkish policy, a conscious effort to decrease the dependence on the West which lays the country open to the damaging effects of arms embargoes.

When Turkey joined NATO in 1952, the army's armoury consisted almost solely of second-hand American equipment from World War II. The Korean War, too, resulted in a flow of surplus or outdated American equipment. At that time Turkey had a very limited military production base.

In the 60s Turkey started building up a defence industry of its own. An important impulse for this was the imminent conflict with the United States in 1964. Turkey was on the verge of intervening in Cyprus, but decided not to after the United States had made it clear that all aid would in that case be halted. After Turkey actually attacked Cyprus in 1974, it was hit by an arms embargo. This only increased the Turkish desire for greater independence of American weapon supplies.

The Financial Power of the Army

Turkey, with the lowest income per head of all the NATO member states, annually spends over 20% of its budget on defence. Though in the years after the invasion of Cyprus the state budget for defence increased, government money alone was not enough for the build-up of a domestic defence industry.

Through the pension fund OYAK, Turkish professional officers had some experience with industrial investment. It therefore seemed a logical step to look within the army for the funds to establish an independent arms industry. From the early 70s onwards, pressure groups were set up in each of the branches of the armed forces, so as to sup-

port those industrial activities of importance for their branch. Hence, there was a Turkish Air Force Fund, a Turkish Land Force Fund and a Turkish Navy Fund. Turkish officers are exceptionally well-paid and a potentially rich source of income for the funds.

In 1987 the three funds were united in the Turkish Fund for the Armed Forces. This new fund also campaigned for funds from private persons and companies. This canvassing is not limited to Turkey alone but also takes place in immigration countries with many wealthy Turks. The Turkish Land Forces Fund, e.g., has 17 branches in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany. The funds participate in companies which are connected to their defence units.

The Military Financial Network

Fund	Company	Interest
Turkish Navy Fund	Testas	50%
	Ditas	20%
	Aselsan	15%
	Netas	15%
	TTE	12%
Turkish Land Force Fund	Aspilsan	83%
	Aselsan	70%
	Izbir	50%
	Koytas	11%
	Otomarsan	5%
Turkish Air Force Fund	Aselsan	12%
	TAI	2%
	TEI	2%
OYAK	Renault	42%
	Petkim	20%
	TPAO	8%
	Goodyear	7%
Air Force Association	Hassas	93%
	Sidas	81%
	Mod Ofis	34%
	Goodyear	9%

The Incentives Policy

By the end of the 70s, the entrepreneurship of the armed forces as well as their influence over the government, had laid the foundations for a domestic arms industry. The armed forces were more or less self-sufficient. Navy dockyards had already become involved in construction activities of frigates, submarines, patrol boats and various kinds of supply ships. There were programmes for the modernisation of various tanks, and the air force had moderately advanced maintenance facilities. A production capacity had been created which would make many a developing country jealous. But compared to its rich NATO partners, Turkey was still a backward region. In the 80s, this situation changes.

Under the economist Özal, the only civilian in the military junta, the state started to pursue an active industrialisation policy in which a large opening was reserved for the defence industry. To attract foreign capital,

the Turkish government offered investors a package of financial benefits. The price of land and of changing the infra-structure has been reduced to near zero, particularly in areas with high unemployment rates.

Furthermore, Turkey has set up a number of Free Zones. The most recent Free Zone is to be created in the area around Atatürk Airport near Istanbul. This Technology and Industry area is to be a combination of research and development institutes. The defence fund SAGEB (*Savunma Sanayii Gelistirme ve Desteklem Bankanligi*) has reserved over £70 million for this project.

The companies in the Free Zones are exempt from paying income and corporation taxes. The same investment incentives apply as in the rest of Turkey, but, unlike the Free Zones in South Korea and Taiwan, there are no restrictions concerning export transactions to the rest of the country. Moreover, strikes are prohibited in these areas.

Foreign Investments

1985 was a definite breakthrough for the Turkish arms industry. The state monopoly on defence enterprises which had existed until then, was lifted in December of that year. This meant that foreign companies could now own shares in existing companies. Often this led to the creation of joint ventures between Turkish and foreign companies. Turkey prefers this type of legal construction to accepting entirely foreign companies on its soil. In this way it can acquire foreign know-how without having to use its meagre foreign currency reserves.

In the year 1985 the Turkish government formed a support organisation for the development of the defence industry (DIDA).

This was an executive body of the ministry of defence, which was to coordinate the Turkish defence industry. DIDA became the link between the wishes of the ministry of defence and the armed forces regarding the build-up of a national army and industry on the one hand and the ability of the arms manufacturers to fulfil this need on the other.

For organisational reasons, most of the tasks of DIDA have been taken over by SSM since 1990; SSM is a subdivision of the ministry of defence. Involved in the policy making of this department are the commander-in-chief, the prime minister, all the generals, and the ministers of defence, general affairs and finance.

SSM applies a number of negotiating criteria for new joint venture companies. In order to become eligible for any substantial defence order, non-Turkish companies must be prepared to have at least part of the manufacturing take place in Turkey. In other words: a company which wants to sell to Turkey, has to (at least in part) settle there. Because of the fierce competition on the international arms market, more and more arms manufacturers are prepared to meet this condition. Often the arrangement is such that the parent company of the joint venture partner takes care of the first part of the order, after which production shifts to the Turkey-based partner.

Another one of SSM's principles is that control over the production and destination of the arms stays completely in Turkish hands. To what extent SSM has actually been able to secure this point is not clear.

To make it easier for foreign companies to find their way in Turkey DIDA/SSM publishes a guide, offering a summary of possible joint venture candidates. The 1989 guide

consisted of no less than 900 companies.

SSM also coordinates research and development work at universities, in the civilian industry and at research institutes. Another important point of attention for SSM is the business training programmes, designed to further specialise the companies' employees. In joint venture projects, this training sometimes takes place at the parent company. Moreover, researchers and military men take courses abroad in production, research and management, all as part of compensation orders.

When negotiating a contract, SSM tries to obtain the guarantee that Turkish technicians will be the ones to handle any future maintenance and revisions. For this to take place, technological training of the employees has to be a rule. The aim is to have this technological training take place in Turkey itself. This way the parent company is forced to build laboratories and research departments in their Turkish branches. Should a company also equip such laboratories with the technology for research, development or even innovation, then that company's tender has an even better chance of being accepted.

Arms Exhibitions

Since 1987 DIDA/SSM organizes a bi-annual arms fair, the *International Defence Equipment & Avionics Exhibition* (IDEA). Arms dealers from all over the world come here to show their products. Businesses make contacts for new joint ventures and customers can admire the weapons they have until then only seen in the catalogues. Seminars are organised where international experts discuss the latest developments in military technology.

By 1991 IDEA had become one of the

biggest defence exhibitions in the world. One reason for this was its strategic situation in the middle of an important arms market, another was the disappearance of other exhibitions in the region as a result of the Gulf War. Buyers no longer merely came from Turkish military circles, but also from the Middle East and Northern Africa. Manufacturers came from NATO countries but also from South America. Furthermore, Turkey was the first NATO country to break the ban on arms trading with South Africa, by admitting an exhibit from that country in 1991. In that year IDEA was so successful that two weapons exhibitions were announced for 1993.

Financing the Industrial Policy

In the field of financing, too, the Turkish government pursues a dynamic policy. Another fund was linked to DIDA/SSM, the SAGEB (defence industry fund) mentioned above. Revenues for this fund come from the state budget, donations and various taxes, for instance those on games of chance, profits, and fuel. Organisations and transactions in the realm of defence are exempt from taxes. The fund thus created is meant to generate \$1.5 billion a year. This sum is an addition to *regular* defence spending, which in 1991 amounted to \$4.4 billion.

Through SAGEB defence companies can stipulate very flexible terms for credits and loans. Sometimes operating profits can be tax-free for three, five, or even ten years. Furthermore, SAGEB offers the possibility of exemption from income tax. Sometimes SAGEB guarantees to buy out companies' production surplus for a number of years, should there not be enough buyers.

It does not, however, automatically provide financial guarantees for the starting-up

costs when a Turkish company signs a licence agreement. One of the aims in attracting foreign partners is to limit the export of foreign currency. This is why a new firm usually first has to find a bank or a group of banks to supply the dollars needed to finance the licence. Banks are often not very eager to take risks with a relatively poor country like Turkey. A number of transactions have fallen through at the last moment because of this. Finding a co-financier is often the last big obstacle before definitely obtaining a defence order.

The Joint Ventures

How then does the build-up of a joint venture work in practice? A good example is TAI, TUSAS Aerospace Industries. This company is based in Mürted near Ankara. It is a joint venture between TUSAS, a development company for the aviation industry founded in 1973, and the American General Dynamics. TAI was especially founded to produce F-16s for the Turkish air force and is working on Project Peace Onyx. This is without a doubt the biggest defence project in Turkey. Peace Onyx enables Turkey to build an aviation industry on par with the rich industrialised countries. The project consists of three parts. Onyx I concerns the production of 152 F-16 fighter planes, Onyx II consists of an order for another 80 of these airplanes and Onyx III is to be a simulation-programme for the training of pilots which will start in 1993.

The first two Onyx programmes involve the assembly of foreign produced parts. Under Onyx I, almost 70% of the frame was produced in Turkey itself. In the Onyx II programme the Turkish share of the production of the frame rises to 90%. Thus with

every new step in the project, a bigger portion of the production is transferred to Turkey.

For the production of the engines of the plane, a separate company called TEI was founded. This is a joint venture between TUSAS and General Electric. There are also many Turkish sub-contractors, often with licences from American firms. The production and assembly of only one type of airplane thus brings together a whole group of companies. Some were even especially founded for this purpose.

In this way the F-16 production has laid the foundations for an aero-space industry. This made it possible for TAI to extend its activities to other types of aircraft. It bought 260 ha of land, on which a number of production lines are now in operation. In a licensed assembly deal the Spanish company CASA supplies TAI with parts for the production of 52 CN 235M-airplanes, intended for the Turkish air force. In this case, too, TAI will be able to handle an increasingly bigger share of the production.

The Italian company Agusta is supplying a licence for a production line for 40 training aircraft. This, too, concerns an order for the Turkish air force. The Italian factory manufactured the first planes. TAI partly manufactures and completely assembles the rest. The entire project costs an estimated \$17 million.

Furthermore, TAI is developing an unmanned aircraft, two prototypes of which have been delivered to the Turkish army. And finally the company is taking part in the European 'Future Large Aircraft Group'. The Turkish air force has an option on 20 of these FLA-planes.

Alongside the various production lines, TAI has started a number of research pro-

grammes to provide the company and its Turkish suppliers with new production techniques, yet to be developed. The testing of all kinds of new materials has become a standard part of the activities. There is a lot of support for this from the United States.

There was a lot of financial support for the TAI expansion programme. General Dynamics and General Electric together brought in \$67 million. TUSAS, the Air Force Fund, and the Turkish Air Force Association, accounted for another \$70 million. Furthermore, DIDA and the American and Turkish ministries of defence gave their support. These latter two have thought up a rather roundabout way to get the most out of the arrangements. The US Air Force is purchasing 152 of the Turkish built F-16s. Subsequently, the American ministry of defence immediately delivers these aircraft back to the Turkish air force. Both parties seem to benefit from this arrangement. For the United States this is probably a way to avoid compensation obligations, while for Turkey the aircraft are a good deal cheaper when sold for the purchase price, but re-bought at a second-hand price.

The total costs of the 200 F-16s amount to around \$6 billion. General Dynamics received this huge order for good reasons. In an interview in the Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* dated July 11, 1985, a former top executive of General Dynamics revealed that this firm had paid approximately \$12.5 million in bribes to top Turkish officials to get the order. It is likely that practices like these occur more frequently, but they are rarely brought to light.

Armoured Vehicles

FNSS is a recent example of a company which has come into being through licence

production. It is a joint venture between the American FMC and the Turkish Nurol SS. Since 1989 FNSS has been assembling the first part of an order of 1,698 armoured vehicles under licence. In the course of this eight-year project it will switch to actually manufacturing these vehicles, up to a maximum of 73% of the order. Also, involved in the contract are co-producers which in the past have taken part in the production of armoured vehicles by FMC. These are: DAF Special Products, Cockerill Mechanic Industries, Marconi and Oerlikon.

The FNSS project concerns the production of armoured vehicles in various models. The vehicles are suited for mountainous terrain and are also amphibious. Up to \$405 million of direct compensation and \$300 million indirect, were agreed upon to help Turkish industry. The total budget of the project amounts to \$1.2 billion.

Competition between the suppliers can become fierce. From 1989 a group of American firms tried to negotiate a licence production deal with Turkish companies. At stake was the production of parts for the armoured vehicles. When, at the end of 1991, after prolonged negotiations, the decision was about to be taken, the French state company GIAT suddenly came out with a bid far below all the others. The bid was so low that, in all probability, GIAT would have had to add money to the project, but it was counting on follow-up orders to recoup this loss. The United States lost the contract. In the summer of 1992 GIAT and a group of Turkish partners received an order for the production of turrets, cannon and munitions technology.

GIAT received its compensation through a deal with the state company MKEK. This company had to pay the rather large sum of

\$29 million for the technology of a particular type of machine gun.

Export

The well-informed magazine *Turkish Defence and Aerospace Update* expects the domestic arms industry to be able to fully meet the demands of the Turkish armed forces by the turn of the century. This might be a little optimistic for, with the possible exception of the United States, no NATO country is self-sufficient. Still, the build-up of the Turkish arms industry can be seen as a success from a military point of view.

From an economic perspective, Turkey can only earn back its investments if it succeeds in also tapping foreign markets. Though there is still a little bit of growth left in the Turkish defence market, one reason for this is the fact that the country, like its NATO partners, is restructuring and professionalising its armed forces in order to make them more flexible. The internal market will just not be big enough to sustain profitable production in the long run.

Right from the start, the Turkish government was aware of this problem. In the *Turkish Daily News* of September 13, 1984, the then Minister of Defence said, "We must not be regarded as underdeveloped in this area. [...] Turkey must be able to sell as well as buy arms."

Since November 1992, Turkey has been an associated member of the West European Union, the European defence organisation. It wants to profit from this, both as a client and a supplier. The Turkish defence industry is trying to gain a position in the European arms market. Thus, MKEK received a contract from Norway to the tune of \$11 million for the supply of machine guns,

despite strong competition from Rheinmetall and the Spanish firm of Santa Barbara.

Compensation Orders

Much of the export of the Turkish weapons industry is a direct result of the compensation orders which the companies agree on when buying a licence. With big orders it is often so that part of the products manufactured under licence are sold to the country from where the licence originated.

Not in every case is there a direct link between an order and the accompanying compensation order. Sometimes compensation consists of the purchase of civilian products, or investments in the military or civilian sector, for example in the tourism industry. With the F-16 order it was stipulated that the United States was to place a compensation order in Turkey. It proved to be quite difficult for General Dynamics to meet this demand. This is why in 1991 the company decided to set up a holding in Turkey under the name of GDYH, in which it invested \$25 million. Amongst other things, the holding took part in the construction of a Hilton Hotel.

The Market

For foreign investors, Turkey can be a very interesting export channel. Often the legislation on weapon exports is less strict than in the country of origin of the parent producer. Through a production line in Turkey a manufacturer can therefore export to areas which are off-limits in his own country. Added to this is the fact that potential arms buyers live next door, as it were. Turkey eagerly capitalises on this fortunate position. In 1991 the IDEA defence exhibition presented itself with the slogan, "IDEA is the trade gateway to the Middle East and Northern Africa."

Since the end of the Cold War the situation of Turkey as arms producer and exporter has become if anything even more important. This is especially so in view of the contacts made with the partly Turkish-speaking, former Soviet republics. The new independent republics all want to build up their own armed forces.

The Middle East, too, recognises the strategic importance of Turkey for the oil sheiks have not really recovered from the fright caused by the Gulf War. In October 1991, Saudi-Arabia donated \$1 billion worth of crude oil to the Turkish defence industry, to be delivered over a period of five years. Both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates will also transfer \$1 billion and \$500 million, respectively, over the next five years. Out of this fund the second production stage of the F-16s will be financed. These countries are important arms purchasers and perhaps potential clients of the Turkish arms industry. In any case, the firm of Ictas AS has already been able to take part in the giant project of making Kuwait mine-free after the Gulf War, in a deal worth \$30 million.

Egypt and Pakistan are also important potential markets for Turkish military products. There are permanent talks at ministerial level with Egypt about defence-industrial and military cooperation. TAI will manufacture F-16 parts and assemble F-16s for Egypt for a contract worth \$30 million. In a follow-up order TAI is also going to manufacture 46 F-16s for Egypt. MKEK provided Egypt with the licensing rights for the production of a 105mm gun barrel developed with support from Germany.

Otokar delivered two all-terrain vehicles to Pakistan as test specimens. Subject to satisfactory performance it expects an order. MKEK maintains trade relations with the

Pakistan Ordnance Factories, one of the biggest suppliers of small arms in the Third World. On top of this, MKEK is exporting 17,000 anti-tank missiles to South Korea. For the Sudanese army Otomarsan supplied 200 5-ton trucks in 1989 and 1990, made with a Mercedes-Benz licence.

Despite this initial demand, Turkey, a newcomer on the arms market will have great difficulty in building up a foreign clientele. During the Gulf War the orders came flooding in, but many were cancelled later. The demand for defence products is not too great at the moment.

Moreover, most of the products which Turkey produces are also available from the parent companies in the West. Only when Turkey can deliver the same products of the same quality at a lower price, or when it starts to supply countries which the West for political reasons does not want to arm, will it be able to recoup the investments made. For this, it will likely try to gain a foothold in the fertile grounds of the territories of the former Soviet Union.

4/ The Arming of a Regional Power

In protest at the use of force against innocent civilians, the sale of arms to Turkey should be stopped. This appeal was made by the human rights commission of the British Parliament, after their return from an investigation in Turkish Kurdistan. The commission concluded that the Turkish army was destroying villages and bloodily suppressing the Kurdish population, mostly with the aid of Western weapons. Garel-Jones, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, refused to consider a boycott, "We are not considering an embargo on the sale of arms to Turkey [because] Turkey is a NATO ally, and has given strong support to the coalition of armed forces during and after the Gulf conflict, and is continuing to do so."

By 1993 Turkey was able to meet a considerable part of its own arms needs, as was described in the last chapter. But domestic arms production is not big enough to meet the demands of the Turkish army. Arms purchases abroad are therefore necessary. These purchases are mostly made in the West, as can be seen from the SIPRI data.

Officially Turkey cannot buy unlimited numbers of weapons from the West without any kind of control. On this subject Garel-Jones said that "arms sales are subject to the standard export legislation, and all sales are examined on the basis of very strict criteria. Amongst these is an assessment of the human rights situation in the receiving country." But despite the fact that Amnesty International reports severe violations of human rights in Turkey almost on a daily basis,

Value of arms trade (in millions of dollars)

Period	86-90	87-91
United States	2,179	3,953
West Germany	1,245	1,549
Netherlands	183	237
Italy	59	125
France	20	22
Great Britain	123	10
Other countries	563	490
Total	4,372	6,386

(Source: SIPRI Yearbooks 1990-1992)

the supply of arms is still continuing. At the time of writing only Germany, Austria and Switzerland have applied arms embargoes. However, the German arms boycott of 1992 was soon lifted.

The strategic importance of Turkey apparently still weighs heavily. Human rights violations are covered up by most West-European countries, and for many years this has been accompanied by the assertion that Turkey has promised to improve the situation. The civil war in Kurdistan has been transformed by the propaganda into a struggle against terrorism.

Reliability of the Suppliers

The continuing discussion on human rights forced Turkey to assess the reliability of its weapons suppliers. In April 1993 Turkey drew up three lists for this purpose, the red, green and yellow one. Countries on the red list may assume that it will no longer be possible to supply arms to Turkey. According to *Jane's Defence Weekly* these countries are Austria, Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries with the exception of Norway. Originally Norway was on the red list, but was probably removed from it because of the Turkish sale of machine guns worth \$11 million to Norway. Norway is now on the yellow list, which also contains Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. This means that arms deliveries from those countries are only possible after explicit approval by the Turkish government. Countries on the green list can supply arms without any problems. On this list we find the Central Asian states, the CIS republics and Great Britain.

The actual consequences of the Turkish reaction to the protests of Western countries remain to be seen. Finland, despite its red

status, was allowed to provide arms. Germany meets the qualifications to be on the red list - officially German weapons may not be used against the PKK - but nevertheless Germany is not on the red list. The military-industrial ties between Turkey and Germany are so strong that it is not realistic for Turkey to give them up.

Trade with the United States

The United States is by far the most important arms supplier to Turkey. According to SIPRI sources it would seem that in the period between 1987 and 1991, Turkey bought no less than 62% of its weapons in the United States.

The reason for these close ties with the United States have already been described in chapter two. Immediately after World War II, the United States started to involve themselves in the military build-up of Turkey, because of its vital strategic position. From Turkey, the West could threaten the southern borders of the Soviet Union and also control the oil fields in the Middle East.

Military Supplies

The close ties between the United States and Turkey accounted for the fact that numerous companies, including the Pentagon itself, were busy supplying weapons to Turkey. A survey of these arms supplies will always be incomplete, due to the fact that a part of the arms trade is conducted behind the scenes and is never made public.

Yet it is still possible to compile an extensive list of weapons supplies on the basis of information from specialist journals. Besides this, the arms trade register of the United Nations, set up in 1993, provides quite a lot of information. Above all, it shows the enormous size of the trade. Ac-

US - Turkey Military Relations (in thousands of dollars)

Fiscal year	military sales agreements	military deliveries	commercial deliveries
'59 - '81	1,285,625	794,619	45,690
1982	446,883	187,565	10,000
1983	447,874	150,188	4,942
1984	4,075,622	304,907	22,512
1985	368,624	389,766	33,665
1986	415,071	262,450	19,387
1987	218,864	278,967	61,125
1988	122,648	630,148	68,280
1989	335,813	667,222	338,314
1990	463,806	706,922	219,384
1991	220,734	765,580	41,434
'50 - '91	11,288,685	5,258,333	666,111

[Source: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, Defence Security Assistance Agency, 30-09-91]

The first column shows the upper limit of permitted export credits. The second column shows the actual deliveries through the government. The third column shows the commercial sales figures of the arms industry, which are subject to the legislation on arms export control.

According to this register the United States supplied Turkey with the following items, amongst other things: 577 heavy combat tanks, 220 armoured vehicles, 75 pieces of heavy artillery, 29 combat planes, 6 attack helicopters, and 1,164 rockets and rocket launchers in 1992.

The list of arms sales clearly shows the preferential treatment which the United States gave to Turkey. For example, the fact that Turkey was the first country to receive permission to sell self-produced F-16s to other countries. Furthermore, it is striking that the more recent sales were often accompanied by a 'co-production agreement' between the United States and Turkish governments.

Alliant Techsystems

In 1992 this arms manufacturer won the competition for the supply of 25mm ammunition to Turkey, a munition type suitable for armoured car cannon. This kind of sale

used to be arranged through the Foreign Military Sales aid programme.

Aydin

In January of 1993 it was announced that this American firm, in co-operation with its Turkish daughter Aydin-Aymet is to handle the integration of the Turkish radar system into the NATO control system.

Cadillac Gage Corporation

This company is involved in the upgrading of 2,000 Turkish M48 tanks. From 1987 until 1995, Cadillac Gage Corporation will supply its cannon-stabilization system for this purpose.

Contel Page International

In 1987 it became known that Page Europe Italy, a subsidiary of Contel Page International, had signed a contract with Turkey for the supply of liaison systems. These systems were intended for the Second and Third Turkish armies. \$90 million were involved in the contract.

FMS

FMS signed a contract with Nurool Savunma Sanayii AS (FNSS) for the manufacture of 1,698 armoured vehicles. According to this contract 73% of the manufacturing was to take place in Turkey. Production started in 1991.

General Defence Corporation

In 1984 a contract was signed with Turkey for the delivery of 155mm tank gun ammunition. Initially this ammunition was produced in the United States, but later in Turkey as well. In 1986 it became known that General Defence Corporation had signed an agreement to produce 105mm tank ammunition in the Turkish town of Kirikkale, in association with MKEK.

In February 1988 it was announced that General Defence Corporation was to enter into a joint venture with the Turkish ESKA, under the name of Detek AS. The plan was for this joint venture to produce ammunition for the United States in Turkey. This would have included 155mm artillery ammunition for the M483 shell.

General Dynamics

Through a joint venture, General Dynamics is producing 160 F-16 fighter planes; 90% of the parts are manufactured in Turkey. The first eight aircraft were made in the United States. The other 152 will be produced in Turkey itself. The contract runs until 1994, but the first Turkish-produced F-16 was already in the air on October 29, 1987.

Incidentally, not all of these airplanes are destined for Turkey. Ankara received permission to deliver 46 F-16s to Egypt, a deal which involved the sum of \$1.3 billion. This transaction is extraordinary, because for the first time a General Dynamics fighter plane

built outside the United States is being sold to a third country.

Meanwhile, in 1992, Turkey and the United States signed a further agreement for the production of 40 extra F-16s plus the components for another 40. In 1992 two F-16s a month were being produced.

Apparently, the production did not go completely according to plan. At least, this was claimed in the Turkish daily newspaper, *Aydunkt*, on July 26, 1993. The establishment of a Turkish production line was experiencing difficulties and in the last two years, seven of the Turkish produced aircraft have crashed. The Ministry of Defence therefore ordered its treasurer, Bülent Kosoglu, to start an investigation. In a report Kosoglu concluded that Turkey had too little responsibility in the project.

The plant in Mürted will, incidentally, not be closed when the production of F-16s is eventually stopped. The plant will then be able to produce helicopters and transport aircraft.

Hercules Inc./Aerospace Div.

In 1986 it became known that Hercules Inc./Aerospace Div. supplied Turkey with engines for the Sparrow AIM-7 missile.

Honeywell

The Undersea Systems Division of Honeywell is selling MK-46 mod-5 torpedoes to Turkey, as was announced in 1987. The supply of these runs through the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales Aid Programme. In addition, Honeywell is involved in an upgrading the programme for M48-tanks.

Kollsman Instruments

Like Honeywell, Kollsman Instruments is involved in the upgrading the programme for M48-tanks.

Ling-Temco-Vought

In 1988 Turkey and the United States signed a *Memorandum of Understanding* in which it was agreed that Ling-Temco-Vought will be involved in the production of 200 MLRS missile artillery systems. That same year the Turkish government ordered, for a sum of \$60 million, 12 MLRS-systems from Ling-Temco-Vought.

Loral

In 1989 a contract for the co-production of 160 passive radar systems and 122 jamming stations was signed. These were intended for the F-16 fighter planes.

Pentagon

The Pentagon has sold or donated large numbers of weapons to Turkey. E.g., between 1971-1982 ten subs, which the US Navy had discarded, were given to Turkey.

In January 1986, the Pentagon was planning the sale of spare parts and back-up supplies of US-produced planes to Turkey. Over \$97 million was involved. Around the same time, the United States delivered 40 F-4E planes to Turkey.

In 1987 it became known that the Pentagon would also sell spare parts for tactical and training aircraft to Turkey. All in all, the sum of \$86 million was involved.

The same year it was announced that the United States would give 12 T-33 training jets to Turkey, accompanied by spare parts worth \$12 million.

In 1991 the Pentagon informed Congress about the planned delivery of 350 Maverick guided missiles to Turkey. These weapons are intended for the F-16, a deal amounting to \$60 million. On September 22 of that year the Pentagon informed Congress about the intended sale of 20 AIM-120 AM-RAAMs (guided missiles) for the F-16. This

deal was worth \$17 million.

At the end of 1992, the United States offered the Turkish air force fifty A-10A Thunderbolt attack planes and 50 AH-1 Cobra helicopters. The Thunderbolts were to be delivered between 1992 and 1997. In 1993 it was announced that the United States had donated 800 M60 A1/A3-tanks to Turkey. This gift was a result of the CFE Treaty, under which weapons are transferred from Europe to Turkey.

In 1993 Turkey received the first four of eight Knox frigates to be supplied by the United States, for the extremely low price of \$800 million. This low price is a compensation for the damage incurred by a Turkish ship, when a US ship accidentally fired a rocket at it during a NATO-exercise. In 1993 it was announced that Turkey will purchase three refuelling aircraft. Presumably these will be airplanes of the KC-135 type, taken over from the US Air Force.

Raytheon

Turkey is 40.6% involved in the Euro-Stinger group. This group manufactures Stinger missiles under licence from Raytheon. Turkey itself will buy 4,000 of those rockets. The main contractor of this project is the German company Dornier. The Turkish companies Rocketsan AS, Aselsan and MKE are also part of the project. They manufacture as well as assemble parts. In 1991 Raytheon and Turkey signed a Letter of Intent for the supply of 10 anti-aircraft systems of the Patriot type.

Sikorsky

In 1988 the Turkish police force ordered six S-70A-17 type Sikorsky helicopters. In December 1992 Turkey signed a contract with Sikorsky for the supply of 95 Black Hawk helicopters, type S70A-28, the export ver-

sion of the UH-60L. This contract involved the sum of \$1.1 billion. The first 45 helicopters were delivered immediately, the rest will be built in Turkey. Furthermore there is an option on an additional 55 helicopters. The co-production will start in 1994.

This agreement was unique because of the fact that the EXIM-bank (Export-Import-bank) made it possible financially by giving credits. With this the EXIM-bank broke its own credit rules, as these do not allow this kind of funding.

Texas Instruments

In 1993 Texas Instruments signed a contract with the Turkish firm of Aselsan for the local production of day and night optical systems (DNSTS) for armoured vehicles for the land forces. This contract, worth \$115 million, also allows Aselsan to sell these products on the foreign market. In the same year Turkey signed a contract for the delivery of High-speed Anti-Radar Missiles, intended for F-16s.

Westinghouse

In March 1986 it was announced that Westinghouse, together with four Turkish firms, would be manufacturing APG-86 radar systems for the F-16. Later the TPS-70 mobile radar system was added.

Trade with Germany

After the United States, Germany is the biggest arms supplier to Turkey. According to SIPRI, Germany was responsible for 24% of weapons supplies to Turkey in the period between 1987 and 1991. Yet the German-Turkish relationship is frequently under pressure. Turkey is, for instance, very much upset by Germany's opposition to Turkey's EC membership.

German NATO Aid

The build-up of the Turkish military apparatus is not just a case of bilateral aid. NATO too, plays an important role in this. The means for the NATO defence aid come directly from the budget of the ministry of foreign affairs: 80% of the defence aid consists of new equipment, another 20% is second-hand Bundeswehr equipment. NATO defence aid is not given on a yearly basis, it is divided into blocks. Originally these blocks would be 18 months long, but since 1989 the blocks for Turkey are 36 months long.

The annual aid earmarked for Turkey amounts to 86.66 million German marks (DM). This figure cannot be found in any foreign trade statistics, because it is supposed that their ultimate destination is the Federal Republic itself. This is because the money flows back to German arms manufacturers, since they get the orders for the maintenance and revision of Bundeswehr equipment, and for the production of new equipment for Turkey.

Moreover, 80% of NATO defence aid is linked to orders for German companies. For this reason the lengths of the blocks were extended in 1989, because "the execution of a planned programme within a term of only 18 months is hardly possible. [...] Particularly because the executive official authority, after the signing of the government agreement must bring in and judge offers from the industries, before orders can be put out to contract," according to the magazine *Wehrtechnik* in 1989.

For some years now, licences and production knowledge are being acquired for use in Turkey itself. Since the mid-80s enough subsidiaries and joint ventures have settled in Turkey for arms to be made there with

German licences, without any problems.

Actual Aid

What does the German NATO aid to Turkey actually amount to? The 17th block, covering the period 1989-1991, can serve as an example. In that period the following goods, worth 260 million DM, were delivered to Turkey:

- Communications equipment, worth 3 million DM;
- Adjustments to M44-self-propelled howitzers, worth 54 million DM;
- Night vision equipment MIRA, worth 9 million DM;
- Installations to install calibration on tank barrels, worth 1 million DM;
- logistic support of the TRANSALL transport aircraft, worth 60 million DM;
- installations for ship-building projects, worth 58 million DM.

Arms Embargo

For the eighteenth block, a sum of 260 million DM had been appropriated, but in November 1992 not a pfennig had been spent, while the eighteenth block had begun on January 1, 1992 and was to run until the end of 1994. The reason for this can be found in the muddled relationship between Turkey and Germany. Germany had declared an arms embargo against Turkey on March 26, 1992, because Turkey had used German weapons against Kurdish civilians. The embargo was lifted in June, but the amount of money for the 18th block was reduced to 135 million DM.

A Process of Redefinition

Commenting in September 1992 on the above developments, the magazine *Turkish Defence & Aerospace Update* wrote that defence aid is going through a redefinition

process, stating, "From now on, defence aid will be judged on a case by case basis. It will, however, be possible to use all the financial support offered in a specific defence-industrial programme." In the November issue of the same magazine the change in aid policy for Portugal, Greece and Turkey was attributed to the financial difficulties caused by the unification of Germany.

German Minister of Defence Volker Rühle, confirmed that current German NATO aid will be reorganised. During his visit to Turkey in the autumn of 1992 he told his Turkish partners that from 1995 onwards, Germany would no longer give material aid to Turkey. He did, however, promise that Turkey would receive a total of 134 million DM worth of military aid until 1994. Hence the previous cuts in aid still stood.

Police and Secret Service

Not only the Turkish armed forces receive support from Germany. The police and secret service benefit from German aid as well.

Equipment and Training Aid

Turkey is one of the countries which receives bilateral military aid from Germany, euphemistically described as 'Equipment and Training Aid'. Until 1987 this form of aid was described as 'Arms aid', but because this sounded too militaristic the more neutral description was chosen.

According to Robert Herzog, an official of the ministry of defence, this aid is concerned with "the supply of material to security forces and police." Like NATO, defence aid such as the Equipment and Training Aid runs for three years. The total amount of money connected with it is estimated to be around 5 to 8 million DM for three years. In

the period 1991-1993 Turkey received 5 million marks, 3 million less than the previous period. This money was used to buy vehicles, field kitchens and electronic equipment, but also to pay for training programmes.

The value of the Equipment and Training Aid is not high enough to require parliamentary control. Hence the government decides which countries are to receive funding and the amount. The German government justifies this kind of aid by arguing that the receiver countries use it in the fight against drugs.

The German government also attaches its own economic goals to the Equipment and Training Aid. It expects Turkey to order spare parts in Germany.

Aid to the Police

Shortly after the coup of September 1980, Germany donated 1 million marks to Turkey to arm the police force. This aid was continued in the following years. In June 1985 the entire Turkish police command staff was the guest of the German minister of the interior. After that visit the Turkish police were able to obtain the most modern weapons and equipment. Aid was not only given through governmental bodies. The electronics firm Siemens supplied computers for police stations. In 1987 another German company, AEG, organised a seminar on computer and video surveillance for the Turkish police.

Germany also gave training programmes for the police. Between 1974-1984 e.g., 42 Turkish police commissioners received a training in Hiltrup. In 1985 Turkey called into being a special elite unit to combat terrorism. This unit received part of its training at GSG-9 headquarters in St. Augustine.

By 1989 GSG-9 had trained two elite units; after that year nothing is known about the training programmes. Germany not only guaranteed the training of the elite units, but also its weaponry.

From December 10-15, 1991 and from March 4-22, 1991 Turkish crews for swift attack boats were trained. The training included police work. The swift attack boat had been supplied by Lürssen in Bremen, as part of an arms project. The training probably also took place in Bremen.

From June 3-25, 1991, 14 Turkish officers of the general staff for security took part in an information workshop by policemen on both national as well as state levels. This workshop included detective and surveillance tasks. Between 1988-1990, 3 million DM were spent on the training of Turkish officers.

The Secret Service

Since 1955 there have been contacts between German counter-intelligence, the *Bundesnachrichtendienst*, and the Turkish secret service, MIT. These contacts have continued up to the present. In July 1992 the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Klaus Kinkel, visited Turkey. In connection with this visit there were talks between representatives of the German and Turkish secret services.

The Turkish secret service works closely with the intelligence services of those countries where persons reside who are involved with "terrorist and separatist activities." Furthermore, security services sometimes pass on information about people seeking political asylum to the Turkish MIT. Despite the illegality of such deeds they nevertheless continue, as a favour between friends.

Special Arms Aid

Since 1980 Germany also gives Turkey special arms aid. This concerns the supply of equipment and the transfer of technological knowledge and licences which cannot be funded by either the NATO defence aid or the Equipment and Training Aid.

1980 saw the start of the first special arms aid project for Turkey. With this project some 600 million DM were involved, divided among the following projects:

- replacement of the 90mm barrel of 160 M48 tanks by 105mm ones;
- upgrading of tanks with MTU engines;
- supply of anti-tank MILAN missiles;
- supply of 77 Leopard-1a3 tanks;
- supply of four salvage tanks.

In 1988, permission was granted for a second special arms aid project. This time, 150 Leopard 1 tanks from the Bundeswehr's military stores were delivered to Turkey. The manufacturer of these tanks won an order to make these vehicles suitable for use in Turkey. By the end of 1991 the last 14 of these remodelled tanks still had to be given to Turkey, but then the plans were thwarted by the German arms embargo, and the German government decided not to deliver the remaining tanks, worth 25 million DM.

The commentator of the specialist magazine *Wehrtechnik*, Erhard Heckman, questioned this decision on the grounds that the 25 million was not intended for Turkey, but for the German arms industry. Probably for this reason, it was decided to go ahead with the delivery anyway, albeit in great secrecy. But the secret delivery came to light, a fact which cost German Minister of Defence Stoltenberg, his job.

In 1991 the third special weapons aid project was approved. This was a reward for Turkey's pro-Western position during the

Gulf War. It is not very clear what amount of money was involved with this third project. According to the German government it was 700 million DM, according to the ministry of defence it was 1 billion.

Under this third project Turkey received, among other things, equipment from the former East German army. This equipment was officially described as civilian. This was rather peculiar, this special aid was completely legal.

Turkey did not keep all the weapons itself. The *Hamburger Abendblatt* reported on 4 February 1992 that, "In the last six months a total of 200,000 Soviet-made Kalashnikovs and Israeli Uzis as well as rockets had been delivered by Turkey to Azerbidzjan. The weapons came from the arsenal of the former GDR-army, which the Bundeswehr had given to Turkey."

On September 29, 1992, that is after the arms embargo had been declared, the defence committee of the Bundestag gave permission for a fourth special arms aid project. This time it covered the delivery of 100,000 anti-tank shells, 131 M110 howitzers, 88 40mm anti-aircraft guns, 20 M48 tanks, 10 bridge laying vehicles and 46 German Phantom RF-4E aircraft.

After questions in parliament, the federal government gave the following additional list of material which Turkey received from Germany under the special arms aid project:

- machinery for the licence manufacture of Cobra rockets;
- a plant for the licence manufacture of G3 and MG3 rifles;
- a plant making tank tracks;
- a plant for the manufacture of M44 and M52 howitzers;
- two 209 submarines and the subsequent delivery of another five boats;

- seven Jaguar swift attack boats;
- licences for the manufacture of engines for the M48 tank and the M44/M52 howitzer;
- Leopard-1 tanks;
- salvage tanks;
- Milan rockets and launchers;
- handheld anti-aircraft weapons;
- aircraft, tanks and artillery munition.

German-Turkish Cooperation

The close ties between Germany and Turkey not only made an immense amount of arms aid to Turkey possible, it also showed German and Turkish companies that cooperation could be very lucrative.

The classic example of successful German-Turkish cooperation is the production of MEKO frigates for the Turkish navy by Howald Deutsche Werft AG/Engineering office Lübeck (HDW/IKL), Thyssen Rhein-stahl Technik (TRT) and Blohm & Voss.

On December 29, 1982 these companies signed a contract for the building of four MEKO-200 frigates for the Turkish navy. The contract bore the code-name *Track I* and stated that Blohm & Voss would build the first ship, HDW the second, and the Turkish shipyard of Gölcük the remaining two ships. The last MEKO frigate of the *Track I* project was put into service in 1989.

The cooperation was so successful that a second contract was signed on January 19, 1990. The first ship was launched at the Blohm & Voss yard in November 1992. Gölcük would build the second ship.

At present, work on *Track IIB* is in progress, a project worth \$510 million. Under *Track IIB* another two MEKO frigates will be built; one at Blohm & Voss, and another at Gölcük.

The MEKO frigates are not the only projects in which the above-mentioned

firms are involved. On November 17, 1987 HDW signed a contract for the construction of two submarines of the 209/1400 type. Both submarines were to be made under IKL licence by Gölcük and are to be delivered in 1993 and 1994.

Abeking & Rasmussen has set up a cooperation project with the only Turkish privately owned shipyard which builds navy ships. Abeking is hoping to get two orders through this cooperation; one for minesweepers and another for patrol boats.

On March 25, 1991 the Turkish ministry of defence and the Friedrich Lürssen yard signed a contract for the construction of two swift attack boats, to be built in Turkish Taskizak. This production takes place under a license granted by Lürssen and is worth 229.2 million DM. They are to be delivered in 1994 and 1995.

At the moment negotiations are underway for the manufacture of three more swift attack boats. One of them is to be built at Lürssen, the other two at Taskizak, under a contract of 400 million DM. The cooperation extends further than appears at first glance. The boats are equipped with diesel engines made by MTU (Motoren & Turbinen Union) and communication equipment by Rohde & Schwarz.

MTU has quite a few orders from Turkey. Almost every vehicle in the Bundeswehr has a diesel engine manufactured by MTU. These include the M-48 tanks, the Leopard I and the Leopard 1A3, all now supplied to Turkey. In 1990 MTU set up a subsidiary company in Istanbul for service and maintenance, the MTU-Motor-Turbin Sanayi ve Ticaret Ltd. Sirketi. Next step is the construction of a factory in Arifiye, which will manufacture MTU diesel engines in licence.

Furthermore, MTU, with Rheinmetall, is

involved in the upgrading of old 155mm M44 howitzers. This work has been done since the 1950s.

Naturally this list of German-Turkish cooperation projects is by no means comprehensive. Worth special mention are Siemens AG, which owns the largest electronics enterprise in Turkey, and Daimler Benz AG, working in Turkey under the name of Otomarsan.

Trade with the Netherlands

Between 1987 and 1991 Dutch companies sold arms(-components) to Turkey with a total value of f425 million (Dutch guilders). This puts the Netherlands in the third place in the list of top arms suppliers to Turkey in this period. However, this Dutch contribution is relatively negligible when compared to those of the USA and Germany. In this same period these countries were responsible for 62 and 24% respectively of the arms trade with Turkey, making the Netherlands' 4% look somewhat insignificant.

Even so, the Dutch share of the arms trade with Turkey is qualitatively important. The relatively low numbers of major arms systems such as tanks and aircraft are compensated by the high-quality military electronics systems.

Dutch State Deliveries

Until 1988, Dutch military aid to Turkey consisted mainly of the dumping of surplus equipment, such as old Starfighter aircraft. In May 1988, however, the government decided to increase structural aid to the economically weaker NATO countries Greece, Turkey and Portugal. Under this LDDI programme the Netherlands, from 1988 onwards, annually gave f40 million to

these three countries. The aid was to consist of export support for Dutch companies supplying defence equipment and the stimulation of LDDI government and company participation in international projects. The dumping of military equipment remained part of the aid programme.

It is not clear to what extent this Dutch policy has been carried out. Although companies and authorities from LDDI countries are participating in several international projects, it is debatable whether this is the result of the stimulating role of the Dutch government. It is, however, clear that the Dutch authorities have retained their enthusiasm for giving away obsolete military equipment.

From 1989 to 1993, the Netherlands supplied Turkey with 60 outdated NF-5 fighter jets, which had been revised and made ready for use by Fokker in Woensdrecht. The training of Turkish ground personnel and NF-5 pilots was also organised.

After Iraq's attack on Kuwait in September 1990, Turkey was supplied with 50,000 special NBC-suits including gas masks. These suits are designed for use during nuclear, chemical and biological warfare.

According to the well-informed magazine *Military Technology*, the Netherlands is also passing on 298 Leopard tanks to Turkey, as a result of the CFE treaty. Official parliamentary sources, however, deny that the Netherlands is supplying any tanks or howitzers to Turkey.

Hollands Signaal Apparatus (HSA)

The electronics company Hollands Signaal (HSA) in Hengelo is the Netherlands' largest defence company. In 1956 the company was taken over by Philips in Eindhoven. HSA makes electronics, more than the com-

plete weapon systems. In the Netherlands, HSA is the main company in the field of fire control equipment and naval control systems. These include, for instance, radar systems such as SMART and STIR and radio commando systems and fire control systems such as the Flycatcher and the Goalkeeper.

Until recently, the company, with an annual turnover of £700 million, received £200 million' worth of orders from the Ministry of Defence. Due to the international political developments this turnover has now been reduced to £500 million.

Partly in order to survive, HSA was taken over by the French electronics chain Thomson-CSF. Another reason for this take-over was that Philips wanted to concentrate on its main activity: consumer electronics. Thomson is the world's second largest producer of defence electronics with 105,000 employees and a turnover of £14 billion.

The take-over of HSA has two substantial advantages. First of all, the French company now has access to markets in which HSA had always been strong, the German market in particular is important in this respect. HSA is a large supplier of radar and computer technology used in German-built ships. The German naval shipbuilding industry is highly successful and sells worldwide.

A second advantage of the take-over of HSA by Thomson is HSA's know-how. Radar, command and control systems such as Goalkeeper and Flycatcher are HSA products competing on the world market. In this respect it is understandable that HSA was given the management of the maritime arms division within the Thomson chain.

HSA and Turkey

The Turkish Ministry of Defence is an important customer for ships built in Ger-

many and intended for the Turkish navy. In many cases these ships are supplied with electronics of Hollandse Signaal, such as radar, fire control, and command and control systems. Between 1980 and 1993 HSA has built equipment for no less than 29 ships (attack ships, frigates, submarines) delivered or on order by the Turkish navy. Unfortunately it is difficult to determine the value of these electronics, but it is certain to amount to hundreds of millions of guilders.

Maritime electronics is not the only card HSA is playing in the Turkish market. The corporation is also competing for a contract to supply 97 Flycatchers. This is a fire control system for a 35mm rapid-fire anti-aircraft cannon, designed for defence against low-flying aircraft. Other competitors are British Marconi/Racal with its Eagle, and Swiss Oerlikon-Contrares with its Skyguard. The original order involved 150 fire control systems, but due to changes in the Turkish air defence concept, the project has been severely delayed. In addition, there were problems with the co-production of the 35mm rapid-fire cannon. The contract, worth an estimated £650 million, should be awarded by the end of 1993.

HSA has closed off a number of successful deals with Turkey in the past, too. In the late 70s the HSA plant in Huizen sold a licence to the Turkish electronics company Aselsan for the production of PRC/VRC 4,600 man-pack radios. At the time HSA assisted the Turkish company with the setting up of a complete factory manufacturing these radios. This brought in £50 million. Since 1980, Aselsan produces the radios under licence and even exports them, possibly to Iran. HSA still receives royalties for every sold radio.

Eurometaal

On June 30, 1992, a small article appeared in *Dagblad De Zaanstreek*, a regional daily, announcing that the Zaans ammunition company Eurometaal had signed a million-dollar contract with Turkey. Eurometaal, jointly owned by the German ammunition company Dynamit Nobel, Swiss arms producer Oerlikon and the Dutch state, was to supply M483A1 artillery shells. The article did not mention the size or volume of the order.

The article was noteworthy because usually Eurometaal does not release information on contracts, whether they are successful or not. Apparently, there was a leak. This turned out to be Gijs Honing, a regional leader of the metal workers' trade union in the region of North-Holland. Apparently Honing had been so excited about the new contract, that he spoke out of turn at a meeting.

The M483 Artillery Shell

The M483A1 artillery shell is a carrier shell for 88 smaller sub-munitions. It is delivered by a 155mm howitzer up to a maximum range thirty kilometres and (usually) explodes above the target. It covers an area the size of a football field and the sub-munitions destroy both humans and armoured vehicles. Since the Turkish army is equipped with 155mm howitzers, these artillery shells can also be used against rebellious Kurds.

The Order

Due to relentless publicity and a debate in the lower house of parliament in December 1992, more openness was achieved about the artillery shell order. The publication of documents taken by an action group calling itself *Explosives Clearance Service*, which raided the Eurometaal premises in Decem-

ber 1992, also shed a different light on the case. As it turns out, Eurometaal will supply 206,000 artillery shells to Turkey between 1992 and 2002. Delivery of the first 18,000 shells had been planned before Christmas 1992.

The order is the result of a *Memorandum of Understanding* signed by the Dutch and Turkish governments. The Dutch government was, in this case, acting on behalf of Turkey and placed the order for the shells with Eurometaal. The money involved in this particular order is ± f340 million. Apart from the order for the Turkish government, an order for the production of 103,000 grenades for the Netherlands was also arranged in the agreement. This is why the total order for Eurometaal involves the production of 309,000 shells in 10 years. Including this Dutch order, Eurometaal can count on orders with a value of f500 million within the next 10 years.

The prospects for Eurometaal were bright, but at the end of 1992 the Dutch authorities spoiled the party. Due to changing relations in the world, the government had decided to rearrange its defence priorities. As a result, the remaining Dutch order was cancelled. It can be concluded from answers to parliamentary questions put to Minister Kooymans of foreign affairs in March 1993, that the Netherlands had ordered altogether 55,000 shells. The option on the remaining 48,000 has been cancelled. For Eurometaal, this meant a loss of income of about f100 million. The Turkish order for 206,000 shells, however, will be carried out.

Production in Turkey

As was laid down in the agreement between the Netherlands and Turkey, the entire pro-

duction of the artillery shells is to be transferred to Turkey in late 1993 or early 1994. There, close to Ankara, the Turkish company Makina Ve Kimya Endüstrisi Kurumu (MKEK) will assemble the M483A1 shell. Eurometaal in Zaandam will continue to manufacture the casings for the shells.

The first part of this contract is being carried out by a subsidiary of Eurometaal in Liebenau, Germany, at least until the assembly part of the process is transferred to Turkey. Large-calibre ammunition has been manufactured in Liebenau for years. After the production transfer, the branch in Liebenau was to be closed and the employers dismissed.

Sub-contractors M483 Shell

Eurometaal is not the only one benefiting from the Turkish order for the M483 shell. The deal is also profitable for a number of sub-contractors, in Europe and abroad. This can be concluded from a list of sub-contractors for the M483 project which was passed on to AMOK by the action group called *Explosives Clearance Service*. This list can be found in one of the appendixes, where it is published for the first time. It includes the following Dutch companies as co-producers of the M483-shell: FDO (Amsterdam), Thyssen Edelstaal (Vianen), Mega Trade (Almere), Surface Treatment (Maasbracht), Bijl (Barneveld), Hilarius BV (Scherpenzeel), Sigma Coatings (Zeist), Loctite Nederland BV (Breda), Signode BV (Hoofddorp), and Markthorst Special Product BV (Hardenberg).

The first 18,000 shells for Turkey were indeed assembled in Liebenau. Up to the summer of 1993, however, they had not been delivered to Turkey, because the German authorities refused to grant an arms export license. The Dutch government, on the other hand, granted permission in January 1993 for the export of the 18,000 shells to Turkey via Germany. The German government position was no doubt influenced by the broadcast of a current affairs programme called *Monitor*, in November '92. In that programme, details of the order were revealed and as a result, a number of members of parliament belonging to the opposition social democrat SPD party, requested the German government to stop the order.

Due to the German refusal to issue an export permit, the Liebenau factory can no longer assemble shells, according to Eurometaal. For this reason Liebenau had to be closed. It seems far more likely, however, that Eurometaal has made a virtue of necessity and speeded up the transfer of the entire production line. Because of this, 80 out of the 130 workers were summarily dismissed.

Mass Redundancies

At the beginning of February 1993, Eurometaal announced the dismissal of more than 300 workers out of a total workforce of almost 500. According to management, the measure was caused by the drastic reduction of the munitions orders of the ministry of defence, and it explicitly referred to the cancellation of the M-483 order.

It is true that Defence has cancelled the remainder of the order mentioned above, but matters are a bit more complicated than that. For many years, small and medium calibre ammunition had been manufac-

tured in Zaandam. Now, the production of this ammunition has been stopped. The larger part of the retrenchments took place in the munitions department and in departments indirectly involved in munitions production, such as administration, quality control and security. The 'indirect' jobs made up a large part of the work force at Eurometaal. In the shell production department, not surprisingly, no one was made redundant. After all, the Turkish order for 206,000 shells will be met and therefore production will continue.

Eurometaal is not stopping the production of small and medium calibre ammunition altogether, though. In June 1993, this company took over ammunition company Franerex in Hoogerheide near Bergen op Zoom in Brabant, in the south of Holland. All ammunition filling work will be concentrated in Franerex. Management has stated that the filling of the large-calibre ammunition, which was done in Liebenau until it was closed down, will also be transferred to Franerex. Thus it is quite possible that the assembly of the M483 shell, even if only temporarily, will take place at Franerex. This would at least solve management's export licensing problems because the 'German detour' would be cut out. As has already been noted, the Dutch government would not block such export to Turkey.

Dutch Deliveries

HSA and Eurometal are not the only Dutch companies supplying the Turkish army. An outline of products delivered to Turkey or ordered by it in the period between 1980 and 1993 is given below, arranged per company.

Bronswerk

Subcontractor for the air conditioning system of a military headquarters near Izmir.

Eurometaal

Order of 206,000 M483 shells for a total amount of about f340 million. Assembly takes place in Turkey, detonators are supplied by the British company Valentec.

DAF - Special Products

Twenty AIFV armoured vehicles for the Turkish army, the first part of an order of 1,698 armoured vehicles which will be completed in Turkey. Also, as part of the same order 135 turrets and other parts worth f125 million between 1989 and 1994. The turrets are being made for the Turkish-American company FNSS, a merger of the Turkish NSS and the American FMC.

Hollandse Signaal (HSA)

- In the late 70s, HSA-Huizen sold a license to the Turkish electronics company Aselsan for the production of the PRC/VRC 4,600 man-pack radio. At the same time, Aselsan also bought an entire factory manufacturing these radios, for f50 million. Since 1980 the company has been producing the radios under licence; HSA receives royalties for every radio sold.
- HSA may supply fire control systems for the 35mm rapid-fire anti-aircraft cannon, intended for use against low flying aircraft. The Turkish government will decide before the end of 1993 whether this order, worth an estimated f650 million, will go through.
- HSA also sold the Squire ground radar system, together with LT Radio (Thomson). HSA was involved in the installation of NIKE missile systems in Turkey. The WM-28 fire control system for eight fast

attack boats, delivered 1977-1988.

- Combat information systems for two new ships for the Turkish navy were ordered. This included STACOS Mod IV, LIOD, VESTA, and Target Designation Sights, fire control systems for 35mm and 76mm cannon.
- The STACOS Mod IV system for two Yildiz-class fast attack boats which still have to be built. For the fire control systems, LIOD and VESTA will be used. These ships are to be delivered in 1994-95.
- The combat information system STACOS, in its newest version STACOS-FD, for three ships of the Yildiz-class, construction of which was approved by the Turkish navy in January 1993.
- The M8 Submarine Integrated Battle and Data System fire control system for six 209 type submarines, delivered between 1975 and 1989.
- Supply of the combat information system STACOS-TU, radar DA 08 and fire control systems STIR and WM 25 for four MEKO 200-frigates, delivered between 1987 and 1989.
- Supply of STACOS-FD and fire control system STIR for two new MEKO-200T frigates not yet under construction. These two ships will be delivered in 1997-98.

Ministry of Defence

- 54 F-104 Starfighters supplied between 1980 and 1983, with a value of f10 million.
- 60 NF-5 fighter aircraft delivered between 1989-1993; 15 of these aircraft were of such bad quality that they were cannibalised. Fokker Air Services in Woensdrecht revised the aircraft and prepared them for export.
- 50,000 NBC-suits including masks and boots in September 1990.

- Electronic deception devices for the Turkish air force during the Gulf War against Iraq.
- A shipload discarded gunpowder with a value of f7 million in March 1988.
- Training of ground personnel for F-104 and NF-5 jets, and pilot training on almost every Dutch air base. Training of Turkish radar technicians at a radar base in Wier in the north of Holland. Transfer of knowledge in the field of electronic warfare.
- Possible supply of 298 Leopard-1 tanks as a result of the CFE-treaty.
- Dutch participation in the LDDI programme with an annual contribution of f40 million. Turkey will probably receive about one-third of this amount.

Nederlandse Kabelfabriek (NFK)

The NFK is participating in the SAVKOM 2000 syndicate competing for the TAFICS-project, which will cost f1.75 million. TAFICS is the Turkish Armed Forces Integrated Communication System, and is intended as a national digital network for the armed forces, government and civil defence in time of war. The system will control telephone, fax and data traffic. A different Turkish company is involved in each of the six syndicates involved. In this way the technological know-how can be transferred. If chosen, NKF will transfer fibre cable technology to the Turkish company Türkablo. Taking into consideration the substantial Turkish element in the syndicate, there is a good chance that SAVKOM will be selected to implement the first phase of the construction of the project, which will take an expected 20 years.

Philips USFA

A contract was signed in 1988 for the licence production of proximity fuzes (VT 7250) by

Aselsan. This Turkish company set up a production line in 1989. In October 1990 Aselsan supplied the first 5,000 fuzes, for use in howitzer shells, to the Turkish armed forces. By June 1991, 40,000 had been delivered. The contract with the Turkish Ministry of Defence allows for another 150,000 fuzes, with a value of 60 million DM. Between 1989-1993, 145,000 components for the fuzes, worth £23 million, were delivered.

Nine hundred and forty Aroflex (encryption machine for telex) worth £29 million were delivered to the Turkish Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and the MSB between 1983 and 1988.

Supply of Stinger missile parts valued at £30 million to the Turkish company Kalekalip between 1991 and 1997.

Trade with Other Western Countries

Trade with Italy

Between 1987 and 1991, Italy was fourth on the list of Turkey's arms suppliers with total sales of \$125 million. Italy owes its prominent position to strong economic ties dating from the 1960s. Through generous credit arrangements, Italy gained 10% of the Turkish civil export market between 1963 and 1970.

The Cyprus crisis in 1974 was a piece of good fortune for the Italian arms industry. The United States then declared an arms ban and Italy was one of the countries ready to fill the gap. Expecting the US ban, Turkey bought 18 second-hand Starfighters from Italy, followed by another 18 in the autumn of 1974. Ever since, Italy has had a strong position on the Turkish arms market. This position was consolidated by signing a

Memorandum of Understanding, in which both parties agreed to meet every two years to discuss collaboration in the field of defence-industrial projects.

Arms Projects

Early 1990, Italian aircraft company Agusta won an order worth \$17 million for the delivery and co-production of 40 training aircraft. The first few machines will be built in Italy, the others in Turkey.

In 1987, Marconi-Italy signed a contract with a value of 15 billion liras for the supply of digital computerisation systems to improve the communication network of the Turkish army.

Trade with France

France was not among Turkey's main arms suppliers. From 1987 until 1991, the French arms trade amounted to \$22 million, which is only 0.3% of the total amount. Since the 80s, France has been trying to get more access to the Turkish market.

Economic Cooperation

This took place mainly through the strengthening of economic links, with obvious success. In the first six months of 1990, trade between the two countries increased by 67% in comparison with 1989. In February 1991, the French and Turkish authorities signed an agreement to improve cooperation in the field of economic and trade relations.

In 1992, France was among the main investors in Turkey and this was consolidated in April with the visit of F. Mitterrand, the first French president to visit Turkey since Charles de Gaulle in 1968. Mitterrand discussed the situation in Central Asia and Cyprus, and the Turkish position in Europe with his colleague, the late Turgut Özal.

A large number of industrialists hoping to obtain lucrative defence and building contracts, such as a helicopter contract, a second airport near Istanbul, and a high-speed train between Ankara and Istanbul, accompanied Mitterand.

Defence Cooperation

The defence industry wanted to profit from the closer economic cooperation between France and Turkey. The French authorities aided this process when, in 1990, the government organisation SOFMA visited Turkey. SOFMA is responsible for providing marketing and service on behalf of the French defence industry. SOFMA went to Turkey to promote the interests of the naval industry.

In December 1991 France and Turkey signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding' covering defence cooperation. At the end of 1992, the increased collaboration between France and Turkey was consolidated with the signing of the 'Defence Industries Security Treaty'. This treaty is concerned with the exchange of sensitive technology, and ensures Turkey access to some secrets of the highly developed French arms industry.

Aerospatiale

Early in 1990, Aerospatiale opened a branch in Ankara, hoping to obtain a large number of Turkish contracts for the delivery of civil aircraft and a satellite. It succeeded in getting the latter, beating its direct competitor British Aerospace (BAe). The satellite is primarily intended for civilian communications, but the military will also use it for the transmission of classified information.

The British were furious about the course of events, and both Margaret Thatcher and the British ambassador in Ankara filed a complaint. They argued that BAe had quot-

ed a lower price and that there was no evidence that the Aerospatiale product was of a higher quality. As a result of the British protests, new bidding was allowed. This was also due to the fact that Turkey changed its requirements. This time, BAe was \$20 million above the Aerospatiale offer and the French company finally obtained the satellite order in 1990, for \$315 million.

Thomson CSF

Early 1990, Thomson, an electronics giant, obtained an order for the supply of a large three-dimensional mobile radar system. It made Thomson one of the bigger suppliers of Turkey. French banks financed the project by lending Turkey \$114 million. By January 1993, however, the costs had run up to \$150.3 million. Thomson is now trying hard to strengthen its position in Turkey. It sought cooperation with two Turkish companies for the radar project. Additionally, Thomson took over Dutch HSA, Belgian MBLE and French TRT. These are all companies supplying arms systems to Turkey.

GIAT

GIAT will supply the artillery turrets for the armoured infantry vehicles of the Turkish army. For this project, GIAT will work together with Nural Makina and MKEK, both Turkish companies.

Trade with Great Britain

Between 1986 and 1990, Turkey ranked 12th on the list of buyers of major arms systems, according to the British defence industry. "When the Turks buy weapons, they can decide themselves what to do with them," was the answer of George Younger, British minister of defence in 1987 when he was asked whether any kind of limit was going to be imposed on the sale of arms that

could be used to suppress internal revolt. Great Britain has few qualms as far as the arms trade with Turkey is concerned. The British regard Turkey as an important NATO ally and in addition, trade with Turkey is beneficial for British industry. It is not surprising, therefore, that Turkey put Great Britain on the 'green list' in April 1993.

The British regard Turkey as an important growth market. For this reason, a Turkish branch of the Defence Export Service Organisation (DESO) was set up in 1988. At that time, Turkey was the sixth country in which the British had established that particular kind of office. Today, there are 10 DESO offices.

Besides the DESO branch, politicians were defending the interests of the British defence industry in Turkey. In 1984, for instance, the Duke of Kent paid a visit to Turkey, together with a group of British industrialists. The aim was the sale of a nuclear power station and military components.

British Aerospace

In the early 80s it was especially British Aerospace which capitalised on the relations with Turkey. In 1983, BAe supplied 36 improved mobile anti-aircraft missiles of the Rapiers type to Turkey. According to *Jane's Defence Weekly*, the arms were used by Turkish soldiers to protect the air force bases of the United States. The transaction was worth £150 million.

In the same year, BAe also supplied anti-ship missiles of the Sea Skua type for the helicopters of the MEKO-200 frigates. This made Turkey the first importer of the most effective maritime weapon in the Gulf War.

Decline

After this period, British arms trade with Turkey declined, despite the fact that British politicians and the arms industry did their best to turn the tide. In 1987, e.g., Premier Margaret Thatcher had a meeting with President Turgut Özal in Ankara. The main topic was the expansion of British military sales to Turkey. In the same month George Younger, minister of defence, visited the international arms exhibition IDEA in Turkey, trying to promote the British defence industry. In his pocket he had an offer to increase the credit facilities for acquisitions from Great Britain. This offer served to persuade the Turkish Minister of Defence to buy the Tornado aircraft.

In 1988, British companies had 26 representatives in Turkish companies, more than any other country. The United States, for example, had 24 and West Germany, 14. The representatives were supposed to obtain as many orders as possible, but this policy was only marginally successful. As the SIPRI chart at the beginning of this chapter indicates, the value of the British arms trade between 1986 and 1990 was \$123 million, whereas between 1987 and 1991 it had decreased to a mere \$10 million. For BAe especially, Turkey did not turn out to be quite the promised land it had seemed half-way through the 80s.

Marconi

In 1993 the electronics company Marconi maintained the bulk of the British military-economic relations with Turkey. In 1989, it signed a contract for the production of radios for military communication, worth £96 million. For this huge project, Marconi sought the cooperation of two Turkish companies. Together with them, Marconi

Trade with Austria

Just like Switzerland, Austria has a problematic relationship with Turkey as far as arms supplies are concerned. In 1990, for instance, Austria blocked a shipment of ammunition to Turkey. It involved small calibre bullets and anti-personnel grenades. The ministry of home affairs stated that the export permit could not be issued, because the use of this ammunition could lead to violations of human rights. Within a month, the order had been given to the American company, Martin Marietta.

Austria was placed on Turkey's red list. Additionally, Turkish authorities stopped the production of 120mm mortars and ignored the Austrian offers of 155mm howitzers and 155mm ammunition.

Trade with Belgium

"Traditionally, NATO partner Turkey is a customer of Belgium, although the purchases are not very substantial," stated Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Willy Claes, in 1992.

In 1990, SABCA and Sonaca supplied Turkey with aircraft parts with a value of 35 million BF. This order was the result of compensation arrangements with the American company General Dynamics. SABCA and Sonaca assemble that company's F-16 fighter aircraft for the Belgian air force. As part of the compensation arrangements, they can supply F-16 parts to Turkey.

In 1992, FNHH, the Belgian subsidiary of the French GIAT, supplied ammunition worth 12 million BF. GIAT/FNHH is also involved in the supply of guns and demonstration equipment to Turkey, with a total value of 1.6 million BF.

In 1992, a crisis arose in Belgian politics concerning the supply of 285 gun turrets for

armoured vehicles built by FNSS in Turkey. A number of these turrets were intended for export to Saudi Arabia via Turkey. According to the Turkish embassy in Brussels, the turrets have a value of \$100 million. The Flemish parties opposed export, while Wallonian parliamentarians backed the interests of the defence industry, which is largely based in the Wallonian provinces. The crisis was averted when the Socialist Party and other Flemish parties agreed to the export.

Willy Claes was not pleased with the course of events, as he immediately covered himself against other scandals stating, "As far as the future is concerned, I would like to point out that the companies do not always inform my department about the projects they are working on."

The Belgian orders are fairly small-scale. Nevertheless public opinion more or less rejects the sale of arms to Turkey. Moreover, there is a law prohibiting the export of arms to countries with internal conflicts. A Belgian arms embargo, however, is not possible according to Willy Claes because "a joint EC decision about that is not possible. That is the only reason for us. Having chosen for a joint European foreign and security policy in Maastricht, we must be consistent and not go off and do our own thing."

Trade with Scandinavian Countries

It is noteworthy that Sweden, one of the main Western arms producers, hardly sells any weapons to Turkey. In 1990, the Netherlands requested Swedish permission to resell Swedish electronic equipment to Turkey. It remains unclear, however, whether that permission was actually given.

Finland will provide the Turkish police force with vehicles that can perform on any sort of terrain. These and other factors re-

sulted in Finland being added to the Turkish green list of countries free to supply Turkey with arms.

In May 1993 Norway was put on the yellow list, because it could supply the Turkish army with 48 turrets for armoured vehicles with anti-tank armament.

Trade with non-Western Countries

Western countries are by far the most important arms suppliers to Turkey. Over the past 12 years, both Egypt and Indonesia have been mentioned in the SIPRI Yearbook in the register of trade and licence production, but these orders did not amount to much.

Trade with the Far East

China is an important arms manufacturer. It supplies many developing countries with the infamous Silkworm missile. China would like to have Turkey as its customer. In 1989, it tried to sell Turkey 155mm howitzer, but western suppliers were given preference. The fact that Turkey is so focused on the West is one of the reasons that China has not accomplished much in its attempts to gain a position in the Turkish arms trade.

Companies from Taiwan and South Korea too, regularly offer their products on the Turkish arms bazaar. One such case involved the delivery of minehunters. A South Korean company was eliminated in the first phase, although South Korea did maintain its position on the list of possible suppliers. However, this was of limited value because the country was not visited when Turkish officials made a round of possible dockyards.

Trade with the CIS

Turkish dependence on the Western arms industry is sometimes problematic, especially when western countries demand that their weapons not be used against Kurdish civilians. Turkey has been trying to avoid that problem by obtaining weapons from the CIS. The CIS is not so critical and sells arms to anyone interested in buying them.

In late 1992, Turkey was the first NATO country to buy a substantial number of arms from the CIS. For \$75 million, Russian M-17 helicopters, armoured vehicles, night vision equipment and machine guns for the police force were obtained. According to Turkey, the sale was 66% cheaper now than it would have been had a similar deal been made with the West. Turkey is still negotiating with Russia about the supply of helicopters. These arms will all be used against the Kurds.

It is quite possible that the republics of the former Soviet Union will become important suppliers. The first supply for the police force could be an indication that from now on, arms for the dirty war against the Kurds will mainly be obtained from the CIS. This would prevent political problems with the West.

An indication for the new policy is the course of events concerning 60 armoured vehicles. Germany supplied these old GDR vehicles to the Turkish air force. In fact they were used by the Turkish police force against the Kurds. That resulted in the German arms embargo of March 26, 1992. Now Turkey has decided to transfer the German vehicles back to the air force, while substitute vehicles will be supplied by the CIS. It seems that German arms are for 'normal' use while the Russian equipment can be employed for the dirty work.

Appendices

1/ The Turkish Armed Forces

Manpower

480,000 of which 390,000 are conscripts

Structure

4 armies

1 mechanised division

1 infantry division

15 armoured brigades

18 mechanised brigades

9 infantry brigades

1 Presidential Guard regiment

3 commando brigades

Army Equipment

Tanks

312 Leopard (German army)

706 M-60 tanks (US Army)

3,000 M-48 tanks (US Army)

Armoured personnel carriers

2,412 M113 vehicles (US Army)

300 BMP-60-vehicles (Russia)

Artillery

1,788 towed artillery (mainly US)

696 self-propelled artillery (mainly US)

Multiple Rocket Launchers

20 MLRS-systems (US co-production)

Anti-tank Guided Weapons

365 TOW (US)

392 Milan (France/Germany)

182 COBRA (Germany)

300 SS-11 (France)

Aircraft and helicopters

538 helicopters (US, Italy)

269 light aircraft (US, Germany)

Navy Equipment

11 destroyers (US Navy)

8 frigates (4 German co-production, 2 German navy)

15 submarines (9 US Navy, 6 Germany)

46 small ships (2 German navy, 15 US Navy)

36 minesweepers/hunters (22 US Navy, 4 Canadian navy, 6 German navy)

7 amphibious ships (7 US Navy)

59 landing craft/ 27 supporting craft (2 German navy, 1 US Navy)

Air Force equipment

418 fighter planes (NATO and co-production)

88 interceptors (NATO)

77 transport aircraft (NATO, Spain)

Countries of origin in brackets. A large amount of equipment (tanks, artillery, aircraft) over and above these figures is kept in storage.

Source: *Military Balance: 1993-1994*.

2/ Turkish Arms Producers

Aselsan

- Shareholder Turkish army fund (70%)
Products military electronics
Projects VRC-4600 radios, Stinger project, components F-16, VI7250 proximity fuzes; night vision equipment for AIFV (infantry vehicles)
Patentholders Philips (Netherlands), Litton (USA), Philips USFA (Netherlands), Texas Instruments (USA)
Export to Pakistan (radios)

Arifrye Tank upgrading plant

- Projects Optical instruments, M48 tanks
Patentholders Zeiss (Germany), Rheinmetall (Germany), MTU (Germany) en GLS (Germany)

Baris

- Shareholder EMEK-holding
Projects Assembly M72 rocket launchers, running parts M48 tanks, Stinger launching tubes
Export to Partners Stinger project

ENKA holding

- Projects Assembly Black Hawk helicopter
Patentholders United Technologies (USA)

Eskizibir

- Shareholders Air Force
Projects motors for F104 Starfighter, F4 Phantom, Northrop F-5 combat aircraft and C160 transport aircraft
Patentholders Rolls Royce (GB), Tyne

FNSS

- Shareholders FMC (USA, 51%), NUROL (49%)
Projects 1698 AIFV (infantry fighting vehicles)
Patentholders FMC (USA), Detroit Diesel (USA), GIAT (France)

Gölcük shipyard

- Shareholders Navy
Projects 209 submarines, MEKO frigates
Patentholders HDW/IKL (Germany), Blohm & Voss (Germany)

Havelsan Aydın

- Shareholders Turkish Air Force Fund (51%), Aydın (USA, 38%)
Projects electronics for the F-16
Patentholders Aydın (USA)

HEMA-holding

- Products radars, gears and pumps
Patentholders Aydın (USA), Eaton (USA), Dowty Plessey (GB), Peine Zalzgitter (Germany)
Export to USA (software)

Hisar Celik Dokum AS

- Shareholders Hisar-holding
Projects steel constructions, components M48 tank, inspections M47 tanks and M113 personnel carriers
Patentholders ESCO Corp (USA), Davy Roll Co Ltd (USA)

Ibrahim Ors

- Products transporters, minelayers, mobile kitchens, water tanks

Kayseri Werkplaats

- Shareholders Turkish Air Force
Projects upgrading M113 carriers, components F-16, modernisation F104 Starfighter, maintenance SF260 training aircraft, maintenance C160 transport aircraft, parachutes
Patentholders Sergeant Fletcher (USA), Siai-August (Italië), MBB (Germany)

MANAS

- Shareholders MAN (Germany, 33%), Ercan (34%), Tercan (18%)
Projects trucks and busses
Patentholders MAN (Germany), Kraus Maffei (Germany), Kuka (Germany)

METIS Construction & Trade

- Projects construction, airfields, runways, shelter
Vestigingen Germany, GB en Libya
Relaties Bronswerk (Netherlands)

MIKES

- Shareholders Kavala, Loral (USA)
Projects electronics F16, passive radar detection equipment, active jammers
Patentholders Loral (USA), Martin Marietta (USA)
Export to USA

MKEK (Makina Ve Kimya Endustris Kurumu)

- Shareholders Turkish state
Projects Anti-aircraft artillery, SR6 gasmasks, filters for gasmasks, HAR anti-tank weapons, Stinger components, rocket launchers, MP5-machine guns, 105mm munition & barrels, MG3-rifles and munition, M483 shells, M811 25mm cannon, 25mm munition, turrets for armoured vehicles
Patentholders Oerlikon (Switzerland), British Leyland (GB), Florin (Sweden), Heckler & Koch (Germany), General Defence Corporation (USA), Rheinmetall (Germany), Eurometaal (Netherlands), GIAT (France)
Export to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates

MKAS (Marconi Kominikasyon)

- Shareholders Marconi (GB), Havelsan
Products communications apparatus, HF/SSB radio

- Patentholders Aeromaritime-Marconi (Italië), Rohde & Schwarz (Germany), Marconi (GB)

MTU Motor Turbin

- Products delivery and maintenance of M48 en Leopard tanks, naval turbines MEKO frigates.
Patentholders MTU (Germany)

Otokar Karoseri Sanayi AS

- Shareholders KOC-Groep
Products busses and terrain vehicles, manufacture Magirus, manufacture vari-ous roket launcher systems
Patentholders Rover (GB), Deutz (Germany), BAe (GB), Ford Aerospace (USA) en Short Brothers (Canada)

Mbenz Turk AS

- Shareholders Daimler Benz (Germany, 36%), Turkish army fund 5%, NAI (11%), Mengtic (11%)
Products town buses, terrain vehicles, transport vehicles, Unimog, reserve components
Patentholders Daimler Benz (Germany)
Export to Sudan (Unimog)

Parsan Makina

- Shareholder Guris holding
Products metal work on axes M113 vehicles and M48 tanks

Rocketsan AS

- Shareholders Kutlutas (20%), STFA (20%), MKEK (15%), Aselsan (15%), Kalekalip (15%)
Products Production and research on rocket components
Projects ATACMS, MRLS multiple rocket launchers, Stinger thrusters
Patentholders ARC (USA), Dornier (Germany)
Export to partners Stinger project

STFA/Savronic AS

Products electronics, radar components
Projects Stinger project, software for F-16 radar, safety Starfighter, PCTE-software
Patentholders Westinghouse (USA)

TAI Tusas Aerospace Industries

Shareholders General Dynamics (USA, 42%), TUSAS (49%), GETSCO (7%), Turkish army fund (2%)
Projects 160 F-16's (Onyx I), 40 F-16's (Onyx II), simulators (Onyx III), maintenance SF260 trainers, development VLA transport aircraft, CN235 transport aircraft, development UAV aircraft.
Patentholders General Dynamics (USA), Saia Augusta (Italië), CASA (Spanje)
Export to Egypte and USA (F-16's)

Taskizak scheepswerf

Shareholders Navy
Projects SAR33 Patrol ships, DOCAN patrol boats
Patentholders Siev. & Rasmu. (Germany), Lürsen (Germany)

TEI Engine Industrie

Shareholders TUSAS (49%), General Electric (49%), Turkish army fund
Products aircraft motors, including those for F-16
Patentholders General Electric (USA)
Export to USA

Tekfen Thomson Radars (TTR)

Shareholders Thomson (France), Tekfen-holding
Projects assembly of mobile radars
Patentholders Thomson (France)

TESTAS

Shareholders Turkish armed forces fund (100%)
Products Electronic components
Patentholders Bultronics, Thomson (France), Acrotonicr

Tursav Agir Makina

Shareholders HEMA-holding
Products Diesel motors, gear boxes
Patentholders Detroit Diesel (USA), Allison GM (USA)

Tubitak Turkish Research Association

Shareholders Turkish state
Products Defence research institute
Relaties BRI (GB), BAe (GB), GATOM

3/ Sub-contractors Eurometaal for the M483 Shell

EUROMETAAL
ZAANDAM
132200.01A/DS2064/KWPL/DPDR

bijlage 7 Blad 1/3

ONDERLEVERANCIERS

Benaming : Projectile, 155mm: HE, M483A1, w/fuze, MTSQ, M577A1,
for howitzer.

Kontrakt nr. : 871.2770.0065.11

HO-nr. : 132200

Map nr. : 1434

Uitgave : 03

AUTORISATIE KW-planning : *DF* A.G. de Greeuw datum : 20-12-91

- Bij onderstaande artikelen is in de bestelopdracht een kwaliteits-systeem-eis opgenomen en/of worden op certificaat geleverd.

Benaming	Leverancier	Adres
-Trumpet Cone	JUDD (ENGINEERING) LTD	Oban road, Coventry West Midlands VC6 6H ENGLAND
	FMP INC	One risdon street Naugatuck, CT 06770 U.S.A
-Fuze GP: M223	VALENTEC DAYRON LTD	Pennyfan Industrial Estate Crumlin-Gwent NP1 4EF ENGLAND
	VALENTEC DAYRON INC	P.O.Box 140394 Orlando, FL 32814-0394 U.S.A
	EMCO	P.O.Box 2193 East Gadsden Alabama 35903 U.S.A
-Comp. A5 Class 1	R.O. BRIDGWATER	Somerset TA7 8AD ENGLAND
-Lead cup assy	R.O. Chorley	Euxton Lane PR7 6AD ENGLAND
-Grenade GP: M42 PH	EMCO	P.O.Box 2193 East Gadsden Alabama 35903 U.S.A
-Grenade GP: M46 CA	VALENTEC KISCO	6300 St. Louis Avenue St. Louis, MO 63121 U.S.A
-Adapter		
-Base, saeedstuk	ALCOA	5151 Alcoa Avenue P.O.Box 58407 VERNON U.S.A
-Ogief, saeedstuk	"	"
-Dye Penetrant onderzoek Ogief en Base	FDO	Dostenburgervoorstraat 70 1018 NR Aesterdaa NEDERLAND
-Binder Resin RFC1028	ROBERTS ASS	Culver city CA 902 P.O.Box 868 8500 STEL U.S.A
-Expulsion charge	DAY & ZIMMERMAN INC	Market street 1818 Philadelphia, PA. 19103 U.S.A

EUROMETAAL
ZAANDAM
132200.01A/DS2064/KWPL/DPDR

bijlage 7 Blad 2/3

ONDERLEVERANCIERS *De/* 10-1-91

Benaming : Projectile, 155mm: HE, M483A1, w/fuze, MTSQ, M577A1,
for howitzer.

Benaming	Leverancier	Adres
-Spline (10)	SAYSTON CORPORATION	P.O.Box 430 Springboro, OHIO 45066-043 U.S.A
-Spline (1)	"	"
-Plate, forward	"	"
-Cup, expulsion charge	"	"
-Tape-stiffener assy	"	"
-Washer MS27183-4	STAMPING COMPANY	403 Wyandanch Avenue North Babylon U.S.A
-Packable slider lock	E.C. GREEN MIRAGE IND	625-3RD ST NEWARK N J 07107 U.S.A
-Obturator	TOPCRAFT INDUSTRIES INC	1099 Mearns Road Warminster, PA 18974 U.S.A
-Spacer (67)	CONSIN COMPONENTS CORP.	P.O.Box 1103 369 Pennsylvania Avenue Sheboygan, Wisconsin 5308 U.S.A
-Spacer (6)	"	"
-Sleeve (22)	"	"
-Sleeve (2)	"	"
-Pad, forward plate	"	"
-Fiberglass type 1 class 1	OWENS-CORNING S.A.	Chaussee de la Hulpe 178, Boite 7, B-1170, Brussel BELGIE
-Staal AISI dia. 140mm	E. ULDRY S.A	1800 VEVEY 1 SUISSE
	THYSSEN EDELSTAAL BV	Postbus 99 4130 EB Vianen NEDERLAND
	MAKINA VE KIMYA ENDUSTRISI KUMURU	06330 Tandogan, Ankara TURKEY
-O-ring MS29513-248	MEGA TRADE	Postbus 3000 1300 EA Almere NEDERLAND
-O-ring MS29513-251	"	"
-O-ring MS9021-245	"	"
-Base, geanodiseerd type III, class 2	SURFACE TREATMENT BV	Postbus 7168 6050 AD Maasbracht NEDERLAND
-Ogief, geanodiseerd type II, class 1	"	"
-Paper VCI type 1	BIJL	Marchandweg 34 3771 MP Barneveld NEDERLAND

EUROMETAAL
ZAANDAM

biilage 7 Blad 3/3

132200.01A/DS2064/KWPL/OPDR

ONDERLEVERANCIERS *Dly* 20-11-91

Benaming : Projectile, 155mm: HE, M483A1, w/fuze, MTSQ, M577A1,
for howitzer.

Benaming	Leverancier	Adres
-Electrode wire copper dia. 3/32"	HILARIUS BV	Postbus 550 2003 RN Haarlem NEDERLAND
-Aux wire brass dia. 3/32"	"	"
-Lasdraad CuZn10 dia. 3mm	"	"
-Afstandschijven	BERGMAN BV	Postbus 752 Rotterdam NEDERLAND
-Granaatuitnemer	VALKENBURG BV	Postbus 7 3925 BR Scherpenzeel NEDERLAND
-Verf olijfgroen kleurnr. 34087	SIGMA COATINGS	Woudenbergseweg 19A 3707 HW Zeist NEDERLAND
-Merkverf geel kleurnr. 33538	"	"
-Merkverf zwart kleurnr. 37038	"	"
-Sealant grade HVV 571	LOCTITE NEDERLAND BV	Essendonk 5 4824 DA Breda NEDERLAND
-Staalband 3/4x0,025"	SIGNODE BV	Postbus 26 2130 AA Hoofddorp NEDERLAND
-Sluitzegel 34AMP 19x28mm	"	"
-Munitiecontainer st nr 400	MARKHORST SPECIAL PRODUCTS BV	Lage inkweg 4 7772 BA Hardenberg NEDERLAND

4/ Sources

The following periodicals were systematically consulted:

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- Arms Transfer News (1993)
- BASIC Reports (1990 - 1993)
- International Defence Review (82 - 93)
- Jane's Defence Weekly (1985 - 1993)
- Jane's Fighting Ships (1992 - 1993)
- Jane's Intelligence Review (1991 - 1993)
- Jane's Military Communications (92 - 93)
- Middle East Report (1981 - 1989)
- Nato's Sixteen Nations (1985 - 1993)
- Turkish Defence and Aerospace Update (1992 - 1993)

Articles from the following newspapers and magazines were also used:

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In Turkish prison cells detainees are tortured. Political activists, as well as lawyers and doctors *disappear* and are later found dead. In 1992, 385 people were killed by government counter-guerrilla forces.

Western countries have often condemned Turkey for its violations of human rights. At the same time, however, they praise Turkey for its firm stand in the war against Iraq, look on this ally as a model for the independent Islamic countries in the former Soviet Union and supply this NATO brother with large numbers of arms. No one seems to be asking what Turkey is doing with these weapons.

The Turkey Connection deals with the way this country treats its citizens, with its development into a regional power and takes a close look at Western involvement in this process.

This book was written by staff of the Anti-Militarist Research Collective (AMOK), which has made an extensive investigation of the military ties between Turkey and the West.

Pax Christi is an international Catholic peace movement, with national sections in four continents. Its activities are related to the issues of security and disarmament; human rights; East-West contacts; North-South relations; peace education; peace spirituality; nonviolence; faith, dialogue and reconciliation; integrity of creation. Pax Christi International has consultative status at the United Nations, Unesco and the Council of Europe. It is the recipient of the 1983 Unesco Peace Education Prize and of the 1987 U.N. Peace Messenger Award.

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